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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRYAN J. WHATLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRUCE E. CHAPMAN. CERI CHAPMAN, 
JAMES L. CHRISTENSEN, and DOES I - V, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT & Jury Demand 
Civil No. 020405636 
Judge: [#5] 
COMES NOW Plaintiff by and through his attorney of record and for his cause of relief 
alleges and states as follows: 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Plaintiff is an individual who resides in Provo, Utah. 
2. Lots 241 and 242 in the Sherwood Hills subdivision in Provo, Utah are owned by 
plaintiff and are the subject matter of an attempted foreclosure action by defendants which is a 
part of the subject matter of this action. 
3. Defendants Bruce E. and Cheri Chapman ("Chapman*5 or "Chapmans") are. on 
information and belief, husband and wife, residing at 1421 S Carterville Rd? Orem UT 84098. 
4. Defendant Christensen is an individual who, on information and belief, resides in the 
state of Utah, but whose precise residence address is unknown. Defendants Christensen and the 
Chapmans are referred to collectively as "named defendants." 
5. Defendants Doe are individuals whose specific identities are presently unknown, but 
who reside in Utah County who have assisted Chapmans in perpetrating the activities 
complained of herein. 
6. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-3-4(1). 
7. All of the matters alleged in this complaint, with the possible exception of the 
participation of defendant Christensen, occurred in Utah County. Defendant Christensen's 
actions took place partially in Salt Lake County and partially in Utah County. 
8. The real estate involved in this matter is located in Utah County. 
9. Venue is proper in this Court under Utah Code Ann. §78-13-1 because this matter 
involves an injury to real property. Venue is proper under Utah Code Ann.§78-13-7 because both 
of the principal Defendants reside in this county and it is possible that all defendants reside there, 
and because the cause of action arose in Utah County, State of Utah. 
INTRODUCTION 
10. On or about December 9, 1992, Mr. Whatley purchased Lots 241 and 242 on Plat F of 
the Sherwood~Hiffs Subdivision. Those lots are adjacent to one another and share a common 
boundary along the west edge of Lot 241 and the east edge of Lot 242. 
11. On or about April 5, 2001, Mr. Whatley and Chapmans entered into an agreement 
entitled "Stock and Asset Purchase and Sale." That document was drafted by defendant 
Christensen. The stated purpose of that agreement was to transfer ownership and control of a 
photographic business, including developing, printing, enlarging, and other photography 
processing related activities, to Mr. Whatley, who also owned another, similar, photographic 
business and for Chapmans to quit their involvement with photography processing, except on a 
hobby basis in their own home. 
12. Mr. Chapman was, at all times relevant hereto, and remains, the prime mover in the 
operation of that business, but Mrs. Chapman is an officer and a vested owner and has some 
function within the business and was a signatory of the contract, including representations and 
warranties. 
13. Mr. Chapman's business processes are, at best, eccentric. Among other things, in 
negotiating to attempt to sell the business to Mr. Whatley, Mr. Chapman made many oral 
representations to Mr. Whatley about the value, viability and vitality of his business. The 
essence of those representations was that the business that Mr. Chapman was attempting to sell 
was a 'gold mine,' generating huge positive cash flows and running extraordinarily smoothly. 
He represented that the equipment in the business was worth "well over" $400,000, net, and that 
annual gross sales were double that figure. However, Mi*. Chapman absolutely refused to allow 
Mr. Whatley access to any of the books and records of account so that Mi*. Whatley could 
investig"ateThose claims. The two most significant of the many material representations which 
Mr. Whatley ultimately relied upon were that the business (1) had, for at least the last year, 
maintained a minimum positive cash flow of $10,000 each and ever}7 month, i.e., the business 
had never had less than a $10,000 positive cash flow each month for the last twelve, although it 
had several months that were in excess of $10,000, and (2) was possessed of all the resources, 
assets, and processes needed to continue to operate at that level of income without any 
significant problems or modifications. Because of Mr. Chapman's refusal to allow Mr. Whatley 
to perform an ordinary business evaluation, those representations and others were incorporated 
into the written document signed by Mr. Whatley and the Chapmans. In some cases the 
representations of the Chapmans were made conditions precedent to the validity of the contract. 
A copy of the agreement is appended hereto. 
14. To secure Mr. Whatley's performance of the payment obligation of the April 5 
agreement, the named defendants insisted upon receiving a "deed of trust," covering each of the 
two lots of real property described above. The ostensible trust deeds were drafted and provided 
by named defendants and both had Mr. Chapman as both trustee and beneficiary. Realizing that 
the trust deeds were invalid as trust documents, having an incompetent beneficiary, Mr. Whatley 
agreed. Mr. Whatley was willing to allow a security interest in the land, but because Mr. 
Chapman was incompetent to be a trustee, the land could not be sold without judicial 
intervention. Therefore, Mr. Whatley was willing to sign the ostensible trust deeds and did so. 
Copies of those deeds are appended hereto. 
15. Mr. Whatley went forward in good faith to attempt to perform his obligation under 
the~cohtract. He performed each material obligation imposed upon him by the agreement from 
its inception through most of April of 2002. 
16. From April of 2001 through April 2002, Mr. Whatley frequently requested that 
Chapmans honor the agreement they made by complying with its terms. Those requests were 
sometimes general and sometimes specific. In no case did Mr. Whatley's remonstrance result in 
compliance by Chapmans. 
17. At the first of April 2002, Mr. Whatley finally received some limited financial 
records related to the year prior to his ostensible purchase of the business. Upon reviewing those 
records he learned that Chapman's representations were false. He immediately sought to discuss 
the matter with Mr. Chapman. Mr. Chapman ignored the problem. The contract requires a 
minimum cash flow, not an average. 
18. Faced with Chapmans' ongoing refusal to comply with the contract requirements, and 
the documents showing that the purchase had been procured by the named defendants on the 
basis of knowingly false information, Mr. Whatley sought to rescind the agreement. Mr. 
Chapman refused to discuss the matter. Ultimately, Mr. Whatley gave Mr. Chapman notice that 
he would not continue to operate the business when what he got was not what he agreed to buy 
and where no effort at performance by Chapmans was received. At that point Mr. Whatley left 
and Chapmans re-entered the business totally. 
Count T - Void Contract/Rescission 
19. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations of the other counts and sections of the complaint 
.a&if each were fully set forth in this count. 
20. The minimum monthly cash flow represented in the recitals, and made a condition 
precedent to the validity of the agreement by paragraph 6 thereof, did not exist. Although the 
financial records required by the "agreement" have not been fully provided as of the date of this 
complaint, the financial records that are available show that less than six months before the 
putative sale the cash flows were down to approximately a fifth of the representation minimum. 
The previous October's cash flow was $4,509 and the following month, November, was only 
$2,009, the following month, December, was only $8,603. Furthermore, the average information 
provided by Squire & Co. was false and misleading. That information included approximately 
$30,000 as positive cash flows for the previous time periods that were actually business 
EXPENSES paid out, not benefits to sellers. When the correct figures are used, the data for the 
nine months that we have obtained show that the average monthly cash flow is only $8,863. In 
summary, four of the nine months for which we have data are below the contractually specified 
monthly minimum. It was only by the deception of including tens of thousands of dollars in 
business expenses that even the average was made to appear to equal $10,000 or more per 
month. Since Mr. Whatley was denied access to the business records, he was unable to discover 
that deception until long after the purported sale. On information and belief, those 
misrepresentations were knowing misrepresentations of material fact, made for the express 
purpose of obtaining Mr, Whatley's reliance. Mr. Whatley did so rely. That reliance lasted fdi 
as long as it was reasonable to do so, but terminated in April 2002 when he received financial 
records showing the representations were false. 
2"h Despite having had over a year to do so, the ostensible sellers have not yet provided 
the 12 month financial records for the 12 months immediately preceding the putative sale as 
required by paragraph 6 of the agreement. 
22. Mr. Chapman himself has also urged that the contract was not effective. In spite of 
the fact that the contract provides for the sale price to include a "mutually agreed" value for 
inventory, and the fact that on the ostensible closing date, the parties did mutually agree to an 
inventory value, Mr. Chapman has sought on multiple occasions to renegotiate the sale price by 
retroactively and unilaterally raising the inventory amount and adding additional payments for 
business assets that were ostensibly already transferred and removing assets that were included 
in the sale. 
23. The material representation of seller contained in footnote 1 of the agreement, that the 
seller was selling Uwall assets of the business that were necessary to achieving the sales and cash 
flow represented by sellers to buyer" is false and was false at the time it was made. On 
information and belief, plaintiff alleges that Chapmans knew it to be false or only avoided such 
knowledge by a reckless disregard for the truth. 
24. Another reason the contract is void is because the fundamental basis for the 
agreement was Mr. Chapman's false assertion that the business had a minimum monthly positive 
cash flow of $10,000, and one of the reasons that such a cash flow did not exist and cannot be 
maintained is because of the worthless, non-functional equipment. The Agfa 6550 C-41 film 
processor, the Fuji 720 Enlarger, the Agfa MSC 2.0 printer, the Agfa MSC 101 printer, and the 
Hope 42 inch paper processor were all part of the business and all were non-functional without 
Herculean efforts to maintain them. Such equipment is completely inconsistent with a 
photographic business running at a level necessary to generate a minimum of $10,000 per monrh 
in positive cash flow. 
25. In addition, at the time of the purported sale, Mr. Chapman removed from the 
business certain equipment that was vital to its operation. While a portion of the equipment 
removed had been subject to a pre-agreement disclosure of intention to remove, by keeping all of 
the operating and financial records of the business hidden, the named defendants prevented Mr. 
Whatley from knowing how vital the equipment to be removed actually was. 
26. There has been no meeting of the minds on the contract price. A condition precedent 
of the sale as stated in paragraph 2(a) and 3(d) is that a mutually agreeable value for inventory 
and stock be arrived at. As of the date of this complaint that had not occurred. 
27. Sellers have not transferred any of the stock of the corporation to Mr. Whatley as 
required by paragraph 2(a). 
28. The representation of sellers regarding no outstanding liabilities other than those 
disclosed prior to the date of sale has been determined to be false. That representation is in 
paragraph 3(e) of the contract. The bank accounts required to be transferred under 3(f) have not, 
in fact, been transferred. That failure has severely hampered Mr. Whatley5s ability to operate the 
business because there was no continuous banking history for the business as a result of that 
failure. 
29. Neither of the two enumerated conditions with respect to paragraph 4, Realty, in the 
contract have been complied with. No written acceptance and continuation of the lease in favor 
of World-Wide Photo from Southland has been obtained. No agreement has been obtamechfrom 
the owner of the Pleasant Grove store. Mr. Whatley has also learned that the owner of the 
Pleasant Grove store may have been actually mislead by Chapmans regarding what was 
supposedly transpiring. 
30. Chapmans have deliberately breached the provisions of paragraph 5 of the agreement. 
That breach includes, but is not limited to, direct and deliberate violations of the non-competition 
clause of the putative sale document. Those violations were conducted using resources, 
including intellectual property, of Mr. Whatley. In addition, the sellers' son has been receiving 
assistance from sellers in operating a photographic business which is not only in direct 
competition with World-Wide Photo, it has actually hijacked Mr. Whatley's ftp site to assist their 
customers to take their business away from Mr. Whatley. 
31. The material representation of sellers regarding the functionality of the business has 
been found to be false. Those representations are false in both the fact that not all necessary 
equipment was sold and the fact that the equipment that was sold was not functional. 
32. Paragraph 6 of the agreement also requires that the business as disclosed in the 
records be reasonably capable of supporting the payments hereunder. That is definitely not the 
case. 
33. Chapmans did not disclose all the claims or potential claims against Worldwide 
Photo. Two examples of that non-disclosure include the contract that Mr. Chapman had entered 
with Trans Western Publishing for approximately $1,000, and outstanding health insurance 
liability which, Mr. Whatley learned after closing, was continuously behind by at-leas-tthree 
months. That arrearage was only partially cured on April 11th (a three month payment). The 
health insurance problem also cost Mr. Whatley approximately $1,000. A potential liability 
exists in that Chapmans were violating insurance regulations regarding group health insurance by 
the discriminatory way in which Chapmans had administered this fiasco. Another claim that was 
not only not disclosed, but actively concealed, was the "sellers"5 appointment of Sam Rodriquez 
as manager of the Pleasant Grove store, with a share of gross sales from that store. Mr. 
Rodriquez was not even listed as an employee in any company records presented to Mr. 
Whatley, nor was his existence disclosed to Mr. Whatley. The extent of this potential liability 
cannot be completely determined at this time. 
34. Seller's representations in paragraph 9(n) of the agreement are also false. Seller had 
not maintained any corporate formalities whatsoever. 
35. Paragraph 3(f) of the contract requires that bank accounts would be transferred as part 
of the sale and that Chapmans would not have any more access to the same. That was a material 
representation because having a banking history is a significant factor in obtaining business 
financing. The sellers did not transfer those accounts and Mr. Chapman, at least, has continued 
to control those accounts. 
36. Paragraph 9(d) of the document states that sellers are required to resign from any 
official status with World-Wide Photo. That provision also requires that as of the date of 
execution of the agreement that the sellers had already removed all of their personal property 
from the premises. Notwithstanding those two representations, Mr. Chapman has surreptitiously 
used World-Wide Photo's confidential data and computer systems and he has also continuously 
removed property from the business premises subsequent to the effective date of the supposed 
sale. 
37. The contract states, "Therefore, the sale contemplated hereunder is made expressly 
contingent upon (1) obtaining from the Southland Corporation, a written acceptance and 
continuation of the lease in favor of WWP in form and content satisfactory to BUYER and 
...." That did not happen. While Mr. Whatley was able to continue to use the premises, no new 
leases in the name of World Wide Photo, as expressly required by the contract, were ever 
provided by named defendants. 
38. In short, the business was not as represented, the sellers have not done any of the 
material items that are necessary to the sale being concluded and effected, and Mr. Chapman has 
continued to treat the business as his own. 
39. Mr. Whatley has worked diligently and zealously attempting to make the 
proposed sale work. However, Mr. Chapman has addressed none of the problems listed above in 
any meaningful way in spite of all of those items having been brought to Mr. Chapman's 
attention previously. Mr. Chapman's sole response has been to argue: either that the written 
requirements of the contract were not binding, or that they were not significant. The failure of 
the ostensible sellers to even make a good faith effort to perform has damaged Mr. Whatley 
considerably. He has expended a year of his time, at only a token salary, working to try and 
overcome the obstacles that have been erected by the Chapmans. The value of that lost time is 
on the order of $58,462, or more. In addition, because he has been expending 70 to 80 hours a 
week trying to overcome the problems concealed or created by the Chapmans, he has been 
unable to develop his own business as he otherwise would have done. We estimate that the loss 
of income both presently and in the future as a result of that is in the mid- to high-six figure 
range. Mr. Whatley has personally advanced funds to World-Wide Photo in the amount of 
$27,943, not including property that Mr. Whatley has purchased for himself that World-Wide 
Photo has been allowed to use. 
40. Mr. Whatley was damaged as a result of defendants' actions in an amount to be 
proven at trial, but estimated as specified in the prayer below. 
Coum TT - Breach of Contract 
41. Piainxiff incorporates the allegations of the other counts and sections of the complaint 
as if each were fully set forth in this count. 
42. Several of Chapmans5 breaches are such that they cannot be cured. For example, the 
failure to transfer bank accounts cannot be cured in arrears. The predominant reason that the 
accounts were insisted upon was to provide a business banking history for financing purposes. 
Mr. Chapman refused to perform for almost a year, in the face of repeated requests that he do so. 
Since the contract has now been found to be void or voidable, no cure is possible. 
43. §3,1} b, of the agreement expressly states that Chapmans5 access to the business and 
its records were limited to records "as of the date of closing." Mr. Chapman was still talcing 
confidential data as of April 2002. 
44. Mr. & Mrs. Chapman were obligated by the contractual documents resign as 
corporate officers at a date shortly after that agreement's effective date. In spite of that, they 
continued to meddle in corporate affairs and even issued and signed stock certificates in their 
capacity as officers as late as mid-2002. 
45. Chapmans were given notice of their defaults, both orally and in writing. By letter 
dated May 2, 2002, Chapmans responded that no cure was necessary. No cure of any of the 
defaults was ever tendered by named defendants. 
46. Mr. Whatley was damaged as a result of defendants5 actions in an amount to be 
proven at trial, but estimated as specified in the prayer below. 
Quint ITT - Fraut? 
47. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations of the other counts and sections of the complaint 
as if each were fully set forth in this count. 
Contractual Fraud 
48. The non-compete clause of the subject agreement was probably the most thoroughly 
negotiated portion of the entire agreement. Mr. Chapman insisted that he needed to be able to 
maintain a hobby business without violating that agreement. Eventually he asked that be 
expanded to allow him to do limited commercial work in geographically remote areas that Mr. 
Whatley did not desire to pursue. In spite of that, Mr. Chapman and his son (with Chapman's 
assistance) promptly began actively soliciting business in Utah County, claiming ownership of 
World-Wide Photo's assets (including, without limitation, equipment that was previously 
existing in the business and that acquired after the purported sale), etc., and assets owned 
personally by Mr. Whatley. 
49. The above actions began occurring within a very short time of signing the 
agreements. Plaintiff therefore alleges, on information and belief, that Mr. Chapman had no 
intention of honoring those promises at the time they were made. Those contractual 
representations, warranties, and promises were conveyed and drafted by Mr. Christensen, 
assisting Mr. Chapman's fraud. 
50. The named defendants absolutely refused to allow Mr. Whatley access to the books 
and records of the company before the contract was signed. It was to get around that bizarre 
restriction that the minimum monthly cash flow statement was drafted. That statement expressly 
and unequivocally requires that for the 12 calendar months immediately proceeding the sale, i.e., 
March 2001 backwards through April 2000, each month had to have AT LEAST $10,000 in 
positive cash flow. Having more than $10,000 in each month was permissible, and Chapmans 
represented that such a surplus was the norm, but the representation deals strictly with the 
minimum of $10,000. In providing documents related to that requirement, named defendants 
were careful to provide only summaries, and only those dealing with an average for a non-
relevant time period. After the purported sale, the named defendants kept control of all of the 
financial records, stating that they were in the hands of Squire & Co., accountants. Chapmans 
maintained control of Squire & Co. and instructed Squire & Co. continue to maintain the books 
and records, even though Mr. Whatley supposedly owned the corporation and the corporate 
records. Mr. Whatley was not given access to the books and records that allowed him to 
discover Mr. Chapman's misrepresentation until approximately 30 days, or fewer, before he left 
Mr. Chapman's company. He delayed that long only-because he was attempting to find a way to 
make it work anyway and to mitigate damages. 
51. Although there was an amendment of the agreement that relates to book value of the 
equipment, that amendment was procured by fraud by defendants. It was justified as relating to 
Chapman's tax issues. After the sale, when it was discovered that the equipment was incomplete 
and non-functional, the named defendants began asserting that the amendment constituted a 
waiver of all issues related to equipment. Since Mr. Chapman, at least, had operated the business 
on a daily basis, and it was later learned, spent a large amount of his time personally battling to 
maintain some operability of the equipment, it is impossible that he did not know the condition 
of the equipment. 
52. Named defendants not only misrepresented the value of the equipment, they also 
represented that it was functional, appropriate, economical, and capable of servicing the business 
on an ongoing basis. All of those representations regarding functionality were not eliminated by 
the amendment and they are all false. 
53. In one case, Mr. Chapman tried to force Mr. Whatley to pay for the equipment 
already ostensibly sold, a second time. When Mr. Whatley refused, Mr. Chapman removed the 
equipment. 
54. The representations and warranties say uall" matters were disclosed. They weren't. 
At the very least, the Trans Western Publishing bill, the impending cancellation of health 
insurance (related to non-payment and possible fraud by Chapmans), and the fact that Mr. 
Rodriquez had a claim to a 15% ownership interest of part of the company ostensibly being sold 
in its totality, were all undisclosed by Chapmans prior to the purported sale. The contract does 
not say, 'Mr. Chapman has disclosed whatever he thinks is important and Mr. Whatley is just 
going to have to absorb all the nasty little surprises that come from things that Mr. Chapman 
does not think are important.' Mr. Whatley ended up paying the bills that Mr. Chapman 
incurred. Mr. Chapman has not cured, or even offered to cure, the problem by repaying Mr. 
Whatley. 
55. The company records show no payments for health insurance from at least 1/1/01 to 
4/11/01. The representations were made, and were false, as of April 5, 2001. 
Stock Fraud 
56. The statement that Mr. Whatley was contracting to purchase the "outstanding shares55 
of the corporation appears multiple times in the document which Mr. Christensen drafted and 
which the Chapmans signed. It is entitled "stock and asset purchase and sale." Mr. Whatley 
requested the stock records and corporate records and was initially told they would be produced. 
Ultimately Mr. Chapman admitted there were none. On information and belief the named 
defendants either knew or should have known that the contractual representation regarding stock 
and corporate records were false when made. 
57. Although he asked for them on several occasions, no corporate minutes or stock 
certificates generated by Defendants were ever produced, identified, or otherwise shown to exist. 
Therefore, the corporation which was "sold" by the named defendants is a sham and an alter ego 
of Mr. Chapman. 
58. Mr. Chapman admitted tcrMrrWhatley that Mr. Rodriquez~was entitled to 15% of the 
gross sales of the Pleasant Grove store. Mr. Rodriquez had a key to the store. By purporting to 
sell an ownership interest that Chapmans had previously conveyed, the named defendants have 
committed securities fraud. 
59. The facts as plead herein show that named defendants have employed one or more 
devices, schemes, or artifices to defraud, have made untrue statements of material fact or have 
omitted to state one or more material facts necessary to make the statements made not 
misleading under the circumstances, and/or have engaged in one or more acts, practices, or 
courses of business which have operated as a fraud or deceit upon plaintiff. Named defendants 
have therefore violated the Utah Uniform Securities Act (UCA § 61-1-1, etseq.). 
60. Mr. Whatley was damaged as a result of defendants5 actions in an amount to be 
proven at trial, but estimated as specified in the prayer below. 
Count IV - Breach of Fiduciary Duties 
61. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations of the other counts and sections of the complaint 
as if each were fully set forth in this count. 
62. In a letter dated May 2, 2002, the named defendants asserted that Mr. Chapman is a 
bailee of the business that he retook. Since that time, Mr. Chapman, through his agent Mr. 
Christensen, has admitted that Mr. Chapman is a "trustee" or "receiver'* of the business. Either 
trusteeship or receivership includes fiduciary duties to all interested parties. 
63. After donning the responsibilities of "trustee or receiver," Mr. Chapman proceeded to 
(1) collect corporate receivables for the time Mr. Whatley was involved in the business, but 
refused to pay employees for the work that generated those receivables; (2) used photographic 
supplies purchased while Mr. Whatley was associated with the business to generate new cash 
and receivables, but refused to pay suppliers for those materials; (3) used office supplies, 
furniture and equipment purchased during Mr. Whatley 's association with the business, but 
refused to pay for those items or return them to the vendors; (4) and other similar activities. 
64. After Mr. Chapman took on his role as "trustee," he immediately began directly 
embezzling business receipts from World-Wide Photo to Global Imaging, Chapmans' competing 
photographic business. Among other means, Chapmans caused work done by World Wide 
Photo employees, using World Wide Photo resources, to be paid and collected into the accounts 
of Global Imaging. On information and belief, Global Imaging is an entity owned or controlled 
by Chapmans or Chapmans' son and with which Chapmans have some significant affiliation and 
participation. 
65. In addition, plaintiff has learned that the named defendants have not timely renewed 
the corporate registration with the state of Utah. As a result, that registration is at least 
delinquent. On information and belief, plaintiff alleges that defendants have allowed the 
corporation to expire. 
66. It further appears in the records of the state of Utah that after becoming a "trustee" of 
the business that the Chapman defendants have stolen corporate opportunities by setting up other 
entities and dba's, headquartered in their home, named "World-Wide Imaging" to do the same 
work, i.e., "photo-finishing laboratories," as that done by the subject corporation. These other 
businesses are parasitic to World-Wide Photo, Inc. and are, on information and belief, being used 
to remove all value and viability from World-Wide Photo. On information and belief, Mr. 
- 1 8 -
Christensen assisted Mr. Chapman in this effort. 
67. In addition, defendants, during a hearing on a labor complaint on December 11, 2002 
against the subject corporation, stated that they would prefer to incur legal fees equal to or 
greater than the amount of the claim, and risk an award of punitive damages of $100,000 or more 
rather than settle the claim. They categorically refused to entertain any settlement proposals and 
stated that they intended to bankrupt the company if it was advantageous to Chapmans to do so. 
68. In light of the above, it is clear that defendants are actively working to injure the 
business which, as trustee, Mr. Chapman is obligated to preserve and conserve for the benefit of 
Mr. Whatley and any other interested persons. 
69. Mr. Whatley was damaged as a result of defendants' actions in an amount to be 
proven at trial, but estimated as specified in the prayer below. 
Cftmit Y - CfWYersifHi/Theft 
70. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations of the other counts and sections of the complaint 
as if each were fully set forth in this count. 
71. Chapmans have retained possession of various items of property belonging to 
plaintiff. The property over which Chapmans have continued to exercise dominion and control, 
in spite of notice or knowledge that it is owned by plaintiff, includes, but is not limited to 
accounting software (Quickbooks) and, at least, an Epson flat bet scanner, and a broadband cable 
router. 
72. Chapmans have also, through false statements, deprived Mr. Whatley of property. 
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Chapmans have represented to creditors, including without limitation, Fuji Photo Film USA 
Office Max, Fuji-Hunt Photochemical, Mackay Envelope Company, Quicksilver Photo/Graphic 
Supply, etc., that property purchased by Chapman's company was the sole responsibility of Mr. 
Whatley. Those false statements have been made in spite of the fact that Chapmans have the 
personalty that was purchased, such as photo paper, desks, chairs, etc. and have refused to return 
those goods either to the vendor or to Mr. Whatley. Mr. Whatley has been deprived of thousands 
of dollars in cash and property as a result of the creditors' reliance upon Chapmans' false 
statements .-
73. Mr. Whatley was damaged as a result of defendants' actions in an amount to be 
proven at trial, but estimated as specified in the prayer below. 
Cf?nntVT-SlanagrftfTitk 
74. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations of the other counts and sections of the complaint 
as if each were fully set forth in this count. 
75. In spite of the fact that the named defendants have been notified that the express 
conditions precedent to performance or validity of the ostensible sale contract have not been 
performed or were violated by Chapmans, named defendants have proceeded to file documents 
in the County Recorder's office of Utah County that are preventing Mr. Whatley from selling his 
land. 
76. Mr.'JWhatley has received one or more bona fide offers to sell that property, but could— 
not do so because of the actions of the named defendants in interfering with Mr. Whatley's title 
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in ways that they were on actual notice were unfounded. 
77. Mr. Whatley was damaged as a result of defendants' actions in an amount to be 
proven at trial, but estimated as specified in the prayer below. 
Count VTT- Defamation 
78. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations of the other counts and sections of the complaint 
as if each were fully set forth in this count. 
79. Bruce Chapman has told Mr. Whatley 5s vendors that he has stolen property, stolen 
cash, stripped the business and otherwise behaved in a dishonest and dishonorable fashion. 
80. Mssrs. Chapman and Christensen have publicly accused Mr. Whatley of "piling 
hundreds of thousands of debt" upon the business and having thereby harmed the business. 
81. As a result of those false statements by Mr. Chapman, Mr. Whatley 5s business and his 
personal reputation, along with his credit have been severely injured. 
82. Mr. Whatley was damaged as a result of defendants' actions in an amount to be 
proven at trial, but estimated as specified in the prayer below. 
Count VTTT - Tortious Interference With Business 
83. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations of the other counts and sections of the complaint 
as if each were fully set forth in this count. 
84. Mr. Whatley's business has been interrupted by the wrongful actions of named 
defendants. 
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85. On information and belief, plaintiff alleges that those wrongful actions were improper 
as to means (fraud, misrepresentation, defamation, etc.) as is alleged herein, and as to motive 
(desire to deprive Mr. Whatley of property and money as to which Chapmans have no legitimate, 
or even colorable claim of right). 
86. Mr. Whatley was damaged as a result of defendants' actions in an amount to be 
proven at trial, but estimated as specified in the prayer below. 
Count IX - Violation of 18 U.S.C S 1030 
87. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations of the other counts and sections of the complaint 
as if each were fully set forth in this count. 
88. Plaintiffs ftp server is a computer within the meaning of 18 U. S.C. § 1030 which is 
used in interstate or foreign commerce or communication. 
89. On information and belief, Chapmans through their son, have intentionally accessed 
that computer without authorization or in a manner that exceeded authorized access, and thereby 
obtained information from that computer which involved an interstate or foreign communication. 
90. Mr. Whatley has suffered loss by reason of defendants" violation of this United States 
Code section. 
91. This action is commenced within 2 years of the date of the act complained of or the 
"date of the discovery of the damage. 
92. Mr. Whatley was damaged as a result of defendants' actions in an amount to be 
proven at trial, but estimated as specified in the prayer below. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for the following relief: 
1. Entry of a preliminary injunction preventing defendants from selling plaintiffs property prior 
to the resolution of this case; 
2. A judgment for monetary damages, in an amount to be proven at trial but estimated, as far as 
damages can now quantified, to be not less than the following for the injuries sustained as a 
result of the above actions of defendants 
Lost Profits Based upon Sale Representations VVvVP 
Lost Profits Campus Photo Due to WWP Problems 
Damages to personal and business reputation of Mr Whatley 
Sale/Move/Purchase Expenses 
Lost Wages (Bryan Whatley) 
Qwest Advertising for WWP 
Replace Signs 
Increased Cost of Paper Acquisition (Campus Photo) 
Leslie Duncan labor claim settlement 
Misc. Out of Pocket Expenses 
Total: 
3. Award of treble damages against defendants where appropriate; 
4. Entry of a judgment declaring the trust deed and related documents related to Mr. Whatley* s 
property to be void and revesting fee title exclusively in Mr. Whatley. 












6. Such other and further relief as the Court deems"]ust 
Jury Demand 
Plaintiff hereby demands that the facts in this case be found by a Jury. 
DATED this R day of December, 2002. 
Plaintiffs Address: 
166W.4600N. 
Provo, UT 84604 
• imothy Miguel Willardson 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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^TOCK AND ASSET PURCHASE AND SALE 
A. Identification of parties: 
This document constitutes the agreement, made and entered into at Orem, in the State of Utah, on or 
about Thursday, April 5tn, 2001, between Bruce E. Chapman acting on behalf of himself and his wife, 
Ceri Chapman, both of whom reside at, 1421 S Carterville Rd, Orem UT 84098, (hereinafter referred 
to collectively as "SELLERS") party of the first part, and Bryan Whatley, an individual residing at 
15265 Del Poniente Court, Poway, CA 92064, (hereinafter referred to as "BUYER") party of the 
second part: 
B. Recitals 
WHEREAS, SELLERS are desirous of having BUYER purchase all of the outstanding stock of 
World-Wide Photo, Incorporated ("WWP"), a Utah Corporation with registered offices at 1421 S. 
Carterville Rd, Orem UT 84098 and principal place of business at 547 W. Columbia Lane, Provo, UT 
84604; 
AND WHEREAS, WWP has determined that it is in its own best interest to limit sales of stock to no 
more than 35 individuals; 
AND WHEREAS, WWP has determined that it is in its own best interest to offer such stock under 
one or more of the registration exemptions under the Securities Act of 1933; 
AND WHEREAS, WWP has determined that it is in its own best interest to offer such stock under 
one or more of the registration exemptions under the Utah Securities Acts; 
AND WHEREAS, BUYER has been expressly informed that the stock which he is purchasing is 
being sold under one or more registration exemptions under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Utah 
Securities Act and therefore may not be resold except pursuant to subsequent registration made or 
exemption obtained; 
AND WHEREAS, BUYER is willing and able to provide payment in exchange for stock and assets; 
AND WHEREAS, SELLERS, being the owner of record of One Thousand (1,000) shares of WWP 
stock, which shares constitute One Hundred Percent (100%) of the outstanding shares of WWP (the 
"Shares"); 
AND WHEREAS SELLERS own the following listed equipment [ 1 ea. freezer, 1 ea. paper cutter 
20K, 1 ea. Speedmaster densitometer, 1 ea. cardboard slide mounter, 2 ea. Durst 78U printer, 1 ea. 
Oscar Fisher mixing tank] which is leased to WWP and which SELLERS are willing and able to sell 
and which BUYEPv requires as part of the acquired business; 
AND WHEREAS SELLERS have represented that gross sales of WWP for last year (2000) 
amounted to at least $800,000, and that level of sales generated sufficient positive cash flow to fund 
wages, salaries and other benefits to SELLERS which will be terminated on closing, of at least 
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$10.000 each and every month1; The parties acknowledge that SELLERS are not guarantying future 
sales or operating expenses at the level enjoyed under SELLERS' management, only that 
performance of WWP under SELLERS' management was as described by SELLERS. 
C. Terms 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises herein contained, the parties agree as 
follows: 
1. Stock and Warranties. 
SELLERS warrant that SELLERS are the sole and complete owners of the Shares, and that 
SELLERS own no other or further shares, and that SELLERS have all of the rights, privileges and 
authorities necessary to sell said Shares in WWP to BUYER. SELLERS further warrant that the 
Shares are not encumbered in any way, including as security for any purpose, that said Shares are free 
from any liens, encumbrances, interest, and judicial processes including but not limited to any marital 
or ownership interest in the Shares or its proceeds by any former spouses. SELLERS further warrant 
that surrendering the Shares will not violate any court order or requirement, and that the sale of the 
Shares v/iil completely extinguish SELLERS' ownership rights of any nature or kind in WWP. 
WWP, by and through its current President Bruce Chapman and Vice President Ceri Chapman 
warrants that the only issued and outstanding shares authorized by it are the 1,000 shares issued to 
SELLERS. WWP further warrants that it is a duly authorized Utah corporation in good standing. 
BUYER hereby represents that he is acquiring the Shares for his own account, for investment, and 
not with a view to or for resale in connection with any distribution thereof. BUYER acknowledges 
that the Shares are subject to the following restriction which will be noted as a legend in substantially 
the following form on the face of the certificates representing the Shares: 
THE SECURITIES REPRESENTED BY THIS CERTIFICATE HAVE NOT BEEN 
REGISTERED UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, AS AMENDED (THE "ACT") 
OR QUALIFIED UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS OF ANY STATE (THE "LAW"). 
SUCH SECURITIES HAVE BEEN ACQUIRED FOR INVESTMENT AND NEITHER 
SAID SHARES NOR ANY INTEREST THEREIN MAY BE SOLD OR OFFERED FOR 
SALE IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EFFECTIVE REGISTRATION STATEMENT FOR 
THE SHARES UNDER THE ACT AND QUALIFICATION UNDER THE LAW OR AN 
OPINION OF COUNSEL SATISFACTORY TO THE CORPORATION THAT SUCH 
REGISTRATION AND QUALIFICATION ARE NOT REQUIRED AS TO SAID SALE 
OR OFFER. 
BUYER further represems that he has such knowledge and experience in business and financial 
matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of investing in the WWP. BUYER 
understands the speculative nature of his investment in the WWP and represents that he has adequate 
1
 This is a material representation because SELLERS will not show WWP financiais to BUYER before closing, 
and SELLERS' representation to BUYER (that the positive casn flow of ai leas: 510,000 each month continues to the aate 
of ciosmg anc trial SELLERS are selling all assets of tne ousmess that were necessary to acnieving trie sales and cash 
flow represented by SELLERS to BUYER) was essentiaj toBTn7I?R ,s decision to Durchasp thp hn^np« *r,r? „^~r.. 
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net worth and means to provide for his current needs and to sustain a complete loss of his 
investment and that BUYER has no need of liquidity of his investment. 
BUYER understands that at present no public market exists, and that a public market may never 
exist, for the Shares and that WWP is under no obligation to provide a market for the Shares. 
SELLERS pledge and warrant to BUYER that the assets of WWP, and the assets of SELLERS that 
are being sold hereunder, are unencumbered, free of liens, and not pledged~as collateral to other 
parties. 
2. Purchase Pries and Payment 
a. Price and Payment Terms 
BUYER shall pay to SELLERS, at closing, the sum of $400,000, allocated $375,000 to stock, 
$25,000 to equipment, plus an additional sum for the mutually agreeable value of inventory in stock 
as of the date of closing, as discussed below. 
Payment shall be made-by delivery of a promissory note in the amount of the purchase price payable 
to Bruce and Ceri Chapman. 
SELLERS shall, upon receipt of payment, transfer to BUYER a total of 1,000 shares of stock, which 
number of shares is and shall remain through closing, all of the issued and outstanding shares of 
WWP. Payment shall be completed, for purposes of this section, by delivery of a promissory note in 
the principal amount of the purchase price, bearing interest at 10% per annum, payable in monthly 
installments of $5,000 with no prepayment penalty until paid in full. All payments in excess of or in 
addition to the minimum monthly payment may be, at BUYER'S election, treated as payments for 
succeeding months, or as payment of principal in advance. That election may be made at any time, or 
changed to prevent default. 
b. Collateral for BUYERS obligations 
BUYER shall, at closing, execute in favor of SELLERS, a security agreement and financing 
statements pledging all of the tangible assets owned by WWP as of closing to secure the payment of 
all indebtedness contemplated in this agreement. After-acquired property and accretions shall not be 
so encumbered. In addition, BUYER shall secure the payment of that indebtedness by a deed of trust, 
with SELLERS, or either of them at SELLERS election, as beneficiary, covering lots 242 and 243 of 
Sherwood Hills subdivision: plat F. Attached hereto are copies of the most recent Utah County real 
property tax notices for those two lots, showing valuation of each at over $42,000 and ownership in 
BUYER. BUYER represents and warrants the authenticity of those tax notices and that he is the 
record owner of the lots described therein, but makes no representation as to the accuracy of any 
information contained therein except for his identity and address. SELLERS may, at their option and 
their own expense, purchase title insurance to further secure their position. 
c. Sale of ctrilHteral 
BUYER and WWP may elect to sell any collateral securing obligations hereunder, but any such sale 
shall result in payment to SELLERS of the net proceeds of such sale as follows: 
Fo- sale of any assets of the business, 100% of the net sale proceeds (with deductions including, bu: 
not limited to, any taxes that are incurred as a result of such sale) shall be promptly paid to 
SELLERS; 
For sale of the realty, SELLERS shall be entitled to receive the entire net sale proceeds as defined 
above of either loi sold for a net amount of 250,000 or less, but if the lots or either of them are sold 
for a net sale proceeds of more than $50,000, SELLERS shall make no claim upon the net sale 
proceeds in excess of $50,000. If the lots are sold through foreclosure due to default of BUYER 
hereunder, SELLERS may keep the entire sale price, not to exceed the sum of the principal amount 
outstanding on the promissory note, plus reasonable and necessary legal fees that would otherwise be 
recoverable under the terms of this agreement. However, if such proceeds equal or exceed the amount 
of the arrearage, such a sale will be conclusively deemed to cure BUYER'S default and any sale 
proceeds in excess of the arrearage shall be counted as an advance payment hereunder. 
d. Sale of Business 
If BUYER elects to sell the entire business (WWP), BUYER shall be required to pay off the unpaid 
balance of the note referenced above at closing of that sale. 
3. Distributions or Changes. 
No distributions or changes of any material aspect of the corporation or its condition shall be made, 
from the date of execution of this agreement unless approved by BUYER and a fair adjustment of 
any effected contract terms is made. All assets and liabilities in the business as of the date of 
execution shall remain in WWP except the following: 
a. One Kodak 2711 digital printing lab; one Noritsu V70 C-41 film processor; and one B&W 
470 film processor, all of which are under lease, shall be transferred to SELLERS and 
SELLERS shall indemnify WWP and BUYER from all costs, loss, liability and/or expense 
related thereto which accrues on or after the date of execution of this agreement. Resolution 
of this matter to the mutual satisfaction of both BUYER and SELLERS is a condition 
precedent to closing. 
b. Accounts Receivable ("A/R") and Accounts Payable ("A/P") as of the date of closing of this 
agreement shall be transferred to SELLERS and SELLERS shall indemnify WWP and 
BUYER from all costs, loss, liability and/or expense related thereto. 
c. All A/R and A/P after the date of closing of this agreement shall remain in WWP and WWP 
shall indemnify SELLERS from all costs, loss, liability and/or expense related thereto which 
accrues on or after the date of closing of this agreement. 
d. BUYER and SELLERS shall negotiate a mutually acceptable value amount to compensate 
SELLERS or to allow SELLERS to recover a mutually agreeable value of inventory in stock 
as of the date of closing. Resolution of this matter to the mutual satisfaction of both BUYER 
and SELLERS is a condition precedent to closing. That mutual agreement shall be reduced to 
writing and signed by all parties and that document shall be constructed as part of this 
document. 
e. SELLERS have represented to BUYER that the business has no outstanding liabilities other 
tnan the three equipment leases to be transferred 10 SELLERS as stated above. Tnerefore. 
SELLERS shall indemnify and hold BUYF"R ^armless for any claim or liability against that 
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arises out of or relates to events prior to the date of closing of this agreement. BUYER shall 
indemnify and hold SELLERS harmless for any claim or liability that arises out of or relates 
to events prior to the date of closing of this agreement. 
f. SELLERS are to transfer ownership of the following assets out of WW? nrinr to closing of 
the sale and such transfer will not effect the purchase price: 
The balance of the following checking accounts shall be transferred to SELLERS, but 
SELLERS shall allow BUYER to put funds in to leave the accounts open and all signatory 
authority for these accounts shall be removed for SELLERS and their agents: 
First Security Bank checking account ? 3321016945 
First Security Bank savings account # 332-8436715 
Oppenheimer money market account # 200 2001319032 
Oppenheimer money market account ~ 200 2005689156 
Since SELLERS are bound under this agreement to indemnify BUYER for all costs, losses, 
and expenses that arise from events prior to closing, SELLERS may, at their option, leave 
sufficient funds in those accounts to cover such items in those categories as are known in 
advance such as accrued payroll and taxes. 
g. The parties acknowledge that World-Wide Photo Pension, which is not owned by WWP and 
which has not been funded for three years, will remain under the ownership and direction of 
SELLERS and that SELLERS will remain liable for all aspect of that pension fund. 
4, Realty 
SELLERS have disclosed to BUYER that the two pieces of real property which are essential to the 
operation of the business being sold and purchased have problems with the leases. The Provo location 
( 547 W. Columbia Lane) is leased to Bruce Chapman personally, and not to WWP, under a written 
lease from Southland Corporation that prevents assignments or subleases. The Pleasant Grove 
location is rented from month to month only and the owner of that property has recently died. 
Therefore, the sale contemplated hereunder is made expressly contingent upon (1) obiaining from the 
Southland Corporation, a written acceptance and continuation of the lease in favor of WWP in form 
and content satisfactory to BUYER and (2) obtaining an agreement with both the de facto and de jure 
owner(s) regarding the use of the Pleasant Grove location satisfactory in form and content to 
BUYER. 
5. Confidentiality. Non-Circumvention, Non-Competition 
Each-party hereto hereby promises the other party that it will not itself, nor will it allow nor assist a 
third party, to circumvent the other party on any opportunity which may reasonably fall within the 
scope of this agreement. In furtherance of this mutual promise, the parties acknowledge that BUYER 
and the BUYER employees to whom information has been disclosed have previously signed 
confidentiality agreements as to information disclosed in connection with the sale contemplated by 
this agreement That obligation of BUYER, shall be voided upon closing of the saie contemplated 
hereby. Those obligations of BUYER'S employees shall be, upon closing, transferred to BUYER. 
6 
SELLERS agree that by execution of this agreement they are agreeing to be bound to the same 
obligation of confidentiality that BUYER incurred prior to closing and that obligation of SELLERS 
shall survive the termination of this agreement for a period not less than five (5) years, during which 
time SELLERS will not themselves, nor will they assist or allow a third party to, use said confideniial 
information for purposes of trade or business competition. 
SELLERS agree that, except as provided for, for a period of three (3) years from the closing date 
hereof SELLERS will not in the geographical area hereinafter mentioned, directly or indirectly, in 
any individual or representative capacity whatsoever, engage in the business of, or, as owner, 
employee, stockholder, partner, sole proprietor, joint venturer, or otherwise manage, operate, control, 
assist, panicipate, be connected with or render any consultation or business advice, with regard to any 
business engaged in photographic processing or finishing. Bruce Chapman, with the prior written 
approval of BUYER, may work, as an employee only, for a noncompetitive photo lab in the 
geographical area hereinafter mentioned. BUYER acknowledges that SELLERS may, without 
violating this agreement, do photographic printing and enlarging, only, for any immediate family 
members, including Bruce Chapman's mother, and as payment in kind for the following named 
professionals only; Jim Christensen, Gary Mathews, Rdean Clark, Phillip Plothow and Roland 
Ivlonson. SELLERS may also, without violating this agreement, sell photographic prints and 
enlargements by mail order, as long as such sales are not in competition with WWP and BUYER, i.e., 
the sales are limited to customers of SELLERS who both (i) have not, prior to the date of this 
agreement, been a customer of either WWP or Campus Photo and (ii) which have no presence in all 
of the following two counties in the state of Uiah: Utah County and Salt Lake Counry. SELLERS 
may also, without violating this agreement, print Ilfochrorne prints from one individual wildlife and 
nature photographer, named B.R. [NAME], The exclusions above for immediate family, out of area 
mail order, and in-kind payment, do not allow SELLERS to develop and process photographic film. 
However, BUYER shall, for the three (3) year period commencing on the date of closing, develop 
and process photographic film, from that excluded group only (immediate family, out of area mail 
order, and in-kind payment), for the SELLRS for the cost of materials plus 10%. In doing any 
business not proscribed by this portion of the agreement, SELLERS may not use the name of WWP 
and shall disclose to anyone who might be aware of SELLERS' former affiliation with WWP that 
SELLERS are no longer so affiliated. This requirement of disclosure specifically includes, bur is not 
-limited to, dealing with past, present, or future customers or suppliers of WWP. 
The geographical area to which the preceding covenant refers is all of Utah County and all of Salt 
Lake County in the siate of Utah. 
SELLERS declare that the foregoing territorial and time limits are reasonable, and are properly 
required for the adequate protection of the assets to be acquired by BUYER from SELLERS, and that 
In the event that any such territorial or time limitation is deemed to be unreasonable by a court of 
competent jurisdiction. SELLERS agrees and submits to the reduction of either said territorial or time 
limitation, or both, to such area or a period of time as by said court shall be deemed reasonable. 
SELLERS further declare that the foregoing restrictive covenants, limited in time and territory as 
aforesaid^re ancillary to sale of WWP, and are necessary to protect BUYER in the enjoyment of and 
beneficial use and ownership of the business thereby acquired. 
In the event SELLERS, should be in violation of the restrictive covenants herein above set forth, then 
the time limitation thereof shall be extended for a period of rime equal to the period of time during 
which such breach or breaches should occur; and in the even: BUYER should oe required to seek 
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relief from any such breach in any court the restrictive covenant shall be extended for a period of 
time equal to the pendency of all proceedings before such court, including all appeals. 
SELLERS shall be jointly and severally liable to BUYER and WWP for any and all damages, costs, 
and legal fees which are suffered by BUYER or WWP by reason of any violation of this agreement, 
including, without limitation, both incidental and consequential damages. In addition, SELLERS 
hereby acknowledge that money damages alone would not adequately compensate BUYER in the 
event of a breach by SELLERS of the foregoing restrictive covenant, and therefore, SELLERS 
hereby covenant and agree that in addition to all other remedies available to BUYER at law or in 
equity, BUYER shall be entitled to injunctive relief for the enforcement thereof. 
The existence of any claim or cause of action by SELLERS against BUYER shall not constitute: a 
defense to the enforcement of the foregoing restrictive covenant, but shall be litigated separately. 
BUYER shall have the right to assign the aforesaid restrictive covenant in the event BUYER desires 
hereafter to sell all or any part of WWP, whether still operating under the same name or if the name 
has been changed, and SELLERS agrees to be bound by the terms of said restrictive covenant to any 
and all subsequent purchasers and assigns of said business. 
6. Closing 
Closing shall occur at a mutually convenient time after SELLERS have made available to BUYER 
the sales tax returns for the most recent 12 months of operations of WWP. That disclosure is intended 
to allow BUYER to verify gross sales and trends. SELLERS shall also make available documentation 
on positive cash flow and payments to or for the benefit of SELLERS that will cease at closing. The 
purpose of these disclosures is to allow BUYER to confirm that, at closing WWP will have had a 
positive cash flow of at least $10,000 each and every month for the 12 calendar months preceding 
closing. BUYER shall be obliged to close within a period no later than 30 days from the date of 
disclosure of the above information by SELLERS unless SELLERS shall have made a material 
misrepresentation, a material change not expressly conxemplated by this agreement, or if the business, 
as disclosed in WWP's records, is not reasonably capable, as of the date of closing, of supporting the 
payment of the obligation incurred by BUYER hereunder. This paragraph shall not be construed to 
vitiate any other express contingencies contained in this agreement. If BUYER fails to close for any 
reason, the obligation of confidentiality previously undertaken by BUYER shall remain in effect for a 
period of five (5) years from the date of refusal or failure to close. 
7. Consultation by SELLERS 
Bruce E. Chapman will, for a term of 60 days after closing, consult with BUYER regarding any 
aspect of the business without additional charge. Such consulting shall be during normal business 
hours and shall not exceed 20 hours in any calendar week. 
8. Default 
Should either party fail to perform its obligations hereunder, the non-defaulting party may notify the 
defaulting party of the general nature of the default. The allegedly defaulting party shall then have 45 
days from receipt of that notice of default to cure that default. If the default is not cured within that 45 
day period, the non-defaulting party may declare this contract in default and shall be entitled to 
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pursue any remedy that may be available ai law or equity, including, without limitation, foreclosure 
on the collateral provided for hereunder. 
9. Miscellaneous Provisions 
a. Integration 
This contract contains the entire contract between the BUYER and the SELLERS, and no agent or 
representative of the corporation or any other person has any pov/er to change or alter the terms of 
tins agreement. 
b . Binding effect 
This agreement shall bind and inure to the benefit of the respective heirs, personal representatives, 
successors, and permitted assigns of the parties. 
c. Dividends and Earnings. 
It is agreed that other than those expressly specified herein, SELLERS shall not be entitled to anv 
retained earnings of WWP after the date of execution of this agreement, or to any assets of WWP, or 
to any shareholder dividends of WWP. 
d. Resignation of Employment. 
SELLERS hereby resign from WWP and terminates their employment status with WWP, effective as 
of the Closing Date. SELLERS have previously retrieved their personal property from the WWP 
premises. 
e. Execution of Resolution. 
SELLERS warrant that each has or will execute, in their respective capacities as shareholders, a 
corporate resolution approving tne purchase by BUYER of SELLERS' One Hundred Percent (100%) 
interest in WWP. 
f. Resignation as Officer and Director. 
SELLERS, and each of them, hereby resign as officers and directors of WWP as of the Closing Date. 
SELLERS, if necessary, will execute all of the necessary corporate documents to complete this 
transaction, including removal of SELLERS from WWP's bank and other accounts. 
g. Release. 
SELLERS warrant that neither is aware of any claims or potential claims against WWP, or SELLERS 
or either of them. SELLERS, and each of them, herein completely and totally release, quit, and 
discharge WWP, its ofrlcersTdirectors, employees, and agents, their successors and assigns, from all 
claims, rights of action, and causes of action, arising from, derived from or related to their respective 
ownership of WWP stock, employment with WWP, or any other relationship with WWP and the 
above-referenced persons. This release of all claims includes with respect to all persons and entities 
aDove, all damages including but not limited to actual, inciaental and consequential in all civil, 
criminal, and administrative causes, causes and claims including but not limited to unemployment 
9 
compensation, worker's compensation, and personal tax liabilities. SELLERS further agree to hold 
WWP, and BUYER, including their agents, attorneys and shareholders harmless from any and all 
claims as referenced in this Section. 
BUYER warrants that he is neither aware of any claims or potential claims against CAMPUS 
PHOTO, or BUYER. BUYER herein completely and totally releases, quits, and discharges 
SELLERS, their agents, successors and assigns, from all claims, rights of action, and causes of 
action, arising from, derived from or related to BUYER'S ownership of CAMPUS PHOTO, 
employment with CAMPUS PHOTO, or any other relationship with CAMPUS PHOTO and the 
above-referenced persons. This release of all claims includes with respect to all persons and entities 
above, all damages including but not limited to actual, incidental and consequential in all civil, 
criminal, and administrative causes, causes and claims including but not limited to unemployment 
compensation, worker's compensation, and personal tax liabilities. BUYER further agree to hold 
SELLERS, including their agents, and attorneys harmless from any and all claims as referenced in 
this Section. 
h. Ownership of Claims and Corporate Authorization. 
Each party to this agreement warrants and represents that it is the holder and owner of the claims 
subject to this agreement that each has not assigned or otherwise conveyed to any person, firnvor 
entity any interest and any claim, demand or cause of action covered by the terms of this agreement 
and that there are no liens or encumbrances against the claims. 
i. Brokerage. 
The parties represent that there are no brokerage or other commissions relative to the sale and transfer 
of the Shares by SELLERS. 
j . Acknowledgment 
Each party hereby acknowledges that he or she has been given the opportunity to review the terms 
and conditions of this Agreement with any legal or other advisor of his or her own choice and that he 
or she fully understands and knowingly consents to the terms and conditions hereof. 
k. Assignment. 
No party shall assign, sublet, or transfer any interest in this agreement withour the prior, express, and 
written consent of the others. 
I. Non-liability. 
Nothing in this agreement shall be construed as creaiing any persona] liability on the part of an} 
officer or agent that may be a party to this agreement, nor shall it be construed as giving any rights or 
benefits under this agreement to anyone other than the parties to this agreement. 
m. Disputes/ Arbitration 
In the event of a dispute under this agreement, the parties agree that any action brought shall be 
submitted to binding arbitration ir accordance with the rules or trie American Arbitration 
.Association. Such arbitration need.not be conducted by the American Arbitration Association, even 
10 
though it would follow their rules. Arbitration proceedings shall be brought in Utah County, Utah, 
and not elsewhere. 
n. Authority for Execution 
SELLERS represent that they have taken all steps necessary to comply with all corporate 
requirements to enter into this agreement. The party signing below on behalf of WWP warrants he 
has authorization from WWP to execute this agreement on behalf of WWP. The parties, by their 
signatures below, represent and warrani that he or she is competent to enter this agreement, fully 
understands the same, and does so agree by his or her own free will and choice. 
o. No Waiver. 
The failure of any party to this agreement to insist upon the performance of any of the terms and 
conditions of this agreement, or the waiver of any breach of any of the terms and conditions of this 
agreement, shall not be construed as thereafter waiving any such terms and conditions except as 
specifically set forth herein, but the same shall continue and remain in full force and effect as if no 
such forbearance or waiver had occurred. 
p. Governing Law. 
It is agreed that this agreement shall be governed by, construed, and enforced in accordance with the 
laws of the State of Utah. 
q. Attorney Fees. 
In the event that any action is filed in relation to this agreement, the unsuccessful party in the action 
shall pay to the successful party, in addition to all the sums that either party may be called on to pay, 
a reasonable sum for the successful party's attorneys' fees and costs. 
r. Effect of Partial Invalidity. 
The invalidity of any portion of this agreement will not and shall not be deemed to affect the validity 
of any other provision. In the event that any provision of this agreement is held to be invalid, the 
parties agree that the remaining provisions shall be deemed to be in full force and effect as if they had 
been executed by both parties subsequent to the expungement of the invalid provision. 
s. Entire Agreement. 
This agreement shall constitute the entire agreement between the parties and any prior understanding 
or representation of any kind preceding the date of this agreement shall not be binding upon either 
party except to the extent incorporated in this agreement. 
t. Modification of Agreement. 
Any modification of this agreement or additional obligation assumed by either party in connection 
with this agreement shall be binding only if placed in writing and signed by each party or an 
authorized representative of each party. 
u Notices. 
11 
Any notice provided for or concerning this agreement shall be m writing and be deemed sufficiently 
given when sent by certified or registered mail to the respective adaress of each party as set forth at 
the beginning of this agreement 
\ . Paragraph Headings. 
The titles to the paragraphs of this agreement are solely for the convenience of the parties and shall 
not be used to explain, modify, simplify, or aid in the interpretation of the provisions of this 
agreement 
w. Counterparts 
This agreement may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be 
an original, but all of which together shall constitute but one and the same instrument. 
D. Execution 




Bry^ &n Whailev 
SELLERS 
Bruce E Chapman, SELEER Cen Chapman, SELLER 
WWP, Inc., a Utah corporation 
BV tffiwi f/hmv^ 
Bruce E Chapman f 
Its Presidenx 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
On the v^ day of April, 2001, personally appeared before me Bryan Whatley, personally known 
to me or proven on the basis ox satisfactory evidence, who being b\ me dul} sworn, dfdTacicnowleage 
that he executed the Toregoing for its stared purposes. 
ARY PUBLIC / 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH) 
On the \ ^ day of April, 2001, personally appeared before me Bruce E Chapman, personally 
known to me or proven on the basis of satisfacto^ evidence, who being by me duly sworn, did 
acknowledge_tb4t he_execute.d_the foregoi.ng_for its stated purposes. 
r.( vS5®;.' 1323Jcoiv :o Ifl S"1 NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OFU-XAH- X- J 
:ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH) 
On the r-6 day of April, 2001, personally appeared before me Cen Chapman, personally known 
to me or proven on the basis of satisfactory evidence, who being by me duly sworn, did acknowledge 
that SELLERS executed the foregoing for its stated purposes 
~> . U r /? / 
' ~N 
) fffgJK' ^ I ^ ' ^ ' I A - j NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF UTAH CQr/IM ^~ '-:; 2005 j 
:ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH) 
On the ^T~day of April, 2001, personally appeared before me Bruce E Chapman, who being by 
me duly sworn did say that he is the President of World-Wide Photo, Incorporated, a Utah 
corporation, and that the within and foregoing instrument was signed m behalf of said corporation by 
authority of its Bylaws or a resolution of its Board of Directors, and Bruce E. Chapman duly 
acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same 
i \ f . J V ^ . ^ . - " p ^ T I NOTARY PUBLIC 
AMENDMEJNT 
This Amendment is entered into by and between Bruce E. Chapman, Ori Chapman, 
World Wide Photo, Inc. and Bryan Whatley on this j^ELday of April, 2001. 
.RECITALS 
WHEREAS3 the above-described parties entered into a document entitled, "Stock and 
Asset Purchase and Sale" on or about April 5, 2001; and 
WHEREAS, the parties desire to clarity certain issues that have arisen MUCH- ii.it' 
execution of that document. 
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual,, promises .herein contained, die parties 
agree as follows: 
AGREEMENT 
1. ' 'Paragraph 2.{c) is" hereby deleted in its entirety-.and replaced with the loll""»w nip 
paragraph: 
c. Sale of collateral 
BUYER and World Wide Phoiu, inc. may elect to sell-any collateral securing obligations 
hereunder, bit" any such sale shall result in payment-of'SELLERS of the net proceeds of such 
••sale.as follows: 
'For sale of any equipment or ass: •:? uusiness purchased iroiu .SELLERS under this 
Agreement, 100% of the,net sale , ids (with deductions including, 'bui. not'limited to, any 
taxes -.that.are incurred as a result of such sale) shall be proinptly paid to SELLERS: 
.For sale of-the realty, SELLERS :shall be-entitled to.receive :the-:entire net ^id proceeds-as 
•defined -above .-for .either lot sold for a net amount of $50,000 or lessveach3 'but :'if-the lots or 
eitherofthem.are-s^ 
maiKriio claim upon "the •nst,sale.proceeds-in-excess of $50,000 each. If the lots ..ere,sold 
•through/foreclosure due to default of BUYER hereunder, SELLERS m:r/'i:eep'the. entire .sale. 
price, not to exceed the sum of the principal -amount outstanding on the promissory note, plus 
reasonable .and necessary legal fees that-would otherwise-be recoverable under thetrinis ofthis 
."a^resuient. However, if such:proceeds equal or exceed the amoun 
of the arrearage, such a sale will be conclusively deemed to cure BUYER'S default and any sale 
proceeds in excess of the arrearage shall be counted as an.advance payment hereunder. 
2. 'The parties .acknowledge' and -agree' that BUYER -'lias not "and. '.'does -not rely on 
any information, schedules or other representations supplied or made~by Bruce Chapman to 
BUYER regarding the value of equipment owned by World Wide Photo, Inc., or being-.sold to 
BUYER .under this Agreement. 'BUYER has• inspected the equipment and has .made his own 
U 1/1:5, liUOl l - l : US F A I
 rjl „ 
independent assessment of the vainc of the equipment and is purchasing World Wide Photo, 
Inc. based on his own analysis of tlbe value of the equipment owned by World Wide Photo, 
Inc. and Bruce Chapman. 
DATED this 2£ day of April, 2001. 
BUYER: 
bryam ^ Whatlcy / 
SELLERS. 
' / 
Bnieehl. caiapmi, SELLER Chezi Chapman, SELLER 
World Wide 'Photo, Iiie.Via Utah .Corpcxratioii 
•sn 
By: f)!M U MlBfl £G5f . Chapmai 
Its: President 
T-
2uoi u.i.iu :..:. [g004 
PROMISSORY NOTE 
$457,500,00 Aprii
 (^ < - - , 2001 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned Bryan Whatley (hereafter referred to as "Maker") 
promises to pay to the order of Bruce Qiapman, his successors and assigns (hereafter referred to 
as "Holder"), at 1421 South Carterville Road? Orem, Utah 84097, or at such otiier place as the 
Holder may, from time to time; designate in writing, the principal sum of Four Hundred Fifty-
Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($457,500.00) together with interest on the unpaid 
.principal balance from the date of this Note at the rate of .1095 per annum, to be paid according, 
to the following terms and conditions: 
. 1 . . -The first .payment shall he made on June 1, .'2001, .in the amount of $5,000.and 
continue xnonttily thereafter on the first day of each month and continuing for 173 months with a 
finat 174*\payment of $1,145.25. Brymemof ^ there is aninier\'eniag 
•default of .Maker, 'constitute payment in full of Maker's obligation to Holder .hereunder, .Interest 
shali.not begin to-accrue until May 1/2001, and shall be calculated as simple ktterest on the basis 
of a 30 day month and 360 day year. Payments made within five days before or.after the first of 
each -mrmtfr shall be considered neither late nor early and interest shall be calculated for each 
'•month.in which payment is made within thai eleven'day window
 :as. if payment was roade.on'.the 
'..first day of each month. 
a. .The payment should be made, to..- Brace Chapman, 1421 South Carterville 
Road, Orem, 'Utah 84097. .Payment .-.shall .'be ."deemed: •••.complete upon 
mailing.. 
b, .No..penalty .shall.'he imposed for early payment ofaay-installment ox "die 
remaining balance on the Note, Early payments • including early payments 
made-through sale of property-or other .assets shall reduce 'the amount that 
must be paid -OR -this note and calculations -shall .he made .-according .to the : 
spreadsheet approved by Maker and Holder, a copy of the formulas for 
which are appended hereto and incorporated hy reference. 
:c. . Maker.shall pay:alate.charge of.'.$125 fm/addition to..accmea mLsretiti io; 
each.and evenr payment-made aitcr .the 6^,of the month. 
2. Eadb payment-sh^ nrsi, to accrued .costs of-collection, 
including" reasonable-attorney's .-fees; second, "to payments made by'-.Holder '.to .preserve any 
collateral-securing this Note; third,-to any other payments .marie'by 'Holder, and provided'for .below' 
in' this Note or in .any trust deeds, -security agreements, -guaranties, -liens, or pledges securing 
payment of this "Note;, fourth, to any late charges; -fifth, re prindpalr-'and-sixth/to accracd interest. 
IU J , J U U _ x I 1U K-Li. SUU5 
3. This Note is secured py two I rust Deeds of even date Herewith. Upon the Minfu 
m undersigned to pa}' auj sum due raider this note when due 01 upon occurrence 01 any 
unexcused event of default set forth in the Srock and Asset Purchase and Sale Agreement, dated 
April 5,2001, or the two trust deeds, the Holder, at its option, and after giving the Maker 45 days 
notice of the nature of the default and opportunity to curs, if such default is not cured, may 
accelerate payment of the Note and declare the entire indebtedness evidenced by this .note, 
including all unpaid principal and accrued interest, immediately due and payable. The Holder may 
then foreclose on any security including both or either of the Trust Deeds and apply the entire 
sales price towards payment of this note, but not to exceed the sum of the principal amount 
outstanding on this note plus reasonable legal fees and costs recoverable under this Promissory 
Note and the Trust Deeds If proceeds of the sale of the security sold due to default of Maker 
hereunder equal or exceed the amount of the arrearage, such a sale will be conclusively deemed 
to cure Buyer's default and any sale proceeds in excess of the arrearage shall be counted as an 
advance payment hereunder. 
The undersigned agrees, in the event of an uncured dexault by nndjersignsd, to pa,y 
all o; the reasonable and necessary costs of collection. inchMing reasonable attorney's tees, 
whef ncr <r not suit is filed herein. 
5. AH payments hereof shall be in lawful money of the U xuiecL ia tares oi Am 11 u*. T u L 
Note may be prepaid in. full or in part ar any nme without penalty 
6. Any security given DY the undersigned foi subsequent obligations owing from the 
undersigned to the Hoider will also be deemed security for tins Note, 
7. The undersigned and an) aureues, guarantors, and endorsers of this Note for 
themselves^ their heirs, legal representatives, successors and assigns, severally waive demand, 
presentment for payment notice of nonpayment, protest and notice of protest, notice of dishonor, 
notice of any extensions or renewals, and diligence in taking of any action to collect any amounts 
called for hereunder and in the handling of properties, rights, or collateral at any time existing in 
connection herewith. They waive any nght to be released b}T reason of any extension of time, 
change m terms of paymsni. increase in principal, extension of additional credit, change in interest 
rate, renewals, modifications, substitutions or novations of this Note, or anj other maisnal 
change. Fiirthenn6fe? They severally consent any renewals or extensions of this Note, whether 
made to or in favor of the Undersigned or any other person, and to the release of any security, or 
any part thereof, with or without substitution. 
8. failure by iiolacr to declare tut entire balance of this Note due and payaole on 
default in the payment of any installment shall no: constitute a waiver of the rigtc to declare said 
balance due in case of default in any subsequent mstalimetc 
9. This Nate snail be drnanig upon anc inuxt to tfati bsneiL u, the unasisigaec and 
Holder their heirs and personal representatives, successors and assigns. 
JUlJi l i : l l FAX © 0 0 8 
10. The provisionsicreof shall be deemed independent ai*d severable, and the invalidity 
or panial invalidity or unenforceability of any one provision or ponion hereof shall not aifca the 
validity or enforceability of any other provision hereof. This Note will be governed 'by the laws 
of the State of Utah. 
11. The undersigned hereby consents to jurisdiction of any court of competent 
jurisdiction in the state of Utah, and consents to venue in. Utah €0111113% Utah. 
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UTAH DEED TRUST 
With. Security Agreement 
THIS TRUST DEED, made this g?S^day of /Vf &L-- , 2001, between Bryan Whatlsy, as TRUSTOR, 
whose address is 15265 Del. Ponieme CL, Poway, CA920S*-2216aad Bruce Chapman, a; TPJrrT"F. JITU! Bruce 
Chapman, as BENEFICIARY, 
WITNESSETH: Tnat'Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, WJXB. POWER OF 
SALE, the fbHowmg described real property, situated in Utah Coiinry, State of Utah: 
Lot 242, Plat F* Sherwood HSis Subdiviaii 
'TOGETHER •WITH all buildings and improvement-.now or hereafter erecred or used .on the above-described real 
property, and allvacated alley* and sceeis abutting the same, and all easement, rights of way, rents, issues, profits, 
income* royalties,--miiie^ water stock, and all fixtures, equipment, 
building TnatwiAis ?pp1 ianeesy tangThla personal pmpeny and goods of every nature whatsoever now. or thereafter 
located in or on, or used or intended to be used in connection with, said real .property, including without limitation 
those for the purposes of supplying or distritntring hearing, cooling, electricity;, gas., Wflter, air and light; and all 
pluinbiug, v/ater heaters* sinks, storm windows and doors, screens, blinds, -shades, •cuitazns.and curtain rods, 
mirrors, ..cabinets, panelling, 'rugs,.attached 'floor coverings? telephone.equip.me.Tit,, crees. and plants, fences, ..securiry 
systems and outdoor hghthig, and all tenement:, hereditaments, privileges and ajpurtenancerthereunto belonging; 
all of which, including replacements for, accessions, modifications, and additions thereto, shall he deemed a part 
of said real property and which, '.together with said ieal-property, "are hereafter collectively referred." to herein 'as the 
"property." 
The foregoing conveyance .in trust shall •also he deemed to be:a.j?amof axecuriry imsrest.in any personal property 
interests hereinafter described, and in ail of the foregoing .items which conitituie;ipeTsonal:propszTy or.fhmire& or any 
other property which is "Subjea to the Uniform Commercial Cade for the State of Utah or to .any common law with 
.respect to pledges, security interests, assignments;, chanel mortgagee and similar rights; saMgrant also creanng such 
pledge,, security mtereayassigninmt, chattel .mortgage,- or --similar hen -interest-or right-
FOR THE PURPOSE OF .SECURING- (1) .payment of .the indebtedness 'and alTo'ther lawful charges .evidenced by 
a promissory note of even .dare (the "Note"), :in 'theprincipal sum of 5457,'5Q0.'0C made by Trustor, -payable .to the 
•order .of Jteoenciary, -.in-the ,manncr ..and wiiii interest -.as ..therein set ..forth, 'and .any ..extensions, -renewals, 
modificarionfi, -.or .consolidations'thereof; (2). the performance of each agreemem of .Trustor contained in titis Trust 
Deed.and the Note; ..,(3) the payment of such-additional loans or advances as":Benefician''.may "hereafter-make'to 
Trustor; and.(4) the payment of all sums expended or .advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms of Ms 
Trust Deed and .the Note, together-with interest thereon -as herein, provided 
Trustor covenants 'and warrants to B«ieiiciary that Trustor is lawfully seized.or the estate.hereby conveyed and has 
the right to grant and convey this Trust Deed and the property, that the execution Of this Trust Deed will not result 
in the .breach of .any .agreement to which Trustor is a party .ox which.purports to be binding-on-&e Trustor orthe 
2001 1 1:11 FAX W/ous 
jroperry. Trustor further warrants thai ID the bezi of bis knowledge,, Trustor has le^al and physical public access 
n the property. The covenants and wiurana.es of rhis paragraph shall survive a foreclosure of this Trust Deed. 
TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THIS TRUST DEED, TRUSTOR AGREES; 
1. MAINTE-NANCE OF PROPERTY. To Jceep the property in good condition and repair; not to 
remove or demolish any building which may exisi or be constructed, thereon; co complex or restore promptly and 
n goad and workman! j]f ft manner any building: -which may he constructed, damaged, or destroyed ihercon; to comply 
atith ail laws, covenants and restrictions affecting the property; not to commie or permit waste thereof; notto commit, 
luffer or Dermit any act upon the property in violation of law; to do all other acts which from the character or use 
}f the property may be reasonably necessary; the specific enumerations herein not excluding the general, 
2 INSURANCE. To provide .and maintain insurance against such casualties as is customarily earned 
3n like: properties or as Beneficiary may require, in an amount, not less than the unpaid balance of the Note or the 
usurable value, for such form, and written by a-company or companies satisfactory to Beneficiary with loss payable 
clauses in favor of and hi a form satisfactory to Beneficiary. In the event of loss or damage, Trusror shall give 
jnmecliaic nonce to Beneficiary. Beneficiary may make proof of loss and-settle and adjust all claims thereunder, 
•applying the proceeds ar i s option, to reduction of the amouni due hereunder, or to the restoration or repair of the 
property damage. Payment of such loss may be made directly to Beneficiary. In the event of the failure of Trustor 
:o provide insurance or to maintain same, or to renew same in a manner satisfactory to Beneficiary, then Biwrffctary 
rnsy itself procure wi maintain such'.insurance and charge th* cost thereof to Trustor. If Trustor cannot seam: 
Insurance to nro vide the reauired coverage^ 'this will constitut?1- an act of default TOder the fgrnw of this TYust Deed, 
Beneficiary shall not be required to accept or approve any policy of insurance or any renewal of an existing policy, 
which, 'is not delivered to It prior to 30 days before the exph-atioit date of existing coverage eves though the same may 
it otherwise satisfactory'.'to '.Beneficiary. 
3, TAXES .AND ..ASSESSMENTS. To pay at .least 10 ..days before ddinqirncy.,.alimes "and 
.assessineffla.aSBKiiDg.the.pKwetTy^ including all assessments upon waxer company stock and all rents, assessments 
and charges for water, appurtenant to or used in connection with the prqpeny; to pay, when due, all encumbrances, 
charges, and liens with interest (including any prior mortgages or trust deeds affecting the property) on hie property 
:*r any pan thereof, • which at. any lime appear to be prior or superior henito; to pay all costs, fees, and expenses of 
.flais "Trust. 
4, PAYMENTS; CHARGES, 'Should Trustor fail to .-make .any payment or to do-any-act .-as herein 
provided, or if any action or proceeding is commenced wtach materia^ 
in the property (including without limitation the filing- of any mechanic's or materialmen's liens or any building code 
enforcement)/.then Beneficiary or Trustee, hue without obligation ao to do -and without notice ..to. or'-'demand,upon 
Trustor and without releasing Trustor.from-any obligation hereof, -may: make or do the same in such manner and 
to such extent us either may deem necessary to protect the.sec^ being authorized 
to entsr upon the property for such purposes; .commence, appear .in, and defend .any .action or proceeding purporting 
to ailect the security h ^ 
any encumbrance, charge orlien which in /the judgment of either appears ro be-prior or .superior .-heretoi and in 
exercising -any such powers, incur .any liability.: expend whatever amounts in its absolute discretion as it may-deem 
•necessary .therefor, including cost of evidence, of title, 'employ counsel, and pay his reasonable Tees. .Such amounts 
shall become additional-priiiqpal-ina^bteto Trust Deed. 
.5. To pay imm&iiaieiy. and. wimoui demand, all sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or' Trustee, 
with -interest from dale.of -eApencliinre at the rate-get forth.in the Note until paid, and-thc.rcpayineiit thereof ahall.be 
.secured hereby. 
6. TRANSFER. Nor to .maix • any voluntary ;ioier vivos transfer
 f -conveyance,' or assignmeni of'the 
-property. or-any-pan .thereof without first obtaining the written .consent of the Beneficiary, .Any such .'transfer, 
conveyance, •& :aBAignD£B&rii the .Beneficiary shall -not so consent, shall constitute a default under 'the- terms of .this 
izutrmnsnt :and the indebtedness -it securer, .and Benenciary -may declare all. sums .secured 'by this Trust ...Deed 
Utah Deed of Trust , Page ,2 
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mnediateiy due and payable ami .may cau&c this Trust Deed co be foreclosed, and tbe premises sold, according to 
tw and the provisions hereof 
T LS MT T I J A L L Y AGREED TEAT; 
7
 k Sjiouid the property or any par: thereof be taken or damaged by reason of any public improvement 
r condemnanon proceeding, or damaged by fire, or eanhquakc, or in any odier manner* Beneficiary snail be entitled 
::) all 'compensation, awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and shall be enritied at its option to commence, 
.ppear in, and prosecute in ics own name, any action or proceedings, or to make any compromise or settlement, in 
onnecdon with such taking or damage. All such compemadon, awards, damages, rigbis of action and proceeds, 
tichiding the proceeds of any policies of fire and other insurance affecting the property, are hereby assigned to 
ieneftciary, who may, after deducting therefrom all its expenses, including attorney's fees, apply fbe same on any 
odebtedness secured hereby. Trustor agrees to Execute such further assignments of any compensation award,
 ;r 
Lamages, and rights of action and proceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee may require, 
8. Ac any time and from time to tune upon written request of Beneficiary, payment of its. lees and 
iresentatkm of this Trust Deed and the Note for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance, for cancellation and 
txenrkm), without affecting the liability of my person for .the payment of the indebtedness secured hereby, Trustee 
nay (a) consent to the making of any map or plat of the property; (b) join in granting any easement or creating any 
'estiiction thereon; (c) join in any subordination or other agreement affecting this Trust Deed or the lien or cfaarfe 
hereof; (d) gran* say csiei^ioner.xrwxiiScationof the tenss of this loan; (e) recorivey, without warranty, aHorairy 
•/an of the property. 'Tiifc .grasses hi any reconveyance may be described as' Hths person or person? entitled thereto;" • 
trustor, agrees to pay reasonable Trustee's .fees for .any of the services mentioned in this paragraph, 
1
 "'.RENTS. As. additional security, Trustor hereby assigns to Beneficiary, dining the cuiitiniian.ee of 
titan truusui, all rents.* issues, royalties, ,and profits of-the property'.-affected' by this. Trust Deed and of 'any personal 
aroperty located tbereotL Until Trustor -.shall default in .the .payment .ofany jndebiedneas-secured.hereby ,orin .fee 
•Winn i nance of any agrrnnenr hereunder, Trustor shall have the right p coHecx all such rents, issuer, royalties, and 
profits; earned prior to default as tbey become due and payable. If Trustor shall default as aforesaid, Trustor's right 
» collect any of such monies shall cease and Beneficiary, shall have the .right, with or without taking possession of 
he property affected hereby, to collect all rents, royalties* issues, and profits. Failure .or;discontinnaDce of 
Beneficiary at any .time or from time to time to collect any such moneys shall not in any manner affect the subseqo&ot 
•alforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to .collect-the same. Nothing•oontainrf:hfttdn,:;ii!or 
".he exercise of the right by Beneficiary to collect, shall be, or be construed to be. an affirmation by Beneficiary of 
any tenancy, lease or option,-nor :an assumption of liabfLiry under, nor .^subordination of the .lien cr charge* of tin* 
Trusi Deed '-to any .such tenancy, .lease or option. 
10. POKBEASANCB NOT A" WAIVER. .The Mure on the part of .Beneficiary .t» premptiy eirfojre 
any right hereunder shall not operate as a waiver of such rigtoand the waiver by Benef id^ of any defaidt aMH not 
.ionsutute a waiver of any-other or subaexjuem default. 
••11, ~ME "IS Or THE ESSENCE. Tune.is -of 'the .essence .hereof. 
12. J~ nts\ u _ l . sjpoTi. the. occurrence of'-any default hcreufloer, and'aftcr giving the Trustor- 45 days -
nonce of'the.namrt o: tne.oeiauit..and oppormnity to cure, if such default is.noreuxed, Beneficiary shall have the 
•option to declare ail '-sums secured hereby immediately due and payable. and foreclose tbis 'Trust £eed.in the manner 
provided by law for the foreclosure of-mortgages on real.property .and Beneficiary, shall he-entitled • to recover in 
such proceedings .ail costi -^nn AT^^SPI: m^r^nf thpr^rn, m :^mriiT)p; ^ reasonable Btiaineyr& .fee in siichamoufir.as ..shall /^Q) ^ f t 
be fixed by tha court. If' proceeds of-the sale of the security sold due TO default of Trusiy- hereunder equal or exceed ^ 
'th& jfftAiwc of the arrearage, such a sale "will be conclusively deemed to cure ' *W-tt^ default and any sale prcKreeds/T^ /5 £? '£ 
' in excess .of-the arrearage -shall be counted as --an advance payment hereunder. ^ ^ 
TliA'h Jjcci a: I rui»» I*age 3 
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13, FORECLOSURE. After the laps© of such time as may then be required by law following the 
ecordation of said notice of default, and notice of default and notice of sale having been given as then required by 
aw, Trustee without demand on Trustor, shall sell the property on the date and at the tzme and place designated in 
aid notice of sale, either as a whole or in separate parcels, and in such order as itmay determine (but subject to any 
tatutorv right of Trustor to direct the order in which such property, if consisting of several known lot$ or parcels, 
hall be sold), at public auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price payable m lawftiL money of the United Stares 
c the tune of sale. The person conducting the sale may, for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale in the 
manner then prescribed by Utah law. Trustee shall execute and deliver to die purchaser its Deed conveying the 
xtoperty so sold, but without any covenant or warraniy, express or implied Any person, including Beneficiary, 
nay bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs and expenses of 
exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the payment of the Trustee's and reasonable attorney's foes 
ictually incurred by the Trustee and Che Beneficiary with the mrmrrrTTrn total of said fees not to be lass than $250.00 y ^ Apr, 
ind not more than 55,000.00; (2) ooot of tmy gvidwiofr of title proeuteri in wmmmimi wMi DUPA mile: (3) all sums \$y ^ 
impended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, T*ifti accrm*! iiaume from date »f croejoditurtti (4) all other sinnfrTjn ft £ is 
hen secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any, to the person or persons legally entitled thereto. ^ 
14. Trustor agrees to surrender possession of the Trust property to the Purchaser at the aforesaid sale, 
rnmediarely after such sale, in the event; such possession has not previously been surrendered by Trustor. 
15. SUCCESSOR. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the 
office of the Counsy Recorder of ssds Bounty in which she property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution 
ji trustee. From the umc the substiTution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to *H the powers- duties, 
authority and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee, Each such substitution shall be executed 
nod acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner pnraded by law-
16. This Trust D^d shall apply to, inure to the benefit of, and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, 
legatees, devisees, administrators, executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint 
and several. The torn HBeneficiaty,1 shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the Note secured 
hereby. In this Trust Deed, whenever the context so requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or 
neuter, and the singular number includes the plural. 
17. Trustee accepts this Trust when this TrustDeed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public 
record as pfovided by law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any pasiy hereto of pendm^ sale lmder a 
Deed or of any action or proceeding in which Trustor* Beneficiary, or Trustee shall b& a party, unless brought by 
Trustee. 
18. NOTICE* Any notice re Trustor provided for io this Trust Ds^d shall Ite given by dftMveiin£ it 
or by mailing it by first class mail unless applicable law requires use of another method. The notice shall be directed 
to the property addnws unless Trustor designates another address in either this Trust Deed or by separate wncen 
notice to Beneficiary, Any notice to Beneficiary $hall be given "by first class mail,to Beneficiary's address stated 
herein or any other address Beneficiary designates by notice to Trustor. Any ncrtke provided, far in this Trust Deed 
shall "be deemed to have"been given to Truatcr or Beneficiary when given as provided in this paragraph. 
19. This Trust Deed shall be construed and governed according to the laws of the Stare of UtaL 
20. The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any nonce of default and of any notice of sale 
hereunder be mailed to him ai the address hereinabove set forth. 
21. In the event any portion of this TnistDeed is declared invalid by a court of law or by legislative 
enactment all other provisions sot so affected shall be valid and binding upon the parties hereto. 
Utah, Deed of Trust, Page 4 
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WITNESS THEREOF THE Tiunor ius caused these prtacnis co be executed the day and year first above written. 
STATE OF, ilkk 




nnfbr.J^Anvoi LMJJAJ. 2001, personally appeared before me Bryan Wbailey, the signer 
f ine above instrument, -who duly acknowledged to mc that they executed uie swrssrx 
S0C?-9-* dXS-Wwo, 
. BSCHrS m 'W3HO ^ X ^ i X ; 
jjvossny T Kiy0r^mS& 
/./ / / / 
^ PUBLIC}' / 
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UTAH DEED TRUST 
With Securiiy Agreement 
THIS TRUST DEED, made tins 2^day of /VPign- , 2001, be tweeaBi^ Whaiiey. as TRUSTOR, 
whose address is 15265 Del Ponicnte CL, Poway, CA 92064-2216 and Bruce Chapman, as TRUSTEE, and Bruce 
Chapman, as BENEITCXARY, 
WITNESSETE: Thai Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, WITH POWER OF 
SALE, the following described real property, situated in Utah County, State of Utah: 
Lot 241, Plat F, Sherwood BSlk Subdivision 
TOGETHER WITH all buildings and improvements now or hereafter erected or used on the above-described real 
property „ and all vacated alleys and streeis abumng the same, and all easements, rights of way, rents, issues, profits, 
income, royalties, mineral, oil and gas rights and profits, water rights, water stock, and all Fixtures, equipment, 
ouildxog materials, appliances, tangible personal property and goods of every nature whatsoever now or hereafter 
located in or on, or used or intended to be used in connection with said real property, including without limitation 
those for the purposes of supplying or distributing heating, cooling, eiectneiry, gas, water, air and light; and all 
plumbing, water heaters, sinks, storm windows and doors, sheens, blinds, shades, curtains and curtain rods, 
mirrors, cabinets, panelling, rugs, attached floor coverings, telephone equipment, trees and plants, fences, security 
systems and outdoor lighting, and all tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging; 
all of which, including replacements for, accessions, modifications, and additions thereto > shall be deemed a part 
of said real property and which, together with sold real property, are hereafter collectively referred to herein as the 
"property/ 
The foregoing conveyance in trust shall also be deemed to be a, grant of a security interest in any personal property 
interests hereinafter described, and in all of the foregoing HBULS which constitute per$onai property or fixtures or any 
other property which iYXubJ£ct to die Uniform Commercial Code for the State of Utah or to any common law with 
respect to pledges, security interests, assjgmnents, chattel mortgages and similar rights; said grant also creating such 
pledge, security jmerest, assignment chattel mortgage, or similar lien interest ocr right 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtcdncfis and all other lawful charges evidenced by 
a promissory note of even date (the "Note"), to. the principal sum of $457,500.00 made by Trustor, payable to the 
order of Beneficiary, in the manner and with interest as therein set forth, and any extensions, renewals, 
modrjicanons, or consolidations" thereof; (2) the performance of each agreement of Trustor contained in this Trust 
Deed and toe Note; {3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as Beneficiary may hereafter make to 
Trustor; and (4) the payment of all sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms of this 
TrustJDeed and the Note, togetherjwiiii interest thereon as herein provided. 
Trustor covenants and warrants to Beneficiary that Trustor is lawfully seiied of the estate hereby conveyed and has 
the right to grant and convey this Trust I>eed and the propeny, that the execution of tint Trust Deed will not xesuii 
in the breach of my agreement to which Trustor is a party or which purports to be binding on the Trustor or the 
y * -o JUUI 11 11 IAJL 41013 
jropmy Irusior mrtiicr warrants ihac IO the bwt of ins knowledge, Trustor has iegai and physical public access 
o trie property The covenants and warranties oi this paragraph shall survive a foreclosure of tiafl Trust Deed 
TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THIS TRUST DEED, TRUSTOR AGREES 
1 MAINTENANCE OF PROPERTY To keep trie property in good condition and repair, not CD 
•emove or flemomsb any building whicn may exist or be constructed, thereof to complete or restore promptly and 
n good and workmanlike manner any building which.may be constructed, damaged, or destroyed tncreon, to comply 
?ith all law*, covenants and restrictions affecting the property; not to commit ar permit waste thereof, not to commit^  
.uifer or permit any act upon the property m violation of law, to do all other acts which from trie character or use 
jf the property may be reasonably necessary, the specific enumerations herein not excluding the general 
2. INSURANCE To provide rod maintain insurance against such rjsualties as » customarily earned 
>n like properties or as Beneficiary may require, in an amount, not less than the unpaid balance of the Note or the 
nsurable vaiue, for such form, and written by a company or companies sausf actory to Beneficiary with loss payable 
clauses in ravor of and in a form satisfactory to Beneficiary. In the event of los$ or damage, Trustor shall give 
immediate nonce io Beneficiaiy Beneficiary ma> make proof of loss and settle and adjust all claims thereunder, 
ippiying the proceeds ai ns option, to reduction of the amount due hereunder, or to the restoration or repair of the 
property damage. Payment of such ioss may be made directly to Beneficiary, In the event of the failure of Trustor 
JO provide insurance or to ragnnram same, or to renew same in «. maimer satisfactory to Beneficiary, then Beneficiary 
•nay ^self procure and Tnarnfrmt such insurance and charge the cost thereof to Trustor If Trustor cannot secure 
assurance to provide the required covstege, this ^ ill constitute an act of default under the terms of this Thrust Deen. 
Beneficiary shall not be required to accept or approve any policy of insurance or any renewal of an cxistmgpolicy, 
which i$ not delivered to it prior to 30 days before the expiranon date of existing coverage even though the same may 
3e otherwise satisfactory to Beneficiary. 
3. TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS. To pay at least 10 days before delinquency all taxes and 
assessments affecting the property, including all assessments upon water company stock and all reuis, assessments 
and charges for water, appurtenant to or used in connection with, the property; to pay, when due, all encumbrances, 
charges, and bens with interest {including any prior mortgages or trust: deeds affecting the property) oil the property 
or any part thereof, which at any time: appear to be prior or superior hereto; to pay all costs, feesr and expenses of 
this Trust 
4. PAYMENTS; CHARGES. Should Trustor fell to make any payment or to do any act a* herein 
provided, or if any acuoa or proceeding is commenced which materially or adversely affects Beneficiary's interest 
in fhepropeny (including without bnutanon the filing of any mechanic's or materialmen's hens or any building code 
sntorcemenO, then Beneficiary or Trustee, but without obligation so to do and without notice to ox demand upon 
Trustor and without releasing Trustor from any obligation hereof, may- make or do the same m sueh manner and 
co such exient as either may deem necessary to protect the security hereof, Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized 
to ^Tpr upon me property for such purpose commence, appear m. and defend any action or proceeding purporting 
to affect the security hereof or the rights or power? of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay, purchase, contest* or compromise 
anj encumbrance, cnaf gfc oriien which in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior hersto; and in 
exercising any such powers, incur any liability, errpend whatever amounts m its absolute discretion as it may deem 
necessary therefor, including cast of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay his reasonable feefi Such amounts 
shall become additional principal indebtedness of Trustor secured by this Trust Deed. 
5. To pay immediately and without demand all sums expended hereunder by Beneficiaiy or Trustee, 
with interest rrom aate of expenditure a: the rate sex fortnm the ft ote until paid, and me repayment thereof snail be 
secured hereby. 
6. TRANSFER Not to mike any vohintary mier vivos transfer, conveyance, or assignment of the 
property or any part thereof without firs: obtaining tnc written consent of the Beneficiary. Anj such transfer, 
conveyance, or assignment it the Beneficiary shall not so consent, snail conautute^rWauli: under the terms of this 
instrument and the macotednsss it secures, and Bcncficuiry may oeclare all sums secured by this Trust Deed 
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mmcdiaiciy due and payable and may cause this Trust Deed to be foreclosed, ajad the premises sold, according ID 
aw and the provisions hereof, 
T IS MUTUALLY AGREED THAT: 
7. Should the property or any part thereof be taken or damaged by reason of any public improvemenr 
ir conriemnahortproceeding, or damaged Dy fire* or earthquake, or in any ot to manner, Beneficiary shall be entitled 
o all compensation, awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and shall be entitled at us option 10 commence, 
ppear m> and prosecute in its own name, any action or proceedings, or to make any compromise or settlement, in 
onnccoon with such taking or damage. All such compensation, awards, damages, rights of action and proceeds, 
nciuding the proceeds of any policies of fee and other insurance affecting the property, are hereby assigned to 
ieneficiary, who may, after deducting therefrom all its expenses, including attorney's fees, apply tfce same on any 
ndebtedness secured hereoy. Trustor agrees to execute such further assignments of any compensation, award, 
lamages, and rights of action sad proceed? as Beneficiary or Trustee may require. 
8. At any time and from time to time upon written request of Beneficiary, psrymsnt of its fees and 
nesentatioii of this Trust Deed and the Note for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance, for cancellation and 
ctention), without affecting the liability of any person for Che payment of the indebtedness secured hereby, Trustee 
nay (a) consent to the making of any map or plat of the property; (b) join m granting any easement or creating any 
'esTxicnon thereon; (c) joni in any subordination or other agreerneor affecung tins Trust Deed or the lien or charge 
hereof; {d> grant any extension or modification of the terms of this loan; (e) recorrvey, without warranty, all or any 
jartof the property. The grantee m any reconveyance may be described as "the person or persons entitled thereto." 
Trustor agrees to pay reasonable Trustee's fees for any of the services mentioned in tins paragraph. 
9. RENTS. As additional security, Trustor hereby assigns to Beneficiary, during the continuance of 
hese trusts, all rents, issues, royalnes, and profits of the property affected by this Trust; Peed and of any personal 
)roperty located thereon. Until Trustor shall default in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the 
performance of any agreeEO^i hereunder, Trustor shall have the right to collect all such rents, issues, royalties, and 
irofits earned prior to default as they become due and.payable- If Trustor shall default as aforesaid, Trustor's right 
o collect any of such monies shall cease and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without taking possession fff 
he property affected hereby, to collect all rents, royalties, issue?, and profits. Failure or discontinuance of 
beneficiary at any b*^ or from time to nine to collect my such moneys shall not tn any manner affect the subsequent 
mforcemeni by Beneficiary of the nghty power, and aonhoiity to collect the same. Nothing coniamed herein, nor 
iue exercise of the right by Beneficiary to collect, shall be, or be construed to be, an affirmation by Beneficiary of 
my tenanqyi lease or option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor a subordination of the lien or charge of this 
Trust Deed to any such tenancy, lease or option. 
10. FORBEARANCE NOT A WAIVER. The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce 
my right hereunder shall not operaie as a waiver of suchnght and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not 
ionsutute a waiver of any other or subsequent ctefault, 
11. TIME'S OF THE .ESSENCE. Time is of the essence hereof. 
12. DEFAULT. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder, and after giving the Trustor 45 days 
nonce of the nature of the default aim opportunity to cure, if such default is not cured, Beneficiary shall have the 
option to declare all sums secured hereby immediately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner 
Dronded by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in 
nick proceedings all costs and expenses incident tnereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall rY) n / 
be fixed oy me court* If proceeds of the sale of trie security Bold due to aefault of 7^sx»r hereunder equal or exceed ^ ^ ^ 
the amount of the airsarage, such a sale will be coocliwively deemed to cure Jr^0xr delanfc and an}" sale proceeds^) $/*£ 
in excess of the arrearage shall oe counted as an advance payment hereunder. 
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13. PORECLOSUBE. After the Ispae ot such tnnc as may then be required by law following the 
scordation of said nonce of defcaift. and notice of default and nonce of wde having been given as then .required by 
aw. Trustee without demand on Trustor, shall sell the property on the date and at the rime and place designated m 
aid nonce of sale, tuber as a whole or in separate parcels, and in such order as amay determine (bur subject to any 
tannery light of Trustor to direct the order in which such property, if consisting of several kncnvn lots or parcels* 
hall be sold}, ar public auction to the highest bidder
 T the purchase price payable m lawful money of the United State 
.t the time of aak. The person conducting the saiemay, for any cause he deems expedient, postpone Che sale in the 
nanner then prescribed by Utah law. Trustee shall execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed conveying the 
>ropeny so sold, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied. Any person, including Beneficiary, 
nay bid at the sale* Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs and expenses of 
ixercifiing the power of sale and of the salt, including the payment of the Trustee's and reasonable attorney's fees 
icaiaHy incurred by the Trusiee and the Beneficiary with the rrrminmrn total of said fees not to be less than $250.00 / 
uod not more than S5,000.00; (2) east of any evidence of tide procured in eenneeriflp wtik meh ifllor (3) all sums ' 
upended imriffr the terms hereof, not then repaid, with aoorood urtwriftfroin dnt» of WCTMIIAIMW!! (4> all other sums 6 
hen secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, .if any, to the person or persons legaBy entitled thereto, 
14. Trustor agrees to surrender possession of the Trustproperty to the Purchaser at the aforesaid sale, 
xnmediately after such sale, in the event such possession has not previously been surrendered by Trustor. 
15. SUCCESSOR, Beneficiary may a^ii i t a successor trusiee fit any tnnc b^ 
office of tte County Becorder of each county m which the property or some pan thereof is situated, a substitution 
2i trustee. iiram the time ^ substitution is & ^ duties, 
authority and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee. Each such siibsttotion shall be executed 
and adasowledged, and notice thereof shall be gxven and proof thereof made5 in the manner provided by law. 
16 This Trust Deed shall apply to, mure to the benefit ot and bmd all parties hereto* their hears, 
legatees, devisees, administrators, executors,, successors and assigns. AH obhgaaom of Trustor hereondftr are joint 
and several. The term nB^nefbiary>T shall mean the owner and bolder, mriiKhng any pledgees of die Noce secured 
hereby. In tills Trust Deed, whenever the context so requires, the wrcnhjy gender inc.ftiries the feminine and/or 
neuter, and the singular number includes the plural. 
17. Trustee accepts tins Trust when this TrustDeed, duly execnfftl and aclrnnwledgad> is marie a public 
record as provided by law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other Trust 
Deed or of any action or prcK^tiling in which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Ttuatee shaE be a party, unless brought by 
Trustee. 
18. NOTICE. Any notice to Trustor provided for in tins Trust Beed shall be given by delivering it 
or by mailing it by fim class m ^ The nonce shall be directed 
to the property address unless Trustor designates another address m either this TrustDeed or by separate written 
notice to Beneficiary. Any notice to Beneiiciary sbail be given oy first class mail to Beneficiary's address stated 
berem or any other address Bendociary designates by nonce to Trustor. Any nonce provided far in this Trust Deed 
shall be deemed to have"bccn given to Trustor or Beneficiary when given as provided in this paragraph. 
19. This Trust "Dt&d shall be construed and governed according to the Laws of the State of Utah. 
20. The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of deiault and of any nonce of sale 
hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinabove set forth. 
21. In the event any portion of this Trust Deed is declared invalid by a court of law or by legislative 
enactment all other provisions not so afected shall oe valid and binding upon the parties hereto. 
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KWTITO^S THEREOF Tiffi 
3ry^WftAitey 
STATE OF ^ 
COUNTY OF W 
ZlL 
Qntto^?P day of 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
ss. 
^ 2001, persorally appeared before m& Bryan Wimiiej„ the signer 
if £hc above instrument, who oubf acknowledged to m£ tnat^aej executed thejianie. i & * i
SOOS-9-t dX3 WWOO 
OAie W3BO HinOS 1-96 
HVMIP mis-snmMIOH 
Nossna T Nvor 
I\rfj444*s. 
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James L. Christensen, USB No. A0639 
Christopher G. Jessop, USB No. 8542 
CORBRIDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2705 
Telephone: 801/534-0909 
Fax: 801/534-1948 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
PROVO DEPARTMENT. STATE OF UTAH 
BRYAN J. WHATLEY, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
BRUCE E. CHAPMAN, CERI 
CHAPMAN, JAMES L. CHRISTENSEN, 
and DOES I-V, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE CHAPMAN 
Civil No. 020405636 
Judge #5 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Bruce Chapman, being first duly sworn, deposes and states that: 
1. I am a resident of Orem, Utah. 




im UM \ - 3: 00 
3. In 1980, my wife Ceri Chapman and I formed a corporation called World-Wide 
Photo, Incorporated, opened a photo finishing store in Provo, Utah, and began doing business as 
World-Wide Photo. 
4. World-Wide Photo was a successful business from the start. After several years 
of doing business in its Provo store, World-Wide Photo expanded and opened a new store in 
Pleasant Grove, Utah. 
5. After approximately 20 years in the photo-finishing business, my wife and I decided 
to sell World-Wide Photo. 
6. In early 2001, I began negotiating the sale of World-Wide Photo with Bryan 
Whatley ("Mr. Whatley"), who had expressed an interest in purchasing the business. 
7. On April 5, 2001, Mr. Whatley and I executed a Stock and Asset Purchase an Sale 
Agreement ("Agreement"). Pursuant to paragraph 6 of that Agreement, I delivered to Mr. 
Whatley all of World-Wide Photo's sales tax returns for the most recent 12 months and 
documentation on positive cash flow for his review and to allow him "to verify gross sales and 
trends" and positive cash flow of $10,000 a month. (Agreement, ^ 6.) A true and correct copy 
of the Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
8. Pursuant to the Agreement, Mr. Whatley was obligated to close his purchase of 
World-Wide Photo "no later than 30 days from the date of disclosure" unless, in his estimation 
I had "made a material misrepresentation, a material change not expressly contemplated by [the] 
[A]greement, or if the business,"""arttisclosed in [World-Wide Photo's] records, [was] not 
2 
reasonably capable, as of the date of closing, of supporting the payment of the obligation incurred 
by [Mr. Whatley]." (Id.) 
9. The Agreement also provides, in relevant part, "Should either party fail to perform 
its obligations hereunder, the non-defaulting party may notify the defaulting party of the general 
nature of the default. The allegedly defaulting party shall then have 45 days from receipt of that 
notice of default to cure that default. If the default is not cured within that 45 day period, the non-
defaulting party may declare this contract in default and shall be entitled to pursue any remedy 
available at law or equity, including, without limitation, foreclosure on the coiiaterai provided 
hereunder." (See Exhibit A, f 8.) 
10. Mr. Whatley demanded that the Agreement contain the following arbitration clause. 
In the event of a dispute under this agreement, the parties agree that any action 
brought shall be submitted to binding arbitration in accordance with the rules of the 
American Arbitration Association. Such arbitration need not be conducted by the 
American Arbitration Association, even though it would follow their rules. 
Arbitration proceedings shall be brought in Utah County, Utah, and not elsewhere. 
(See Exhibit A, 1[9(m).) 
11. Mr. Whatley pledged two parcels of real property as collateral for the Agreement: 
Lots 241 and 242, Plat F, Sherwood Hills Subdivision. 
12. Prior to closing, my wife and I approved the sale of World-Wide Photo to Mr. 
Whatley and resigned from our positions at World-Wide Photo. Later, we formalized this action 
by executing a corporate resolution made effective April 10, 2001. 
3 
13. On April 25, 2001, Mr. Whatley closed the transaction and executed the following 
documents: 
a. An Amendment that modifies paragraph 2(c) of the Agreement and 
acknowledges that Mr. Whatley has inspected the company's equipment; 
b. A promissory note in the amount of $457,500 in favor of me and my wife; 
c. A "Utah Deed Trust" in favor of Bruce Chapman in the amount of 
$457,500, which was recorded against Lot 241, Plat F, Sherwood Hills Subdivision as Entry 
^ t U J ^ O . L U U i III L11C KJICU.L ^ U U i i L ) JLVV^UI U-Ol C3 V i l l u s \Jli / i p i l l X, / , ^ U U i , 
d. A "Utah Deed Trust" in favor of Bruce Chapman in the amount of 
$457,500, which was recorded against Lot 242, Plat F, Sherwood Hills Subdivision as Entry 
40597:2001 in the Utah County Recorder's Office on April 27, 2001. 
14. I agreed to stay on as a consultant to Mr. Whatley after the sale of World-Wide 
Photo was complete. After the sale of World-Wide Photo Mr. Whatley was in contact with me 
on a regular basis. 
15. On June 22, 2001, Mr. Whatley and I executed an Assignment, Assumption, 
Consent Agreement for Mr. Whatley's assumption of the Provo store lease. 
16. On April 2, 2002, Mr. Whatley entered into a lease agreement with MM Property 
for new space located at 300 N., State Street in Orem, Utah. 
17. On April 23,2002, Mr. Whatley, through his attorney Timothy Miguel Willardson, 
sent a four-page notice4e-me that I was essentially in default under the Agreement and that he 
4 
(Mr. Whatley) would permanently close the doors to World-Wide Photo on Saturday, April 27, 
2002. 
18. Although the Agreement requires a 45 day cure period, Mr. Whatley demanded that 
I respond to his April 23, 2002, letter on or before April 25, 2002 and gave me no chance to cure 
any of the alleged defaults. 
19. Not wanting to see World-Wide Photo go out of business due to Mr. Whatley's 
unwillingness to continue with the company, I took possession of the business and began operating 
ii as a gratuitous^oailee and/or receiver for Mr. Whatley on Monday, April 29, 2002. I have been 
operating the business in that capacity ever since. 
20. Mr. Whatley stopped making his monthly payments for the business as required in 
the Agreement on or about April 23, 2002. 
21. On May 2, 2002, I sent a notice of default and demand to cure to Mr. Whatley 
through my attorney, James L. Christensen, for Mr. Whatley's breach of the purchase Agreement. 
22. On May 3, 2002, Mr. Willardson responded to the May 2, 2002 letter and alleged 
that his client was not in default and that there was no need to give Mr. Chapman 45 days to cure 
any alleged defaults. 
23. On May 31, 2002, I directed Mr. Christensen sent a letter to Mr. Willardson 
requesting an accounting of World-Wide Photo's finances while under the control of Mr. Whatley. 
No such accounting has ever been given to either myself or my attorney. 
5 
24. On June 7, 2002, I sent another letter to Mr. Whatley through my attorney 
indicating that I had cured each of the defaults alleged in Mr. Whatley's April 23, 2002 letter. 
25. On December 5, 2002, I directed my attorney to file a demand for the arbitration 
of this matter with the American Arbitration Association, which my attorney did. A true and 
correct copy of the demand for arbitration is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
26. In response to my demand for arbitration, Mr. Whatley, through his attorney, filed 
a complaint in the above-captioned court on or about December 19, 2002. 
27. At no lime has my aitorney, James L. Chrisiensen ("Mr. Chrisiensen"), ever been 
a shareholder of, or in any way affiliated with World-Wide Photo. 
28. The Stock and Asset Purchase and Sale Agreement was not drafted by Mr. 
Christensen; it was drafted by Timothy Willardson, counsel for Mr. Whatley. After Mr. 
Willardson drafted the Agreement, I showed it to Mr. Christensen, who suggested that a few 
revisions be made to it. Mr. Willardson incorporated some of the suggested revisions into the 
Agreement and refused to make others. 
29. All of the terms of the Agreement were negotiated directly between myself and Mr. 
Whatley. I did not involve Mr. Christensen in any of the negotiations between myself and Mr. 
6 
Whatlev, but asked him to become involved in discussing the structure and wording of the 
Agreement with Mr. Willardson. 
DATED this j t ^ d a y of J anuar) , 2003. 
Bruce Chapman 
Subscribed, sworn to, and acknowledged before me this day of January, 2003 by 
Chapman, signer of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed 
'.»me /? * 
Notary Public 
7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, 
to the following at the address(es) indicated o;. :n-«. /^ _ cllv of-W^lAfi/l^il/li j ^LU^J^) 
1 aiiuthy Miguel Willardson 
10885 South State Street 




STOCK AND ASSET PURCHASE AND SALE 
1 
A. Identification of parti es i 
This document constitutes the agreement, made and entered into at Orem, in the State of Utah, on or 
about Thursday, April 5th, 2001, between Bruce E. Chapman acting on behalf of himself and his wife, 
Ceri Chapman, both of whom reside at, 1421 S Carterville Rd, Orem UT 84098, (hereinafter referred 
• to collectively as ''SELLERS") party of the first part, and Bryan Whatley, an individual residing at 
15265 Del Poniente Court, Poway, CA 92064, (hereinafter referred to as "BUYER") party of the 
second part: 
B. Recital^ 
WHEREAS, SELLERS are desirous of having BUYER purchase all of the outstanding stock of 
World-Wide Photo, Incorporated ("WWP"). a Utah Corporation with registered offices at 1421 S. 
Carterville Rd, Orem. UT 84098 and principal place of business at 547 W, Coli imbia I ane, Provo, UT 
84604; 
AND WHEREAS, WWP has determined that it is in its own best interest to limit sales of suck K n<; 
more than 35 individuals; 
AND WHEREAS, WWP has determined that it is in its own best interest to offer such stock under 
one or more of the registration exemptions under-the Securities Act of 1933; 
AND WHEREAS, WWP has determined that it is in its own best interest to offer such stock under 
one or more of the registration exemptions under the Utah Securities Acts; 
J^-^J^ WHEREAS, JbUYER has been expressly informed that the stock which he is purchasing is 
being sold under one or more registration exemptions under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Utah 
Securities Act and therefore may not be resold except pursuant to subsequent registration made or 
exemption obtained; . • 
/ TI \ - lEPr Ac T'T ' v r r * and able to provide pnvment in exchange for stock and assets; 
AND WHEREAS, SELLERS, oeing the owner of record of One I housand (1,000) shares of WWP 
stock, which shares constitute One Hundred Percent (100%) of the outstanding shares of WWP (the 
"Shares"); 
AND WHEREAS SELLERS own the following listed equipment [ 1 ea. freezer, 1 ea. paper cutter 
20K, 1 ea. Speedmaster densitometer, 1 ea. cardboard slide mounter, 2 ea. Durst 78U printer, 1 ea. 
Oscar Fisher mixing tank] which is leased to WWP and which SELLERS are willing and able to sell 
and which BUYER requires as part of the acquired business; 
AND WHEREAS SELLERS have
 representecLthaLgross sales of WWP for last year (2000) 
amounted to at least $800,000, and that level of sales generated sufficient positive cash flow to fund 
wages, salaries and other benefits to SELLERS which will be terminated on closing, of at least 
2 
Si 0,000 each and every month1; The parties acknowledge that SELLERS are not guaranty in 7 future 
sales or operating expenses at the level enjoyed under SELLERS' management, on I}' that 
performance of WWP under SELLERS' management was as described by SELLERS. 
C. Terms 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises herein contained, the parties agree as 
follows 
1. Stock and Warranties, 
SELLERS warrant that SELLERS are the sole and complete owners of the Shares, and that 
SELLERS own no other or further shares, and that SELLERS have all of the rights, privileges and 
authorities necessary to sell said Shares in WWP to BUYER. SELLERS further warrant that the 
Shares are not encumbered in any way, including as security for any purpose, that said Shares are free 
from any liens, encumbrances, interest, and judicial processes including but not limited to any marital 
or ownership interest in the Shares or its proceeds by any former spouses. SELLERS further warrant 
that surrendering the Shares will not violate any court order or requirement, and that the sale of the 
Shares will completely extinguish SELLERS' ownership rights of anv nature or kind in WWP. 
WWP, by and through its current President Bruce Chapman and Vice President Cen Chapman 
warrants that the only issued and outstanding shares authorized by it are the 1.000 shares issued to 
SELLERS WWP furtner warrants that it is a riulv authorized Utah corporation in good standing. 
BUYER hereby represents that he is acquiring the Shares for his own account, for investment, and 
noi with a view to or for resale in connection with any distribution thereof. BUYER acknowledges 
that the Shares are subject to the following restriction which will be noted as a legend in substantially 
the following form on the face of the certificates representing the Shares: 
THE SECURITIES REPRESENTED BY THIS CERTIFICATE HAVE NOT BEEN 
REGISTERED UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, AS AMENDED (THE "ACT") 
OR QUALIFIED UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS OF ANY STATE (TPIE "LAW"). 
SUCH SECURITIES HAVE BEEN ACQUIRED FOR INVESTMENT AND NEITHER 
SAID SHARES NOR ANY INTEREST THEREIN MAY BE SOLD OR OFFERED FOR 
SALE IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EFFECTIVE REGISTRATION STATEMENT FOR 
THE SHARES UNDER THE ACT AND QUALIFICATION UNDER THE LAW OR AN 
OPINION OF COUNSEL SATISFACTORY TO THE CORPORATION THAT SUCH 
REGISTRATION AND QUALIFICATION ARE NOT REQUIRED AS TO SAID SALE 
OR OFFER. 
BUYER further represents that he has such knowledge and experience in business and financial 
matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of investing in tne WWP. BUYER 
understands the speculative nature of nis investment in the WWP and represents that he has adeqiidt-
1
 Tnis is a materia] representation because SELLERS will not show WWP f mancials to BUYER before closing, 
and SELLERS' representation tc BUYER (tnat tne positive cash flow of at least $10,000 each month continues to trie date 
of closing ana tnat SELLERS are selling all assets of tne business tnar were necessary to achieving tne sales and casn 
flow represented by SELLERS to BUYER) was essential to BUYER'S decision to purcnase tne business anu assets. 
net worth and means to provide for his current needs and to sustain a complete loss of his 
investment and that BUYER has no need of liquidity of his investment. 
BUYER understands thai at present no public market exists, and that a public market ma) never 
exist, for the Shares and thai WWP is under no obligation to provide a market for the Shares. 
SELLERS pledge and warrant to BUYER: tnat the assets of WWP, and the assets of SELLERS that 
are being sold hereunder, are unencumbered, fret of liens, and not pledged as collateral to other 
parties. 
2, Purchase Price and Payment 
a. Price and Payirtrnl Je rn ts 
BUYER shall pa\ to SELLERS, at closing, the sum of $400,000, allocated $375,000 to stock, 
$25,000 to equipment, plus an additional sum for the mutual!} agreeable value of inventory in stork 
as of the date of closing, as discussed below. 
Payment shall be made by deliver} of a promisson ncue in the amount of the purchase price payable 
to Bruce and Ceri Chapman. 
SELLERS shall, upon receipt of payment, transfer to BUYER a total of 1,000 shares of stock, which 
number of shares is and shall remain through closing, all of the issued and outstanding shares of 
WWP. Payment shall be completed, for purposes of this section, by delivery of a promissory note in 
the principal amount of the purchase price, bearing interest at 10% per annum, payable in monthly 
installments of $5,000 with no prepayment penalty until paid in full. All payments in excess of or in 
addition to the minimum monthly payment may be, at BUYER'S election, treated as payments tor 
succeeding months, or as payment of principal in advance. That election ma} be made at any time, or 
changed to prevent default. 
b t r i l a t e ra l for BUYER'S obligations 
BUYER shall, ai closing, execute in favor ot SELLERS, a security agreement and financing 
statements pledging all of the tangible assets owned by WWP as of closing to secure the payment of 
all indebtedness contemplated in this agreement. After-acquired proper!} and accretions shall not be 
so encumbered. In addition, BUYER shall secure the payment of that indebtedness by a deed of trust, 
with SELLERS, or either of them at SELLERS election, as beneficiary, covering lots 242 and 243 of 
Sherwood Hills subdivision; plat F. Attached hereto are copies of the most recent Utah County real 
property tax notices for those two lots, showing valuation of each at ewer $42,000 and ownership in 
BUYER. BUYER represents and warrants the authentic]!} oi those tax notices and that he is the 
record owne r of the lots described therein, but makes no representation as to tne accuracy of any 
information contained therein except for his identity and address. SELLERS ma}', at their option and 
their own expense, purchase title insurance to further secure their position. 
c. Sale of collateral 
BUYER ana WWP ma) elect to sell an} collateral securing obligations hereunder, but am such sale 
shall result in payment to SELLERS of the net proceeds of such sale as follows: 
For sale of any assets of the business. 100% of the ne: sale proceeds (with deductions inducing, but 
. ^ e ; -
not limited to, any taxes that are incurred as a result of such sale) shall be promptly paid to 
SELLERS; 
For sale of the realty, SELLERS shall be entitled to receive the entire net sale proceeds as defined 
above of either lot sold for a net amount of $50,000 or less, but if the lots or either of them are sold 
for a net sale proceeds of more than $50,000, SELLERS shall make no claim upon the net sale 
proceeds in excess of $50,000. If the lots are sold through foreclosure due to default of BUYER 
hereunder, SELLERS may keep the entire sale price, not to exceed the sum of the principal amount 
outstanding on the promissory note, plus reasonable and necessary legal fees that would otherwise be 
recoverable under the terms of this agreement. However, if such proceeds equal or exceed the amount 
of the arrearage, such a sale will be conclusively deemed to cure BUYER'S default and any sale 
proceeds in excess of the arrearage shall be counted as an advance payment hereunder. 
d. Sale of Business 
If BUYER elects to sell the entire business (WWP), BUYER shall be required to pay off the unpaid 
balance of the note referenced above at closing of that sale. 
3. Distr ibut ions or Changes. 
No distributions or changes of any material aspect of the corporation or its condition shall be made, 
from the date of execution of this agreement, unless approved by BUYER and a fair adjustment of 
any effected contract terms is made. All assets and liabilities in the business as of the date of 
execution shall remain in WWP except the following: 
a. One Kodak 2711 digital printing lab; one Noritsu V70 C-41 film processor; and one B&W 
470 film processor, all of which are under lease, shall be transferred to SELLERS and 
SELLERS shall indemnify WWP and BUYER from all costs, loss, liability and/or expense 
related thereto which accrues on or after the date of execution of this agreement. Resolution 
of this matter to the mutual satisfaction of both BUYER and SELLERS is a condition 
precedent to closing. 
b. Accounts Receivable C'A/R") and Accounts Payable ("A/P") as of the date of closing of this 
agreement shall be transferred to SELLERS and SELLERS shall indemnify WWP and 
BUYER from all costs, loss, liability and/or expense related thereto. 
c. All A/R and A/P after the date of closing of this agreement shall remain in WWP and WWP 
shall indemnify SELLERS from all costs, loss, liability and/or expense related thereto which 
accrues on or after the date of closing of this agreement. 
d. BUYER and SELLERS shall negotiate a mutually acceptable value amount to compensate 
SELLERS or to allow SELLERS to recover a mutually agreeable value of inventory in stock 
as of the date of closing. Resolution of this matter to the mutual satisfaction of both BUYER 
and SELLERS is a condition precedent to closing. That mutual agreement shall be reduced to 
writing and signed by all parties and that document shall be constructed-as-part of this 
document. 
e. SELLERS have represented to BUYER that the business has no outstanding liabilities other 
than the three equipment leases to be transferred to SELLERS as stated above. Therefore. 
SELLERS shall indemnify and hold BUYER harmless for any claim or liability against that 
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arises out of or relates to events prior to the date of closing of this agreement. BUYER shall 
indemnify and hold SELLERS harmless for any claim or liability that arises out of or relates 
to events prior to the date of closing of this agreement. 
f. SELLERS are to transfer ownership of the following assets out of WWP prior to closing of 
the sale and such transfer will not effect the purchase price: 
The balance of the following checking accounts shall be transferred to SELLERS, but 
SELLERS shall allow BUYER to put funds in to leave the accounts open and all signatory 
authority for these accounts shall be removed for SELLERS and their agents: 
First Security Bank checking account # 3321016945 
First Security Bank savings account* 332-8436715 
Oppenheimer money market account # 200 2001319032 
Oppenheimer money market account # 200 2005689156 
Since SELLERS are bound under this agreement to indemnify BUYER for all costs, losses, 
and expenses that arise from events prior to closing, SELLERS may, at their option, leave 
sufficient funds in those accounts to cover such items in those categories as are known in 
advance, such as accrued payroll and taxes. 
g. The parties acknowledge that World-Wide Photo Pension, which is not owned by WWP and 
which has not been funded for three years, will remain under the ownership and direction of 
SELLERS and that SELLERS will remain liable for all aspect of that pension fund. 
4. Realty 
SELLERS have disclosed to BUYER that the two pieces of real property which are essential to the 
operation of the business being sold and purchased have problems with the leases. The Provo location 
( 547 W. Columbia Lane) is leased to Bruce Chapman personally, and not to WWP, under a written 
lease from Southland Corporation that prevents assignments or subleases. The Pleasant Grove 
location is rented from month to month only and the owner of that property has recently died. 
Therefore, the sale contemplated hereunder is made expressly contingent upon (1) obtaining from the 
Southland Corporation, a written acceptance and continuation of the lease in favor of WWP in form 
and content satisfactory to BUYER and (2) obtaining an agreement with both the de facto and de jure 
owner(s) regarding the use of the Pleasant Grove location satisfactory in form and content to 
BUYER. 
5. Confidential i ty. Non-Circumvention, Non-Competit ion 
Each party hereto hereby promises the other party that it will not itself, nor will it allow nor assist a 
third party, to circumvent the other party on any opportunity which may reasonably fall within the 
scope of this agreement. In furtherance of this mutual promise, the parties acknowledge that BUYER 
and the BUYER employees to whom information has been disclosed have previously signed 
confidentiality agreements as to information disclosed in connection with the sale contemplated by 
this agreement. That obligation of BUYER shall be voided upon closing of the sale contemplated 
hereby. Those obligations of BUYER'S employees shall be. upon closing, transferred to BUYER. 
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SELLERS agree that by execution of this agreement they are agreeing to be bound to the same 
obligation of confidentiality that BUYER incurred prior to closing and that obligation of SELLERS 
shall survive the termination of this agreement for a period not less than five (5) years, during which 
time SELLERS will not themselves, nor will they assist or allow a third party to, use said confidential 
information for purposes of trade or business competition. 
SELLERS agree that, except as provided for, for a period of three (3) years from the closing date 
hereof SELLERS will not in the geographical area hereinafter mentioned, directly or indirectly, in 
any individual or representative capacity whatsoever, engage in the business of, or, as owner, 
employee, stockholder, partner, sole proprietor, joint venturer, or otherwise manage, operate, control, 
assist, participate, be connected with or render any consultation or business advice, with regard to any 
business engaged in photographic processing or finishing. Bruce Chapman, with the prior written 
approval of BUYER, may work, as an employee only, for a noncompetitive photo lab in the 
geographical area hereinafter mentioned. BUYER acknowledges that SELLERS may, without 
violating this agreement, do photographic printing and enlarging, only, for any immediate family 
members, including Bruce Chapman's mother, and as payment in kind for the following named 
professionals only; Jim Christensen, Gary Mathews, Rdean Clark, Phillip Plothow and Roland 
Monson. SELLERS may also, without violating this agreement, sell photographic prints and 
enlargements by mail order, as long as such sales are not in competition with WWP and BUYER., i.e., 
the sales are limited to customers of SELLERS who both (i) have not, prior to the date of this 
agreement, been a customer of either WWP or Campus Photo and (ii) which have no presence in all 
of the following two counties in the state of Utah: Utah County and Salt Lake County. SELLERS 
may also, without violating this agreement, print Ilfochrome prints from one individual wildlife and 
nature photographer, named B.R. [NAME]. The exclusions above for immediate family, out of area 
mail order, and in-kind payment, do not allow SELLERS to develop and process photographic film. 
However, BUYER shall, for the three (3) year period commencing on the date of closing, develop 
and process photographic film, from that excluded group only (immediate family, out of area mail 
order, and in-kind payment), for the SELLRS for the cost of materials plus 10%. In doing any 
business not proscribed by this portion of the agreement, SELLERS may not use the name of WWP 
and shall disclose to anyone who might be aware of SELLERS' former affiliation with WWP that 
SELLERS are no longer so affiliated. This requirement of disclosure specifically includes, but is not 
limited to, dealing with past, present, or future customers or suppliers of WWP. 
The geographical area to which the preceding covenant refers is all of Utah County and all of Salt 
Lake County in the state of Utah. 
SELLERS declare that the foregoing territorial and time limits are reasonable, and are properly 
required for the adequate protection of the assets to be acquired by BUYER from SELLERS, and that 
in the event that any such territorial or time limitation is deemed to be unreasonable by a court of 
competent jurisdiction, SELLERS agrees and submits to the reduction of either said territorial or time 
limitation, or both, to such area or a period of time as by said court shall be deemed reasonable. 
SELLERS further declare that the foregoing restrictive covenants, limited in time and territory as 
aforesaid, are ancillary to sale of WWP, and are necessary to protect BUYER in the enjoyment of and 
beneficial use and ownership of the business thereby acquired. 
In the event SELLERS, should be in violation of the restrictive covenants herein above set forth, then 
the time limitation thereof shall be extended for a period of time equal to the period of time during 
wnich such breach or breaches should occur; and in the event BUYER should be required to seek 
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relief from any such breach in any court the restrictive covenant shall be extended for a period of 
time equal to the pendency of all proceedings before such court, including all appeals. 
SELLERS shall be jointly and severally liable to BUYER and WWP for any and all damages, costs, 
and legal fees which are suffered by BUYER or WWP by reason of any violation of this agreement, 
including, without limitation, both incidental and consequential damages. In addition, SELLERS 
hereby acknowledge that money damages alone would not adequately compensate BUYER in the 
event of a breach by SELLERS of the foregoing restrictive covenant, and therefore, SELLERS 
hereby covenant and agree that in addition to all other remedies available to BUYER at law or in 
equity, BUYER shall be entitled to injunctive relief for the enforcement thereof. 
The existence of any claim or cause of action by SELLERS against BUYER shall not constitute: a 
defense to the enforcement of the foregoing restrictive covenant, but shall be litigated separately. 
BUYER shall have the right to assign the aforesaid restrictive covenant in the event BUYER desires 
hereafter to sell all or any part of WWP, whether still operating under the same name or if the name 
has been changed, and SELLERS agrees to be bound by the terms of said restrictive covenant to any 
and all subsequent purchasers and assigns of said business. 
6. Closing 
Closing shall occur at a mutually convenient time after SELLERS have made available to BUYER 
the sales tax returns for the most recent 12 months of operations of WWP. That disclosure is intended 
to allow BUYER to verify gross sales and trends. SELLERS shall also make available documentation 
on positive cash flow and payments to or for the benefit of SELLERS that will cease at closing. The 
purpose of these disclosures is to allow BUYER to confirm that, at closing WWP will have had a 
positive cash flow of at least $10,000 each and every month for the 12 calendar months preceding 
closing. BUYER shall be obliged to close within a period no later than 30 days from the date of 
disclosure of the above information by SELLERS unless SELLERS shall have made a material 
misrepresentation, a material change not expressly contemplated by this agreement, or if the business, 
as disclosed in WWP's records, is not reasonably capable, as of the date of closing, of supporting the 
payment of the obligation incurred by BUYER hereunder. This paragraph shall not be construed to 
vitiate any other express contingencies contained in this agreement. If BUYER fails to close for any 
reason, the obligation of confidentiality previously undertaken by BUYER shall remain in effect for a 
period of five (5) years from the date of refusal or failure to close. 
7. Consultation by SELLERS 
Bruce E. Chapman will, for a term of 60 days after closing, consult with BUYER regarding any 
aspect of the business without additional charge. Such consulting shall be during normal business 
hours and shall not exceed 20 hours in any calendar week. 
8. Default 
Should either party fail to perform its obligations hereunder— the-non-defaulting party may notify the 
defaulting party of the general nature of the default. The allegedly defaulting party shall then have 45 
days from receipt of that notice of default to cure that default. If the default is not cured within that 45 
day period, the non-defaulting party may declare this contract in default and shall be entitled to 
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pursue any remedy that may be available at law or equity, including, without limitation, foreclosure 
on the collateral provided for hereunder. 
9. Miscellaneous Provis ions 
a. Integration 
This contract contains the entire contract between the BUYER and the SELLERS, and no agent or 
representative of the corporation or any other person has any power to change or alter the terms of 
this agreement. 
h. Binding effect 
This agreement shall bind and inure to the benefit of the respective heirs, personal representatives, 
successors, and permitted assigns of the parties. 
c. Dividends and Earnings. 
It is agreed that other than those expressly specified herein, SELLERS shall not be entitled to any-
retained earnings of WWP after the date of execution of this agreement, or to any assets of WWP, or 
to any shareholder dividends of WWP. 
d. Resignation of Employment. 
SELLERS hereby resign from WWP and terminates their employment status with WWP, effective as 
of the Closing Date. SELLERS have previously retrieved their personal property from the WWP 
premises. 
e. Execution of Resolution. 
SELLERS warrant that each has or will execute, in their respective capacities as shareholders, a 
corporate resolution approving the purchase by BUYER of SELLERS' One Hundred Percent (100%) 
interest in WWP. 
f Resignation as Officer and Director. 
SELLERS, and each of them, hereby resign as officers and directors of WWP as of the Closing Date. 
SELLERS, if necessary, will execute all of the necessary corporate documents to complete this 
transaction, including removal of SELLERS from WWP's bank and other accounts. 
g. Release. 
SELLERS warrant that neither is aware of any claims or potential claims against WWP, or SELLERS 
or either of them. SELLERS, and each of them, herein completely and totally release, quit, and 
discharge WWP, its officers, directors, employees, and agents, their successors and assigns, from all 
claims, rights of action, and causes of action, arising from, derived from or related to their respective 
ownership of WWP stock, employment with WWP, or any other relationship with WWP and the 
above-referenced persons. This release of all claims includes with respect to all persons and entities 
above, all damages including but not limited to actual, incidental and consequential in all civil, 
criminal, and administrative causes, causes and claims including but not limited to unemployment 
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compensation, worker's compensation, and personal tax liabilities. SELLERS further agree to hold 
WWP, and BUYER, including their agents, attorneys and shareholders harmless from any and all 
claims as referenced in this Section. 
BUYER warrants that he is neither aware of any claims or potential claims against CAMPUS 
PHOTO, or BUYER. BUYER herein completely and totally releases, quits, and discharges 
SELLERS, their agents, successors and assigns, from all claims, rights of action, and causes of 
action, arising from, derived from or related to BUYER'S ownership of CAMPUS PHOTO, 
employment with CAMPUS PHOTO, or any other relationship with CAMPUS PHOTO and the 
above-referenced persons. This release of all claims includes with respect to all persons and entities 
above, all damages including but not limited to actual, incidental and consequential in all civil, 
criminal, and administrative causes, causes and claims including but not limited to unemployment 
compensation, worker's compensation, and personal tax liabilities. BUYER further agree to hold 
SELLERS, including their agents, and attorneys harmless from any and all claims as referenced in 
this Section. 
h. Ownership of Claims and Corporate Authorization. 
Each party to this agreement warrants and represents thai ii is the holder and owner of the claims 
subject to this agreement, that each has not assigned or otherwise conveyed to any person, firm, or 
entity any interest and any claim, demand or cause of action covered by the terms of this agreement 
and that there are no liens or encumbrances against the claims. 
i. Brokerage. 
The parties represent that there are no brokerage or other commissions relative to the sale and transfer 
of the Shares by SELLERS. 
j . Acknowledgment. 
Each party hereby acknowledges that he or she has been given the opportunity to review the terms 
and conditions of this Agreement with any legal or other advisor of his or her own choice and that he 
or she fully understands-and knowingly consents to the terms and conditions hereof. 
k. Assignment. 
No party shall assign, sublet, or transfer any interest in this agreement without the prior, express, and 
written consent of the others. 
1. Non-liability. 
Nothing in this agreement shall be construed as creating any personal liability on the part of any 
officer or agent that may be a party to this agreement, nor shall it be construed as giving any rights or 
benefits under this agreement to anyone other than the parties to this agreement. 
m. Disputes/ Arbitration 
In the event of a dispute under this agreement, the parties agree that any action brought shall be 
submitted to binding arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration 
Association. Such arbitration need not be conducted by the American Arbitration Association, even 
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though it would follow their rules. Arbitration proceedings shall be brought in Utah County, Utah, 
and not elsewhere. 
n. Authority for Execution 
SELLERS represent that they have taken all steps necessary to comply with all corporate 
requirements to enter into this agreement. The party signing below on behalf of WWP warrants he 
has authorization from WWP to execute this agreement on behalf of WWP. The parties, by their 
signatures below, represent and warrant that he or she is competent to enter this agreement, fully 
understands the same, and does so agree by his or her own free will and choice. 
o. No Waiver. 
The failure of any party to this agreement to insist upon the performance of any of the terms and 
conditions of this agreement, or the waiver of any breach of any of the terms and conditions of this 
agreement, shall not be construed as thereafter waiving any such terms and conditions except as 
specifically set forth herein, but the same shall continue and remain in full force and effect as if no 
such forbearance or waiver had occurred. 
p. Governing Law. 
It is agreed that this agreement shall be governed by. construed, and enforced in accordance with the 
laws of the State of Utah. 
q. Attorney Fees. 
In the event that any action is filed in relation to this agreement, the unsuccessful party in the action 
shall pay to the successful party, in addition to all the sums that either party may be called on to pay, 
a reasonable sum for the successful party's attorneys' fees and costs. 
r. Effect of Partial Invalidity. 
The invalidity of any portion of this agreement will not and shall not be deemed to affect the validity 
of any other provision. In the event that any provision of this agreement is held to be invalid, the 
parties agree that the remaining provisions shall be deemed to be in full force and effect as if they had 
been executed by both parties subsequent to the expungement of the invalid provision. 
s. Entire Agreement. 
This agreement shall constitute the entire agreement between the parties and any prior understanding 
or representation of any kind preceding the date of this agreement shall not be binding upon either 
party except to the extent incorporated in this agreement. 
t. Modification of Agreement. 
Any modification of this agreement or additional obligation assumed by either party in connection 
with this agreement shall be binding only if placed in writing and signed by each party or an 
authorized representative of each party. 
u. Notices, 
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Any notice provided for or concerning this agreement shall be in writing and be deemed sufficiently 
given when sent by certified or registered mail to the respective address of each party as set forth at 
the beginning of this agreement. 
v. Paragraph Headings. 
The titles to the paragraphs of this agreement are solely for the convenience of the parties and shall 
not be used to explain, modify, simplify, or aid m the interpretation of the provisions of this 
agreement. 
w. Counterparts. 
This agreement may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be 
an original, but all of which together shall constitute but one and the same instrument. 
D. Execution 




Bruce E. Chapman, SELLER 
r^ 
Ceri Chapman, SELLER 
WWP. inc., a Utah corporation 
\JL Bruce E. Chapman 
Its: President 
STATE OF UTAH 
:ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
On the ^J day of April, 2001, personally appeared before me Bryan Whatley, personally known 
to me or proven on the basis of satisf-actory evidence, who being by me duly sworn, did acknowledge 
that he executed the foregoing for its stated purposes. 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
.ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
On the \ 1 day of April, 2001, personally appeared before me Bruce E Chapman, personally 
known to me or proven on the basis of satisfactory evidence, who being by me duly sworn, did 
acknowledging he^exegutedjhe foregoing^for its stated purposes 
f
 4 v » ; > -0WPUBLIC-SmofITM , J^fasl'Tlu , 
?( vi^BA- 1323SOUT' s:o-AS', NOTARY PUBLIC 
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ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
On the £ day of April, 2001, personally appeared before me Cen Chapman, personally known 
to me or proven on the basis of satisfactory evidence, who being by me duly sworn, did acknowledge 
that SELLERS executed the foregoing for its stated purposes 
} W^V^V; < ' OUiRF wi " ow*'1 , NOTARY PUBLIC /7 
STATE OFJQTAH ^ j ^ i r ^ ? ^Ll 
' .ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
On the o day of April, 2001, personally appeared before me Bruce E Chapman, who being by 
me duly sworn did say that he is the President of World-Wide Photo, Incorporated, a Utah 
corporation, and that the within and foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by 
authority of its Bylaws or a resolution of its Board of Directors, and Bruce E Chapman duly 
acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same 
\\\$**V< op 1T, • 12 - r-, pq7 i N^TARY PUBLIC 
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AMENDMENT 
This Amendment is entered into by and between Bruce E. Chapman, Ceri Chapman, 
World Wide Photo, Inc. and Bryan Whatley on this 3S day of April, 2001. 
RECITALS 
WHEREAS, the above-described parties entered into a document entitled, "Stock and 
Asset Purchase and Sale" on or about April 5, 2001; and 
WHEREAS, the parties desire to clarify certain issues that have arisen since the 
execution of that document. 
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises herein contained, the parties 
agree as follows: 
1. Paragraph 2.(c) is hereby deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following 
paragraph: 
c. Sale of collateral 
BUYER and World Wide Photo, Inc. may elect to sell any collateral securing obligations 
hereunder, but any such sale shall result in payment of SELLERS of the net proceeds of such 
sale as follows: 
For sale of any equipment or assets of the business purchased from SELLERS under this 
Agreement, 100% of the net sale proceeds (with deductions including, buL not limited to, any 
taxes that are incurred as a result of such sale) shall be promptly paid to SELLERS: 
For sale of the realty, SELLERS shall be entitled to receive the entire net sale proceeds as 
defined above for either lot sold for a net amount of $50,000 or less, each, but if the lots or 
either of them are sold for a net sale proceeds of more than $50,000 each, SELLERS shall 
make no claim upon the net sale proceeds in excess of $50,000 each. If the lots are sold 
through foreclosure due to default of BUYER hereunder, SELLERS m:iy keep the entire sale 
price, not to exceed the sum of the principal amount outstanding on the promissory note, plus 
reasonable and necessary legal fees that would otherwise be recoverable under die terms of this 
agreement However, if such proceeds equal or exceed the amount 
of the arrearage, such a sale will be conclusively deemed to cure BUYER'S default and any sale 
proceeds in excess of the arrearage shall be counted as an advance payment hereunder. 
2. The parties acknowledge and agree that BUYER has not and does not rely on 
any information, schedules or other representations supplied or made by Bruce Chapman to 
BUYER regarding the value of equipment owned by World Wide Photo, Inc., or being sold to 
BUYER under this Agreement. BUYER has inspected the equipment and has made his own 
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independent assessment of the value of the equipment and is purchasing World Wide Photo, 
Inc. based on his own analysis of the value of the equipment owned by World Wide Photo, 
Inc. and Brace Chapman. 





A SI I / \ 
Bruce JE, Chapman. SELLE 
yU/)W 
Cheri Chapman, SELLER 
World Wide Photo, Inc., a Utah Corporation 






AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES 
DEMAND FOR ARBITRATION 
MEDIATION is a nonbinding process. The mediator assists the parties in working out a solution that is acceptable to them. If you 
wish for the AAA to contact the other parties to ascertain whether they wish to mediate this matter, please check this box 
(there is no additional administrative fee for this service). 
TO: Name 
B r i a n Whatley 
Name of Representative (if known) 
Timothy W i l l a r d s o n , e s q . 
Name of Firm (if applicable) 
n / a 
Address 
10885 S. S t a t e S t r e e t 
Representative's Address 
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Fax No. 
801-576-1960 
The named claimant, a party to an arbitration agreement contained in a written contract, dated 
A p r i l 5, 2001
 ancj providing for arbitration under the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the 
American Arbitration Association, hereby demands arbitration thereunder. 
Is THIS A DISPUTE BETWEEN A BUSINESS AND A CONSUMER? 0 Y es iNo 
THE NATURE OF THE DISPUTE Mr. Whatley1 s breach of a Stock and A s s e t Purchase and 
S a l e Agreement f o r t h e purchase of World-Wide P h o t o , I n c o r p o r a t e d ; and Mr. WhatleyTs 
abandonment of t h e b u s i n e s s . 
THE CLAIM OR RELIEF SOUGHT (the Amount, if Any) Damages i n t h e amount of n o t l e s s than 
$ 2 9 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 , p l u s a t t o r n e y 1 s f e e s and c o s t s . 
DOES THIS DISPUTE ARISE OUT OF AN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP? D Yes £] No 
TYPES OF BUSINESS 
Claimant Photo d e v e l o p i n g / p r o c e s s i n g Respondent Photo d e v e l o p i n g / p r o c e s s i n g 
HEARING LOCALE REQUESTED 
You are hereby notified that copies of our arbitration agreement and this demand are being filed with the American 
Arbitration Association at its F r e s n o > C A office, with a request that it commence administration of the 
arbitration. Under the rules, you may file an answering statement within fifteen days after notice from the AAA. 
Signature (may bg sigrfedly$a rep^sentatK Title 
Attorney 
Date 
December 5 , 2002 
^faaas^f Claimant 
B ru c e Ch apman 
Name of Representative 
James L / C h r i s t e n s e n 
Name of Firm (if Applicable) 
ICorh r idge Baird & C h r i s t e n s e n 
Address (to Be Used in Connection with This Case) 
39 Exchange P l a c e , S u i t e 100 
Representative's Address 
39 Exchange P l a c e , S u i t e 100 






801 -534 -0909 
Fax No. 
801-534-1948 
TO INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, PLEASE SEND TWO COPIES OF THIS DEMAND AND THE ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENT, WITH TFIE FILING FEE AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE RULES, TO THE AAA. SEND THE 
nPTHTMAT DEMAND TO THE RESPONDENT. 
Jllh U I 2o pjj '03 
Timothy Miguel Willardson (4443) Q ^ J 
10 8 8 5 S outh State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Telephone: (801) 576-1400 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRYAN J. WHATLEY, 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
Bruce E. Chapman, Ceri Chapman, James L. 
Christensen, and Does I - V, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' J M O T I O N S TO COMPEL 
ARBITRATION AND TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 020405636 
Judge: #5 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
COMES NOW Plaintiff by and through his attorney of record and opposes Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint, and Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration as 
follows: 
Disputed Material Facts 
Rule 12 provides that, upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted where matters beyond the pleadings are presented, that uthe motion shall be treated as 
one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given 
reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." 
Because Defendants have elected to supply an affidavit of Mr, Chapman, their motion to dismiss 
clearly falls within that provision and this motion is governed by Rule 56 As is set forth more 
fully in the accompanying motion for relief under Rule 56(f), Mr. Whatley cannot fairly meet all 
of the assertions of alleged fact without discover}' in this matter. 
In addition, Defendant's "Introduction" contains a number of disparaging comments about Mr. 
Whatley which are unsupported and which are not referenced in the "facts'* proposed. 
Gratuitous disparagement is inappropriate argumentation and should be stricken. To the extent 
that it is not, Mr. Whatley is entitled to discovery to determine what he is being accused of and 
time to rebut the accusation, 
Nevertheless, to assist the Court and parties in framing the issues in this matter, where some of 
the bases of factual disputes are already known, those disputes are set forth below in numbered 
paragraphs that correspond, in subject matter, to the correspondingly numbered paragraphs of 
Defendants' memorandum in support of their motions. 
1. Plaintiff has no knowledge of this allegation. Discovery is needed. 
2. Plaintiff has no knowledge of this allegation. Discovery is needed. 
3. Plaintiff has no knowledge of this allegation. Discovery is needed. 
4. MR. WHATLEY did not initiate contact as is implied by Defendants, nor had 
MR. WHATLEY communicated with anyone, prior to Mr. Chapman's solicitation, that MR. 
WHATLEY had interest in purchasing World-Wide Photo. Mr. Chapman approached Mr. 
Whatley in early February 2001. While MR. WHATLEY^as in Orlando at the 2001 PMA 
show one of his employees gave Mr. Whatley a message that Mr. Chapman had called him, and 
wanted to talk to me. The employee gave Mr. Whatley Mr. Chapman's telephone number and 
MR. WHATLEY returned his call. In this initial conversation. Chapman stated that he knew 
MR. WHATLEY was at the PMA show, and that before MR. WHATLEY made any significant 
purchases, he wanted to let Mr. Whatley know that he was interested in selling World-Wide 
Photo, and wanted to know if MR. WHATLEY was interested in meeting with him to see if 
something could be worked out. (Note that (1) he knew MR. WHATLEY was in Orlando and 
(2) he knew MR. WHATLEY was considering buying a large printer and processor.) MR. 
WHATLEY met with Chapman soon after returning from Orlando. During this first meeting, 
Chapman represented that he wanted to sell the business for $400,000.00, and that he would 
finance such a sale. His justification for valuation of the business was that the value of the 
equipment and assets were in excess of $400,000.00 and that the annual sales were twice that 
(i.e. $800,000.00). MR. WHATLEY told him that that was interesting, but that MR. 
WHATLEY wanted to look at his fmancials to see cash flows and trends. He said that he would 
not show any fmancials or company operations information, because we were competitors. MR. 
WHATLEY told him he was not interested, if he could not see company records/fmancials. 
After this first meeting, MR. WHATLEY continued forward with his separate plans for Campus 
Photo. At this time MR. WHATLEY was in the process of looking for a new, larger location 
and was actually reviewing a proposed lease. The day before MR. WHATLEY was to make an 
offer on a property MR. WHATLEY was considering, he received another telephone call from 
Chapman asking if Mr. Wliatley had thought further about buying World-Wide Photo. Mr. 
Whatley asked Chapman if he had rethought his position and would allow Mr. Wliatley to review 
his business fmancials and operations. He said no, he would not show company records or 
operations. Mr, Whatley simply stated that, then, he was not interested. Later, discussions were 
renewed about whether there was a way to insure the company's value and cash flow without 
such an examination. 
5. Mr. Whatley did not receive sales tax returns for the most recent 12 months 
(relative to April 5, 2001) either before April 5, 2001, nor since, as required by paragraph 6 of 
this agreement. Mr. Whatley received 12 months sales tax returns from January 2000 to 
December 2000. Mr. Whatley was never given by Chapman or by Squire & Co. sales tax returns 
from January 2001, February 2001 and March 2001. The documentation "on positive cash flow 
for his review" that Chapman refers to was a single page letter from Squire & Co., stating that 
they were not guaranteeing anything, but accompanying was a page with a six (6) line Schedule 
of Payments for the Benefit of Bruce Chapman, (Copy attached.) This schedule did not show 
monthly information, but was an annual average summary, for 2000. Again, this did not include 
January 2001, February 2001 and March 2001. Mr. Whatley learned months later that even that 
non-conforming information was falsely inflated by incorrectly including monthly loan payments 
that were not to the benefit of Chapman. There was no monthly breakdown and there was no 
further description of what the line items were. Mr. Whatley was not able to review these 
payments to Chapman until after March 15B 2002, when Mr. Whatley received a copy of the 
2000 World-Wide Photo, Inc. tax returns. These tax returns had been prepared by Squire & Co.. 
under the direction of Chapman. After receiving these tax returns, and seriously questioning 
what had been represented in April 2001, Mr. Whatley carefully aakedJiquire & Co. for further 
details of the expenses, as represented in the 2000 tax returns. By carefully asking for these 
expense details in the context of review of corporate tax filings, Mr. Whatley was able, for the 
first time, to get the wages, salaries and benefits, as paid to Chapman for July 2000 through 
March 2001. At that point (late March through mid-April 2002), and not until this point, did Mr. 
Whatley have the actual financial records from World-Wide Photo which showed that the 
guaranteed representation by Chapman in paragraph 6 of the agreement that "at closing WWP 
will have had a positive cash flow of at least $10,000 each and every month for the 12 calendar 
months preceding closing" was false. While Mr. Whatley never received details of April 2000, 
May 2000 and June 2000, it was clear that the nine (9) months July 2000 through March 2001 
did not meeL this requirement. This guarantee thai the company had "generated sufficient 
positive cash flow to fund wages, salaries and other benefits to SELLERS which will be 
terminated on closing, of at least $10,000 each and every month" was a key element of the 
STOCK AND ASSET PURCHASE AND SALE and was specifically listed in paragraph B. 
Recitals. The contract further documented in footnote 1 that 'This is a material representation 
because SELLERS will not show WWP fmancials to BUYER before closing, and SELLERS5 
representation to BUYER (that the positive cash flow of at least $ 10,000 each month continues 
to the date of closing and that SELLERS are selling all assets of the business that were necessary 
to achieving the sales and cash flow represented by SELLERS to BUYER) was essential to 
BUYER'S decision to purchase the business and assets/9 (Emphasis by holding and underline 
added. All other emphasis is in original.) 
6. Here Chapman is stating that Mr. Whatley was ''obligated to close his purchase of 
World-Wide Photo "no later than 30 days from the date of disclosure". The sum total of 
''disclosure" was as Mr. Whatley represented in #5, above. Within this 30 day period, it was not 
assumed, agreed or allowed for Mr Whatley to review the financial records of the business The 
''disclosure" was copies of nine (9) months sales tax returns, out of a required most recent twelve 
(12) months, and six (6) lines of a calendar year 2000 benefits average and summary, of a 
required $10,000.00 each and every month for the most recent twelve months. If making the full 
disclosure required is the key to requiring closure, there is to this date not requirement to close 
because Chapmans have still not provided all of the financial records. Mr. Whatley have merely 
been able to piece together sufficient information to demonstrate that Chapmans' representations 
were false and should have been known by them to be false at the time they were made. 
7', No present objection, 
8. Mr. Whatley did not demand that the agreement contain the arbitration clause. 
Mr. Whatley did not object to it, but Mr. Whatley did not ask for or require the referenced 
arbitration clause. 
9. Chapman demanded collateral for the Agreement. Mr. Whatley signed the 
documents, incorrectly prepared by Chapman and Christensen, for the Trust Deeds. Chapman 
requested his personal home as collateral That demand Mr. Whatley refused. 
10. If this statement by Chapman is saying that on April 10th, 2001 they executed this 
corporate resolution, this statement is false. Bruce Chapman told Mr. Whatley that there were no 
such corporate minutes, and Bruce Chapman and Ceri Chapman signed a document, around May 
1st, 2001, which was titled minutes of DIPJECTOR'S MEETING, dated April 24th, 2001. If this 
statement #10-wer&true, there would be no reason for them to sign another document on May 1st, 
2001 related to control and ownership of the business. Because Chapman had not transferred the 
existing World-Wide Photo checking account #3321016945, as required in the Agreements 
paragraph 3.f.5 Mr. Whatley was attempting to open a temporary business checking account. 
This temporary account was opened on May 7th, 2001. After April 25th, 2001 but before May 7th, 
2001 while trying to open this account at Wells Fargo, the banlc requested that Mr. Whatley give 
them copies of the corporate bylaws and minutes authorizing the action. Mr. Whatley asked 
Chapman for company minutes and bylaws. He provided a copy of the bylaws, but said that 
there were not any minutes. By Chapman's own admission, they had not gone through the 
necessary meetings and did noi have the minutes that the bank was requesting. On or about May 
1st, 2001, Mr. Whatley quickly created minutes for a DIRECTOR'S MEETING, dated April 24th, 
2001, which Bruce Chapman and Ceri Chapman signed. By providing the bylaws and the 
referenced documents, among other things, Mr. Whatley was finally able to open the temporary 
checking account on May 7th, 2001. If Chapmans had done what #10 asserts, none of that effort 
would have been necessary 
11. The first part of this statement is unequivocally false. Mr. Whatley did not 
inspect any of World-Wide Photo's books on April 25th, 2001. No closing documents or 
statements were evei presented to me. As is stated above, the full financial disclosure required 
was never made. 
a. In the initial meeting in February 2001 Chapman represented that the equipment 
and assets of the business, World-Wide Photo, Inc. were in excess of 
$400,000.00. Again, during the meeting on March 10th, 2001, when we outlined 
the "intent of the agreement" he set the purchase price of World-Wide Photo, Inc 
at $400,000.00 because this was, according to Chapman's emphatic insistence, 
less than the value of the equipment and assets and less than 1/2 of the past year's 
annual sales. Between March 10th and April 25th, while I was working with his 
accountant, Doug Child, to determine how much of the purchase price would be 
allotted to assets and how much would be considered goodwill, Child requested 
the company's "book value" of the equipment and assets. In the later part of 
April, before the 25th, Chapman finally provided this "book value" as being 
below $250,000.00. Mi. Whatley was very surprised and found this inconsistent 
to what Chapman had verbally represented. His attorney, Mr. Willardson, spoke 
to Chapman's attorney, Mr. Christensen. and indicated the misrepresentation. 
Mr. Whatley then received and saw the Amendment, mentioned in statement 
#11 .a., for the first time on April 23rd, 2001. This amendment was to protect 
Chapman from his earlier misrepresentation as to the value of the equipment and 
assets. Mr. Whatley was given a cursory tour of the business and the company's 
equipment on March 10tb, 2001. Neither before nor after this disagreement on 
stated value of $400,000.00 and book value of $250,000.00, was Mr. Whatley 
invited to inspect the company's equipment. Mr. Whatley took Chapman's 
statement in the footnote ai the bottom of page 2 of the Agreement, "that 
SELLERS are selling all assets of the business that were necessary to achieving 
the sales and cash flow represented by SELLERS to BUYER'' to be true and 
relied upon it. to his considerable detriment. The reliance was not upon the value 
of the equipment, which was completely irrelevant, but upon the representation 
that the equipment was sufficient to support the sales and profits represented and 
warranted by Chapmans, Those representations were false and Chapmans knew 
or should have known they were false when they made them. 
b. Mr. Whatley agreed to a PROMISSORY NOTE in the amount of $457,500.00 
was executed [$400,000,00 for the STOCK AND ASSETS of the company 
(Agreement page 3, paragraph 2.a) and $57,500.00 as the "mutually agreed upon 
value of the inventory" (as outlined in Agreement page 4, paragraph 3.d.)]. 
However, Chapman did not agree to this amount as inventory value and he was 
constantly changing the amount up until Mr. Whatley finally left. As late as 
March 20025 Chapman demanded payment, as outlined in a "Summary for Sale 
of WWP" of $66,744.41 for the inventory. He also had added to the note 
$565.05 reimbursement for Worker's Compensation payments, and $431.25 for 
postage reimbursement, neither of which were ever previously discussed or 
agreed upon. After this March demand, Mr. Whatley argued with Chapman that 
he had agreed on $57,500.00 value for the inventory. He indicated that we had 
"said'" $57,500.00, and that he thought Mi". Whatley was taking a risk because he 
did not think the value of the inventory was high as $57,500.00, but it was now 
more, Chapman insisted that if the value had been less than $57,500.00 he would 
have adjusted the note down, but the value was higher. He would not agree that 
the value of the note was $57,500.00. 
c. Mr. Whatley signed a *'Utah Deed Trust'5, which was incorrectly prepared by 
Chapman/Christensem against Lot 241. 
d. Mr. Whatley signed a "Utah Deed Trust", which was incorrectly prepared by 
Chapman/Christensen, against Lot 242. 
12. The Agreement required Chapman "for a term of 60 days after closing, consult 
with BUYER regarding any aspect of the business without additional charge. Such consulting 
shall be during normal business hours and shall not exceed 20 hours in any calendar week". 
(Agreement page 7, paragraph 7) A^ staled above, there never was a closing at which all of 
Chapman's required performance was tendered. After the signing of the documents referenced 
b}T Defendants5, Chapman continued, through April, 2002, to work on the premises and 
continually attempted to renegotiate the deal. Chapman continued to remove property of the 
business as if it was his On one occasion Mr. Whatley caught him on a Sunday, when the 
business is closed, taking 20 rolls of Kodak film for his personal use. Upon seeing me, Chapman 
said he was leaving on a vacation and didn't think Mr. Whatley would mind if he took this film. 
Surprised, and not wanting to accuse him of stealing, Mr, Whatley asked that he "ring it through 
or write it down3* so that we could make sure he was charged for it. Mr. Whatley doe& not know 
whether he did so, however. Chapman continued to occupy what had previously been his office, 
despite numerous requests that he leave. Chapman also continued to remove equipment from the 
business and premises, well after April 25th, 2001. Some of the other items which Chapman took 
and/or were removed included: multiple deck video editing equipment, a Pentax 6x7 copy 
camera, 6 or 7 filing cabinets, a Sony video editing mirror box, an Agfa film splicing block. 
Some of the items were removed as late as December 2001. When confronted, Chapman 
insisted that these were his personal items and that they were ''not on a list of equipment that the 
business owned". The Agreement does not include such a list. Personal items were to be 
removed before April 25th, 2001. Chapman also continued to come in and access company 
confidential computers and records, without asking and without permission. On April 17th, 2002, 
Chapman came into the business and indicated that he was contacting his accounts receivable. 
Mr. Whatley told him that Mr. Whatley was uncomfortable with customers being contacted for 
collections from two different sources. He then produced a report which he had run on March 
" 18u\ 2002. listing A/R. Mr. Whatley asked where he had obtained the report. He indicated that 
he had run it on the computer, and that he regularly ran such reports. Mr. Whatley told him that 
he absolutely did not have permission to use company confidential records. This computer holds 
customer files, pricing, inventory, and sales. If he would just ask, we would provide such reports 
for him. Mr. Whatley was very surprised that he said that he still did not see a problem with it, 
and he did not say that he would not access the computer again. Throughout the entire time Mr. 
Whatley was working on the business, his continued contact with Chapman was to request that 
he complete the terms of the agreement and that he return items removed. He never did so. 
13. On June 22nd, 2001 Chapman and Mr. Whatley signed an ASSIGNMENT, 
ASSUMPTION, CONSENT AGREEMENT with The Southland Corporation for the 547 W. 
Columbia Lane store lease. The April 5th, 2001 STOCK AND ASSET PURCHASE AND SALE 
agreement explicitly indicated on page 5, paragraph 4 that "the two pieces of real property... 
-have-problems with the leases. The Provo location (547 W. Columbia Lane) is leased to Bruce 
Chapman personally, and not to WWP, under a written lease from Southland Corporation that 
prevents assignments or subleases, ... Therefore, the sale contemplated hereunder is made 
expressly contingent upon (1) obtaining from the Southland Corporation, a written acceptance 
and continuation of the lease in favor of WWP in form and content satisfactory to BUYER..." 
Southland Corporation did not assign the lease to WWP, but instead insisted, according to 
Chapman, that it be in an individual's name. 
14. This statement is irrelevant It makes no difference if Mr. Whatley signed a lease. 
Mr. Whatley's persona] obligations to others are not at issue. Even if Defendants had alleged 
that the lease was done on behalf of the ostensible corporation, such a lease is unrelated to the 
supposed "'agreement" between Defendants and Plaintiff The statement as made, is false, 
however. 
15. Chapmansf characterization of the letter is, at least, misleading. The letter clearly 
states that Chapmans never had performed the items necessary to close, and that the 
representations whose truth was a condition precedent to closing were false. The letter also 
contains a long list of items for which as much as 45 WEEKS of cure notice had been given but 
which had been ignored. The conclusion of that letter states: 
In short, the business is not as represented, the sellers have not done any of the 
material items that are necessary to the sale being concluded and effected, 
and Mr, Chapman has continued to treat the business as his own. 
My client has worked diligently and zealously attempting to make the 
proposed sale work. However, the anniversary of thai attempt is almost upon us 
and none of the problems listed above have been addressed in any way by 
Mr. Chapman in spite of all of those items having been brought to Mr. 
Chapman's attention previously. The failure of the ostensible sellers to even 
make a good faith effort to perform has damaged my client considerably. He has 
expended a year of his time ... working to try and overcome the obstacles 
that have been erected by the putative sellers. The value of that lost time is on 
the order of $70,000.00, or more. In addition, because he has been expending 70 
to 80 hours a week trying to overcome the problems created by the putative 
sellers, he has been unable to develop his own business as he otherwise would 
have done. We estimate that the loss of income both presently and in the future as 
a result of that is m the six figure range. My client has personally advanced funds 
to World-Wide Photo m the amount of $27,000.00, not including property that my 
client has purchased for himself that World-Wide Photo has been allowed to use. 
The rental value of that equipment is approximately $6,000. 
In light of the above and foregoing this letter constitutes a demand that 
Mr. and Mrs. Chapman execute a document acknowledging that the contract 
above is void, and releasing Mr. Whatiey and his property from ail liability and 
refunding Mr. Whatiey the amounts paid out of pocket ($33,000.00). The 
foregoing demand actually constitutes an offer of settlement. If that demand is 
not complied with we will have no choice but to go forward with litigation 
seeldng damages which we presently estimate to be between $250,000.00 and 
$1,000,000.00. Please respond to this letter in writing no later than 4:00 p.m. 
MDT, April 25, 2002. Please be advised that my client is not continuing to 
pour money into your client's business and will not be paying any more bills, 
including payroll. Time is therefore of the essence. In order to constitute 
timely response the letter needs to be received in my office by the deadline stated. 
Receipt by fax will be considered sufficient. 
16. This is also false as is shown immediately above. 
17. Plaintiff has no knowledge of this allegation. Discovery is needed. 
18. Payments were made as contemplated by the "agreement" for April 2002. 
According to promissory note. ''Payments made within five days before or after the first of each 
month shall be considered neither late nor early..." so Mr. Whatiey could not have been 
considered to having "stopped making his monthly payments" until after May 6th, 2002. In 
addition, we are informed and believe that Mr. Chapman is talcing $5,000 or more per month 
from the business and has done so since Mr, Whatley left. Discover)7 is needed on this matter. 
19. At the time of the alleged notice to cure, no default had occurred. Furthermore, as 
is alleged above, it appears that Mr. Chapman is still getting his money so that no default has 
subsequently occurred. Discovery is needed. 
20. Defendants5 statement is again, a significant distortion of the truth, this time by 
omission. The letter stated, among other things, "Your assertion that no cure is necessary 
eonsiiiuies an anticipatory repudiation of the obligation to cure which obviates the need for us to 
wait the 45 days." As is pointed out above, Chapman had already had the 45 days with weeks or 
months to spare. The statement was merely that if there were any umioticed items in the list, that 
Christensen's anticipatory breach eliminated the need to give such notice. 
21. The assertion that no "accounting" has been provided is false on at least three 
levels. First, Mr. Chapman never left the business and regularly reviewed its fmancial records 
during the entire time as is discussed above. Second, Mr. Whatley did provide financial 
information pursuant to Christensen's request and even updated the same Third, all of the 
financial records related to the company, except for the temporary checldng account checkbook 
and statements, were left with the company when Mr. Whatley left. 
22- The Christensen letter referenced asserts that all matters are cured, but in fact the 
"cure" was mostly argument, the key documents were not actually provided, and the false 
representations were not made true. While Defendants do consistently call-b-lack-white, and the 
referenced letter did so, the black was still black. 
23. The statement as made is true. The implications which Defendants are trying to 
make, however, are false. 
24. While it is true that a complaint was filed, the filing was in no way in response to 
the arbitration filing. As is stated above, the suit was contemplated since April, and Defendants 
were given notice of that intention, Mr. Christensen was asked on at least two occasions if he 
would accept service of process. Instead of answering that request, Defendants filed their 
arbitration demand in an attempt to trump the impending lawsuit. 
25. The records of the state of Utah show that the registered office for World-Wide 
Imaging, part of Defendants' scheme to defraud Mr. Whatley, is the office of Mr. Christensen. 
(See attached.) Mr. Christensen has been the prime mover in all of the activities of Defendants. 
Discovery is needed, however, on the precise extent of his involvement. 
26. Defendants" statement of how the documents came into existence is again 
distorted. After much discussion with Mr. Chapman, with every "agreement" changing at every 
meeting, Mr. Whatley finally recounted to Mr. Willardson what the issues and what Mr. Whatley 
thought we had agreed upon and asked him to reduce that to writing. He did so and Mr. Whatley 
presented the result to Chapman. Chapman said that it was completely unacceptable and that he 
would have his own lawyer write the contract. From then on Mr, Christensen was responsible 
for the drafting. Mr, Christensen requested, and received, the word processing document that 
Mr. Willardson generated. Mr. Christensen did choose to use a lot of what was originally 
written, but it was Mr. Christensen, wilting on behalf of defendants, who actually had the 
responsibility for all drafting There were several revisions of the document, including the final 
one, that Mr. Willardson did not even see before they were signed and Mr. Willardson did not 
receive a copy of the final document until shortly before this litigation was filed. 
27. This is false or misleading for the same reasons stated above. Christensen may 
not have met with or spoken with Mr. Whatley directly, but he did the drafting and it was his 
changes that Chapman discussed with Mr. Whatley and insisted upon implementing. 
As can be readily seen, the *'facts" asserted without evidence by Mr. Chapman's affidavit, are 
disputed and that dispute is supported by documentary evidence. 
Motion to Compel Arbitration 
The motion is moot, because plaintiff is already participating in arbitration of all matters 
covered by the arbitration agreement 
1. Defendants' motion seeks to have this court order plaintiff to participate in an 
arbitration proceeding commenced by Defendants. Plaintiff is so paiticipating. Plaintiff and his 
counsel have filed all required documents in that action, including without limitation, selection 
of arbitrators and disclosure of involved parties (for conflict checks). Plaintiffs counsel has 
participaxed with Defendant Christensen in a telephone conference on how the arbitration is to be 
managed. Defendants' assertion that plaintiff is not participating in arbitration is, at least, 
grossly misleading.] 
See affidavits of Bryan Whatley and Timothy Miguel Willardson. 
The arbitration clause is inapplicable to the matters plead in the complaint 
2. Paragraph 9.m. of the agreement states, in its entirety: 
In the event of a dispute UNDER this agreement, the parties agree that any 
action brought shall be submitted to binding arbitration in accordance with the 
rules of the American Arbitration Association. Such arbitration need not be 
conducted by the American Arbitration Association, even though it would follow 
their rules. Arbitration proceedings shall be brought in Utah County, Utah, and 
not elsewhere. (Emphasis added.) 
3. The subject complaint contains nine separate counts. Those are: 1) Void 
Contract/Rescission, 2) Breach of Contract, 3) Fraud (both contractual and securities fraud), 4) 
Breach of Fiduciary Duties, 5) Conversion/Theft, 6) Slander of Title, 7) Defamation, 8) Tortious 
Interference with Business, and 9) Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (anti-hacking statute). 
4. The first count alleges that the contract is a nullity. Therefore that matter is not a 
"dispute UNDER" the agreement. 
5. The second count alleges that the contract has been breached. Therefore, under the 
doctrine of United States v. Utah Constr. Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966), and myriad other cases is 
that a breach of contract does not "arise under" a contract. Logically, since a contract is broken 
by the breach, the dispute is, definitional]y, about something not within, or "under" the contract. 
6. The third count alleges both pre-contractual and extra-contractual fraud. Since the 
contract contains no provisions authorizing fraud, and since fraud renders the contract void or 
voidable, this is not a matter uunder"TKe~cohtract. 
7. Similarly, the fourth count, Breach of Fiduciary Duties, camiot be "under" the 
contract because there is no authorization to breach such duties contained therein. 
8. The contract is not one that authorizes conversion or theft of property and therefore 
the fifth count cannot be said to 'arise under5 the contract. All of the tort claims; fraud, 
conversion, theft, slander of title, defamation, tortious interference; are, by their nature as tort 
claims, unavoidably non-contractual. Therefore, counts six through nine cannot be covered by 
the arbitration clause. 
9. Count nine, Violation of 18 U.S;C. §_1030 (anti-hacking statute) alleges that a Federal 
Crime has been committed. That is also a tort claim, but it should be clear even to defendants 
that a claim which arises under a Federal criminal statute is not one which 'arises under' the 
contract. 
The Utah Arbitration Act is Expressly not Applicable to Cases Involving Fraud 
and other issues here. 
10. Defendants cite the Utah Arbitration Act, but apparently did not bother to read it. 
UCA % 78-3 la-3 specifically and expressly says that a "written agreement to submit any existing 
or future controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except upon grounds 
existing at law or equity to set aside the agreement, or when fraud is alleged as provide din the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.'5 (Emphasis added.) 
11. As is stated above, fraud of two different-types is alleged in the complaint. The 
arbitration agreement therefore cannot be enforced. 
12. The counts alleging breach, voidness of contract and rescission all constitute bases, at 
law and/or equity7, for not enforcing that portion of the agreement, even if the Act itself did not 
specifically state that allegations of fraud make it non-enforceable. 
Bargaining for Arbitration is Irrelevant 
13. Defendants' argumentative strategy appears to have been to find a case whose 
statements and holding they liked and then to build an argument to fit. Unfortunately, the case is 
non-binding precedent (10 1 Circuit, nut Utah), and nont of the issues in that case are involved 
here. 
14. As is discussed above, Mr. Whatley is appropriate for Mr. Chapman's claim and is 
cooperating in that arbitration fully. However, Mr. Whatley's position is that the "contract" is 
void or must be rescinded so that there is no binding agreement to arbitrate, and even if there 
were, none of Mr. Whatley5 s nine counts are within the scope of the arbitration clause. 
15. Pacific Development v. Orton, 2001 UT 36, 23 P.3d 1035, 10384040 (Utah 2001) 
contains the following holding: 
f 9 We have previously held that only written arbitration agreements are 
enforceable under the Act. See Jenkins v. Peraval, 962 P.2d 796, 799-800 (Utah 
1998).[fn4] Further, the written agreement defines the scope of the 
arbitrator's authority. "An arbitration award purporting to resolve 
questions beyond [the] jurisdictional boundary [of the agreement] is not 
valid. For a court to find that an arbitrator has exceeded his or her delegated 
authority, the court must deterrmne^thatrthe arbitrator's award covers areas not 
contemplated by the submission agreement,'" Intermountam Power v. Union 
Pacific R.R., 961 P.2d 320, 323 (Utah 1998) (quoting Buzas Baseball 925 P.2d at 
949) As noted above, the arbitration agreement in this case limited the 
arbitrator's authority to issuing an award for the Plat C dispute and also 
specifically precluded an award for the Plat B dispute. The arbitrator 
nevertheless issued an award for both plats. Therefore, the arbitrator 
exceeded his delegated authority unless the agreement was modified to allow 
an award for Plat B. 
f 13 The scope of the arbitration is a governing standard that is 
fundamental to the expectations of the parties to the arbitration The parties must 
know the boundaries of the subject matter of the dispute submitted and the 
potential liabilities flowing therefrom befoie they are able to intelligently waive 
their rights to submit their disputes to formal litigation And because the 
authority of the arbitrator derives from the arbitration agreement itself, see 
Buzas Baseball, 925 P.2d at 949, it follows that the scope of an agreement to 
arbitrate cannot be modified except by proper concurrence of the parties to 
the arbitration. 
f 14 The court of appeals concluded that a written arbitration agreement 
may be implicitly modified merely by the parties' actions m bringing evidence of 
matters outside the scope of the agreement We disagree The decision of the 
court of appeals is contrary to the statutory criteria governing arbitration and to 
our decisions construing those criteria Where the statute and our case law have 
held that arbitration agreements must be in writing, the preference for an 
explicit expression of the intent of the parties regarding the scope of 
arbitration is well-established. To allow modification of an express written 
agreement by less than a similarly explicit intent would simply circumvent 
the statutory requirements and the policies they vindicate. In this case, no 
express written agreement to modify the scope of the arbitration has been 
alleged, let alone proven We therefore reverse and hold that the arbitrator 
exceeded the authority granted to him when he issued an award foi Plat B 
(Emphasis added,) 
16 Even though both parties presented evidence on the mattei outside the scope of the 
arbitration agreement, the Utah Supreme Court held thatihejdefiision was void It is clear that 
the Supreme Court will not countenance ustietching" arbitration clauses beyond their actual 
woids 
Waiver of Arbitration is Irrelevant 
17. Since there is no agreement to arbitrate matters that do not arise "under55 the contract, 
and since none of the matters complained of here are "under55 the contract, as is discussed above, 
Defendant's entire argument about "waiver55 is a straw man and must be ignored. 
Substantial Participation in Litigation is Irrelevant 
18 Defendants are arguing facts and issues that have nothing to do with this case. 
Prejudice by Litigation is Irrelevant 
19. Defendants are arguing facts and issues that have nothing to do with this case. 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is Improper in Form, Inadequate as to Substance, and 
Premature as to Timing 
2Q. Defendants5 motion is styled as one under 12(b)(6), but by adding Mr. Chapman's 
affidavit they have made it a Summary Judgment motion. A motion for summary judgment must 
be supported by admissible evidence. (URCP 56(e)). It is clear that Mr. Chapman's statements 
about what Mr. Chiistensen said are hearsay and therefore not admissible. In addition, although 
many documents are referenced, and the Court is asked to accept Defendants5 representations 
about them, only the arbitration demand, the "contract"5 and the "amendment55 are actually 
provided. All of the assertions about other documents are therefore inadmissible, absent a 
showing that the)7 are unavoidably unavailable are therefore also inadmissible. 
21. As is shown above, while plaintiff has facts related to many matters, there are 
numerous material matters about which discovery must be had before summary judgment can be 
appropriately decided. 
22. Defendant's motion is therefore inappropriate and must be stayed if it is not denied. 
Mr. Whatley does have a claim against Mr. Christensen because Mr. Christensen 
is the mastermind behind the Chapman's fraudulent and abusive acts. 
23. Defendants acknowledges (although mostly in footnotes) that allegations related to 
Christensen exist in complaint paragraphs 49, 50, 51, 52, 56, 58, and 59. In fact, allegations 
concerning Mr. Christensen exist in paragraphs 14, 18, 25, 37, 45, 49, 50, 51, 52, 55, 56-60, 62, 
65-68, 75, 76, 80 and 84. Those allegations are in counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 6. 7, and 8. In addition, each 
count references every allegation of every other count and section of the complaint. 
Required Fraud Allegation: 
(1) that a representation was made 
(2) concerning a presently existing material 
fact 
(3) which was false and 
(4) which the representor either 
(a) knew to be false or 
Made in Complaint: 
49, 50, 52, 56, 
50, 52, 56 
18,52,56 
18,56 
(b) made recklessly, knowing that there was 
insufficient knowledge upon which to base 
such representation. 
(5) for the purpose of inducing the other party 
to act upon it and 
(6) that the other party, acting reasonably and 
in ignorance of its falsity, 
(7) did in fact rely upon it 
(8) and was thereby induced to act 
(9) to that party's injury and damage. 
56 
18, 56, contract footnote 1, appended to 
complaint and referenced therein. 
13,20,72 
13, 20, 72, contract footnote 1, appended to 
complaint and referenced therein. 
13,20,72 
60 
24. As is shown, all of the elements of the prima facie case for fraud have been alleged 
against Mr. Christensen. 
25. Defendants5 brief argues that an attorney cannot be held liable for his actions on 
behalf of his client. Unfortimately for them, that is a false statement. The quote from their own 
source, 7 Ana. Jur. 2d5 Attorneys at Law y 249 says, "If an attorney is actuated by malicious 
motives or shares the illegal motives of his or her client, the attorney may be personally liable 
with the client for damage suffered by a third person as a result of the attorney's action." 
Paragraph 68 of the complaint specifically alleges that Mr. Christensen is actively working to 
injure the business That is an allegation, incorporated by reference in all other parts of the 
. m i . 
complaint, that Mr. Cliristensen has the malicious motive to injure the business and Mr. Whatley. 
Furthermore, several of the paragraphs allege that Mr. Christensen assisted in the fraud and bad 
actions of the other named defendants. 
26. Even Defendants5 own authority does not say that being an attorney baptizes you 
from torts you commit. The quoted authority merely says that an attorney's duty under the 
cannons of ethics do not create an independent liability if no conventional tort can be alleged. 
Here, several conventional torts have been alleged. The only one attacked directly by 
Defendants' memorandum is fraud, which is shown above to have been plead. 
27. Defendants do not argue that sufficient allegations have not been made as to the other 
seven counts involving Mr. Christensen so those counts must stay. 
The "cure" provision of the contract cannot possibly apply to eight of the nine 
counts in the complaint, and Chapmans were given months to cure the curable 
breaches. 
28. "Cure" is a contractual concept. Seven of the nine counts in the complaint are torts. 
The concept of "cure" is meaningless in that context. Those counts cannot, therefore, be 
dismissed on the basis of Defendants' motion and memorandum. 
29. The remaining two counts are voidness/rescission of the contract and breach. If the 
contract is breach, or if the conditions for rescission exist, that cannot be cured. There is a fatal 
defect in contract formation that cannot be retroactively smoothed over, Any contract made 
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would be a new one and courts will not make contracts that do not exist for parties. 
30. Therefore, the "cure" argument can only be relevant to the 'breach5 count. As is 
discussed above, notice and opportunity to cure were given. Even if notice had not been given, 
defendants' letter stating that no cure was necessary was an anticipatory repudiation, eliminating 
that requirement. 
Summary and Conclusion 
31. Defendants have made a significant effort to throw sufficient negative matter into the 
air that the issues and legal standards will be obscured, in the hope of benefiting from injustice. 
While that is consistent with Defendants' conduct throughout, it is not a basis for granting the 
relief they request. 
32. The Rules of Procedure, as well as the substantive law, prevent the result that 
Defendants' are requesting. 
DATED: Thursday, January 23, 2003. 
Timothy Miguel Willardson 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4ih r : 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRYAN J WHATLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
Bruce E Chapman, Cen Chapman, James L 
Chiislensen, and Does I - V, 
Defendants 
MOTION FOR RELIEF UNDER RULE 
56(F) 
CIVIL NO 020405636 
JUDGE #5 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
COMES NOW the Defendant pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and moves the Court for an order continuing the time to resolve Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
until thirty (30) days aftei discovery is completed 
In support of this Motion Defendant shows the Court 
1, Plaintiffs motion to dismiss urges the Court to find certain facts Plaintiff has 
shown by affidavit that while some of the facts necessary to lebut Defendants' assertions are m 
plaintiff's possession, that some are incomplete and some cannot be answered without discovery 
2 The probable facts not available go directly to the contentions of plaintiffs motion 
to dismiss and would defeat that motion eithei by establishing materia] controverted facts or by 
showing that defendant Spencer is entitled to judgment as a mattej of law 
3 Defendant has taken all possible steps to obtain these facts, 
4 Additional time will enable Defendant to rebut Plaintiffs buiden that there is no set 
of facts that will entitle defendant to pievail. 
In light of the above, Defendant respectfully request the Court to issue the order descnbed 
above 
DATED Thursday, January 23, 2003 
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BRYAN WHATLEY, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. Plaintiff has no knowledge of this allegation. Discovery is needed. 
2. Plaintiff has no knowledge of this allegation. Discovery is needed. 
3. Plaintiff has no knowledge of this allegation, Discovery is needed. 
4. I did not initiate contact as is imphed by Defendants, nor had I communicated with 
anyone, prior to Mr. Chapman's solicitation-rthat I had interest in purchasing World-Wide Photo. 
Mr. Chapman approached me in early Februaiy 2001. Wliile I was in Orlando at the 2001 PMA 
show one of my employees gave me a message that Mr. Chapman had called him, and wanted to 
talk to me. The employee gave me Mr. Chapman's telephone number and I returned his call. In 
this initial conversation, Chapman stated that he knew I was at the PMA show, and that before I 
made any significant purchases, he wanted to let me know that he was interested in selling 
World-Wide Photo, and wanted to know if I was interested in meeting with him to see if 
something could be worked out. (Note that (1) he knew I was in Orlando and (2) he knew I was 
considering buying a large printer and processor,) I met with Chapman soon after returning from 
Orlando. During this first meeiing^Chapman represented that he wanted to sell the business for 
$400,000.00, and that he would finance such a sale. His justification for valuation of the 
business was that the value of the equipment and assets were in excess of $400,000.00 and that 
the annual sales were twice that (i.e. $800,000.00) I told him that that was interesting, but that I 
wanted to look at his fmaneials to see cash flows and trends. He said that he would not show any 
fmaneials or company operations information, because we were competitors. I told him I was 
not interested, if I could not see company records/financials. After this first meeting, I continued 
forward with my separate plans for Campus Photo. At this time I was in the process of looking 
for a new, larger location and was actually reviewing a proposed lease. The day before I was to 
make an offer on a property I was considering, I received another telephone call from Chapman 
asking if I had thought further about buying World-Wide Photo. I asked Chapman if he had 
rethought his position and would allow me to review his business fmaneials and operations. He 
said no, he would not show company records or operations. I simply stated that, then, I was not 
interested. Later, discussions were renewed about whether there was a way to insure the 
company's value and cash flow without such an examination. 
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5. I did not receive sales tax returns for the most recent 12 months (relative to April 5, 
2001) either before April 5, 2001, nor since, as required by paragraph 6 of this agreement. I 
received 12 months sales tax returns from January 2000 to December 2000 I was never given 
by Chapman or by Squire & Co. sales tax returns from January 2001, February 2001 and March 
2001. The documentation "on positive cash flow for his review" that Chapman refers to was a 
single page letter from Squire & Co., stating that they were not guaranteeing anything, but 
accompanying was a page with a six (6) line Schedule of Payments for the Benefit of Bruce 
Chapman. (Copy attached.) This schedule did not show monthly information, but was an annual 
average summary, for 2000. Again, this did not include January 2001, February 2001 and March 
2001. I learned months later that even that non-conforming information was falsely inflated by 
incorrectly including monthly loan payments that were not to the benefit of Chapman. There 
was no monthly breakdown and there was no further description of what the line items were. I 
was not able to review these paymenxs to Chapman until after March 15, 2002, when I received a 
copy of the 2000 World-Wide Photo, Inc. tax returns. These tax returns had been prepared by 
Squire & Co., under the direction of Chapman. After receiving these tax returns, and seriously 
questioning what had been represented in April 2001,1 carefully asked Squire & Co. for further 
details of the expenses, as represented in the 2000 tax returns. By carefully asking for these 
expense details in the context of review of corporate tax filings, I was able, for the first time, to 
get the wages, salaries and benefits, as paid to Chapman for July 2000 through March 2001. At 
that point (late March through mid-April 2002), and not until this point, did I have the actual 
financial records from World-Wide Photo which showed that the guaranteed representation by 
Chapman in paragraph 6 of the agreement that "at closing WWP will have had a positive cash 
3 
flow of at least $1 Q?0Q0 each and every month for the 12 calendar months preceding closing" 
was false. While I never received details of April 2000, May 2000 and June 2000, it was clear 
that the nine (9) months July 2000 through March 2001 did not meet this requirement. This 
guarantee that the company had "generated sufficient positive cash flow to fund wages, salaries 
and other benefits to SELLERS which will be terminated on closing, of at least $10,000 each and 
every month" was a key element of the STOCK AND ASSET PURCHASE AND SALE and 
was specifically listed in paragraph B. Recitals. The contract further documented in footnote 1 
that "This is a material-representation because SELLERS will not show WWP financials to 
BUYER before closing, and SELLERS' representaiion to BUYER (that the positive cash flov/ of 
at least $10.000 enph mtmth continues to the date of closing and that SELLERS are selling all 
assets of the business that were necessary to achieving the sales and cash flow represented by 
SELLERS to BUYER) was essential to BUYER'S decision to purchase the business and assets." 
(Emphasis by holding and underline added. All other emphasis is in original.) 
6. Here Chapman is stating that I was "obligated to close his purchase of World-Wide 
Photo "no later than 30 days from the date of disclosure". The sum total of "disclosure" was as I 
represented in #5, above. Within this 30 daj period, it was not assumed, agreed or allowed for 
me to review the financial records of the business. The ''disclosure55 was copies of nine (9) 
months sales tax returns, out of a required most recent twelve (12) months, and six (6) lines of a 
calendar year 2000 benefits average and summary, of a required $10,000,00 each and every 
-month for the most recent twelve months. If making the full disclosure required is the key to 
requiring closure, there is to this date not requirement to close because Chapmans have still not 
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provided all of the financial records. I have merely been able to piece together sufficient 
information to demonstrate that Chapmans5 representations were false and should have been 
known by them to be false at the time they were made. 
7. No present objection, 
8. I did not demand that the agreement contain the arbitration clause. I did not object to 
it, but I did not ask for or require the referenced arbitration clause. 
9. Chapman demanded collateral for the Agreement. I signed the documents, 
incorrectly prepared by Chapman and Christensen, for the Trust Deeds. Chapman requested my 
personal home as collateral That demand I refused. 
10. If this statement by Chapman is saying that on April 10th, 2001 they executed this 
corporate resolution, this statement is false. Bruce Chapman told me that there were no such 
corporate minutes, and Bruce Chapman and Ceri Chapman signed a document, around May 1st, 
2001, which was titled minutes of DIRECTOR'S MEETING, dated April 24th, 2001. If this 
statement #10 were true, there would be no reason for them to sign another document on May lsl? 
2001 related to control and ownership of the business. Because Chapman had not transferred the 
existing World-Wide Photo checking account #3321016945, as required in the Agreements 
paragraph 3.f.? I was attempting to open a temporary business checking account. This temporary 
account was opened on May f\ 2001. After April 25th. 2001 but before May 7th, 2001 while 
trying to open this-aeseuni at Wells Fargo, the bank requested that I give them copies of the 
corporate bylaws and minutes authorizing the action. 1 asked Chapman for company minutes 
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and bylaws. He provided a copy of the bylaws, but said that there were not any minutes. By 
Chapman's own admission, they had not gone through the necessary meetings and did not have 
the minutes that the bank was requesting. On or about May 1st, 2001,1 quickly created minutes 
for a DIRECTOR'S MEETING, dated April 24th, 2001, which Bruce Chapman and Ceri 
Chapman signed. By providing the bylaws and the referenced documents, among other things, I 
was finally able to open the temporary checking account on May 7lh, 2001. If Chapmans had 
done what #10 asserts, none of that effort would have been necessary 
11, The first part of this statement is unequivocally false. I did not inspect any of World-
Wide Photo's books on April 25th, 2001. No closing documents or statements were ever 
presented to me. As is stated above, the full financial disclosure required was never made. 
12. In the initial meeting in February 2001 Chapman represented that the equipment and 
assets of the business, World-Wide Photo, Inc. were in excess of $400,000.00. Again, during the 
meeting on March 10th, 2001, when we outlined the ^intent of the agreement" he set the purchase 
price of World-Wide Photo, Inc. at $400,000,00 because this was, according to Chapman's 
emphatic insistence, less than the value of the equipment and assets and less than 1/2 of the past 
year's annual sales. Between March 10th and April 25th, while I was working with my 
accountant, Doug Child, to determine how much of the purchase price would be allotted to assets 
and how much would be considered goodwill, Child requested the company's "book value5' of 
the equipment and assets. In the later part of April, before the 25th, Chapman finally provided 
this "book va luers being below $250,000.00. I was very surprised and found this inconsistent 
to what Chapman had verbally represented. My attorney, Mr. Willardson, spoke to Chapman's 
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attorney, Mr. Christensen, and indicated the misrepresentation. I then received and saw the 
Amendment, mentioned in statement #1 i .at, for the first time on April 23rd, 2001. This 
amendment was to protect Chapman from his earlier misrepresentation as to the value of the 
equipment and assets, I was given a cursory tour of the business and the company's equipment 
on March 10th, 2001. Neither before nor after this disagreement on stated value of $400,000.00 
and book value of $250,000.00, was i invited to inspect the company's equipment. I took 
Chapman's statement in the footnote at the bottom of page 2 of the Agreement, "that SELLERS 
are selling all assets of the business thai were necessary to achieving the sales and cash flow 
represented by SELLERS to BUYER'5 to be true and relied upon it, to my considerable 
detriment. The reliance was not upon the value of the equipment, which was completely 
irrelevant, but upon the representation that the equipment was sufficient to support the sales and 
profits represented and warranted by Chapmans. Those representations were false and 
Chapmans knew or should have known they were false when they made them. 
13. 1 agreed to a PROMISSORY NOTE in the amount of $457,500.00 was executed 
[$400,000.00 for the STOCK AND ASSETS of the company (Agreement page 3, paragraph 2.a) 
and $57,500.00 as the ''mutually agreed upon value of the inventory" (as outlined in Agreement 
page 4, paragraph 3.d.)]. However, Chapman did not agree to this amount as inventor}7 value 
and he was constantly changing the amount up until I fmall}7 left. As late as March 2002, 
Chapman demanded payment, as outlined in a "Summary for Sale of WW?'* of $66,744.41 for 
the inventory.-He-also had added to the note $565.05 reimbursement for Worker's 
Compensation payments, and $431.25 for postage reimbursement, neither of which were ever 
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previously discussed or agreed upon. After this March demand, I argued with Chapman that he 
had agreed on $57,500.00 value for the inventory. He indicated that we had "said" $57,500.00, 
and that he thought I was taking a risk because he did not think the value of the inventoiy was 
high as $57,500.00, but it was now more. Chapman insisted that if the value had been less than 
$57,500.00 he would have adjusted the note down, but the value was higher. He would not agree 
that the value of the note was $57,500.00. 
14. I signed a "Utah Deed Trust", which was incorrectly prepared by 
Chapman/Christensen, against Lot 241. 
15. I signed a "Utah Deed Trust", which was incorrectly prepared by 
Chapman/Christensen, against Lot 242. 
16. The Agreement required Chapman "for a term of 60 days after closing, consult with 
BUYER regarding any aspect of the business without additional charge. Such consulting shall 
be during normal business hours and shall not exceed 20 hours in any calendar week". 
(Agreement page 7, paragraph 7) As stated above, there never was a closing at which all of 
Chapman's required performance was tendered. After the signing of the documents referenced 
by Defendants5, Chapman continued, through April, 2002, to work on the premises and 
continually attempted to renegotiate the deal. Chapman continued to remove property of the 
business as if it was his. On one occasion I caught him on a Sunday, when the business is 
closed, taking 20 rolls of Kodak film for his personal use. Upon seeing me, Chapman said he 
was leaving on a vacation and didn't think I would mind if he took this film. Surprised, and not 
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wanting to accuse him of stealing. I asked that he "ring it through or write it down55 so that we 
could make sure he was charged for it. I don't know whether he did so, however, Chapman 
continued to occupy what had previously been his office, despite numerous requests that he 
leave. Chapman also continued to remove equipment from the business and premises, well after 
April 25th, 2001. Some of the other items which Chapman took and/or were removed included: 
multiple deck video editing equipment, a Pentax 6x7 copy camera, 6 or 7 filing cabinets, a Sony 
video editing mirror box, an Agfa film splicing block. Some of the items were removed as late 
as December 2001. When confronted, Chapman insisted that these were his personal items and 
that they were "not on a list of equipment that the business owned". The Agreement does not 
include such a list. Personal items were to be removed before April 25lh. 2001. Chapman also 
continued to come in and access company confidential computers and records, without asking 
and without permission. On April 17th, 2002, Chapman came into the business and indicated that 
he was contacting his accounts receivable. I told him that I was uncomfortable with customers 
being contacted for collections from two different sources. He then produced a report which he 
had run on March 18th, 2002. listing A/R. I asked where he had obtained the report. He 
indicated that he had run it on the computer, and that he regularly ran such reports. I told him 
that he absolutely did not have permission to use company confidential records. This computer 
holds customer files, pricing, inventory, and sales. If he would just ask, we would provide such 
reports for him. I was very surprised that he said that he still did not see a problem with it, and 
he did not say that he would not access the computer again. Throughout the entire time I was 
working on the business, my continued contact with Chapman was to request that he complete 
the terms of the agreement and that he return items removed. He never did so. 
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17. On June 22nd, 2001 Chapman and I signed an ASSIGNMENT, ASSUMPTION, 
CONSENT AGREEMENT with The Southland Corporation for the 547 W. Columbia Lane store 
lease. The April 5th, 2001 STOCK AND ASSET PURCHASE AND SALE agreement explicitly 
indicated on page 5, paragraph 4 that "the two pieces of real property... have problems with the 
leases. The Provo location (547 W. Columbia Lane) is leased to Bruce Chapman personally, and 
not to WWP, under a written lease from Southland Corporation that prevents assignments or 
subleases. .. .Therefore, the sale contemplated hereunder is made expressly contingent upon (1) 
obtaining from the Southland Corporation, a written acceptance and continuation of the lease in 
favor of WWP in form and content satisfactory to BUYER,.." Southland Corporation did not 
assign the lease to WWP, but instead insisted, according to Chapman, that it be in an individual's 
name. 
18. This statement is irrelevant. It makes no difference if I signed a lease. My personal 
obligations to others are not at issue. Even if Defendants had alleged that the lease was done on 
behalf of the ostensible corporation, such a lease is unrelated to the supposed "agreement" 
between Defendants and Plaintiff. The statement as made, is false, however. 
19. Chapmans' characterization of the letter is, at least, misleading. The letter clearly 
states that Chapmans never had performed the items necessary to close, and that the 
representations whose truth was a condition precedent to closing were false. The letter also 
contains a long list of items for which as much as 45 WEEKS of cure notice had been given but 
which had been ignored. The conclusion of that letter states; 
In short, the business is not as represented, the sellers have not done any of the 
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material items that are necessary to the sale being concluded and effected, 
and Mr. Chapman has continued to treat the business as his own. 
My client has worked diligently and zealously attempting to make the 
proposed sale work. However, the anniversary of that attempt is almost upon us 
and none of the problems listed above have been addressed in any way by 
Mr. Chapman in spite of all of those items having been brought to Mr. 
Chapman's attention previously. The failure of the ostensible sellers to even 
make a good faith effort to perform has damaged my client considerably. He has 
expended a year of his time ,.. working to try and overcome the obstacles 
that have been erected by the putative sellers. The value of that lost time is on 
the order of $70,000.00, or more. In addition, because he has been expending 70 
to 80 hours a week trying to overcome the problems created by the putative 
sellers, he has been unable to develop his own business as he otherwise would 
have done. We estimate that the loss of income both presently and m the future as 
a result of that is in the six figure range. My client has personally advanced funds 
to World-Wide Photo in the amount of $27,000.00, not including property that my 
client has purchased for himself that World-Wide Photo has been allowed to use. 
The rental value of that equipment is approximately $6,000. 
In light of the above and foregoing this letter constitutes a demand that 
Mi", and Mrs. Chapman execute a document acknowledging that the contract 
above is void, and releasing Mr. Whatley and his property from all liability and 
refunding Mr. Whatley the amounts paid out of pocket ($33,000.00). The 
foregoing demand actually constitutes an offer of settlement. If that demand is 
not complied with we will have no choice but to go forward with litigation 
seeking damages which we presently estimate to be between $250,000.00 and 
$1,000,000.00. Please respond to this letter in writing no later than 4:00 p.m. 
MDT, April 25, 2002. Please be advised that my client is not continuing to 
pour money into your client's business and will not be paying any more bills, 
including payroll. Time is therefore of the essence. In order to constitute 
timely response the letter needs to be received m my office by the deadline stated. 
Receipt by fax will be considered sufficient, 
20. This is also false as is shown immediately above. 
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21. Plaintiff has no knowledge of this allegation Discovery is needed. 
22. Payments were made as contemplated by the "agreement" for April 2002. According 
to promissory note, "Payments made within five days before or after the first of each month shall 
be considered neither late nor early..." so J could not have been considered to having ^stopped 
making his (my) monthly payments" until after May 6th, 2002. In addition, we are informed and 
believe that Mr. Chapman is taking $5,000 or more per month from the business and has done so 
since I left. Discovery is needed on this matter. 
23. At the time of the alleged notice to cure, no default had occurred. Furthermore, as is 
alleged above, it appears that Mr, Chapman is still getting his money so that no default has 
subsequently occurred. Discovery is needed. 
24. Defendants' statement is again, a significant distortion of the truth, this time by 
omission. The letter stated, among other things, "Your assertion that no cure is necessary 
constitutes an anticipatory repudiation of the obligation to cure which obviates the need for us to 
wait the 45 days." As is pointed out above, Chapman had already had the 45 days with weeks or 
months to spare. The statement was merely that if there were any unnoticed items in the list, that 
Christensen's anticipatory7 breach eliminated the need to give such notice. 
25. The assertion that no ^accounting" has been provided is false on at least three levels. 
First, Mr. Chapman never left the business and regularly reviewed us financial records during the 
entire time as is discussed above. Second. I dlffprovide financial information pursuant-to— 
Christensen's request and even updated the same. Third, all of the financial records related to the 
12 
company, except for the temporary checking account checkbook and statements, were left with 
the company when I left. 
26. The Christensen letter referenced asserts that all matters are cured, but in fact the 
"cure" was mostly argument, the key documents were not actually provided, and the false 
representations were not made true. While Defendants do consistently call black white, and the 
referenced letter did so, the black was still black. 
27. The statement as made is true. The implications which Defendants are trying to 
make, however, are false. 
28. While it is true that a complaint was filed, the filing was in no way in response to the 
arbitration filing. As is stated above, the suit was contemplated since April, and Defendants 
were given notice of that intention. Mr. Christensen was asked on at least two occasions if he 
would accept service of process. Instead of answering that request, Defendants filed their 
arbitration demand in an attempt to trump the impending lawsuit. 
29. The records of the state of Utah show that the registered office for World-Wide 
Imaging, part of Defendants5 scheme to defraud me, is the office of Mr. Christensen. (See 
attached.) Mr. Christensen has been the prime mover m all of the activities of Defendants. 
Discovery is needed, however, on the precise extent of his involvement. 
30. Defendants' statement of how the documents came into existence is again distorted. 
After much discussion with Mr. Chapman, v/ith every ''agreement3* changing at ever}7 meeting, I 
13 
finally recounted to Mr. Willardson what the issues and what I thought we had agreed upon and 
asked him to reduce that to writing. He did so and 1 presented the result to Chapman. Chapman 
said that it was completely unacceptable and that he would have his own lawyer write the 
contract. From then on Mr. Christensen was responsible for the drafting. Mr, Christensen 
requested, and received, the word processing document that Mr. Willardson generated. Mr. 
Christensen did choose to use a lot of what was originally written, but it was Mr. Christensen, 
writing on behalf of defendants, who actually had the responsibility for all drafting. There were 
several revisions of the document, including the final one", that Mr. Willardson did not even see 
before they were signed and Mr. Willardson did not receive a copy of the final document until 
shortly before this litigation was filed. 
31. This is false or misleading for the same reasons stated above. Christensen may not 
have met with or spoken with me directly, but he did the drafting and it was his changes that 
Chapman discussed with me and insisted upon implementing, 
32. Defendants' motion seeks to have this court order plaintiff to participate in an 
arbitration proceeding commenced by Defendants. Plaintiff is so participating. Plaintiff and his 
counsel have filed all required documents in that action, including without limitation, selection 
of arbitrators and disclosure of involved parties (for conflict checks). Plaintiffs counsel has 
participated with Defendant Chiistensen in a telephone conference on how the arbitration is to be 
managed. Defendants' assertion that plaintiff is not participating in arbitration is, at least, 
grossly misleading. 
DATED: Thursday, January 23, 2003. 
14 
B^tn Whatlf y 
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Timothy Miguel Willardson (4443) 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Telephone: (801) 576-1400 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRYAN J. WHATLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Bruce E. Chapman, Ceri 





AFFIDAVIT OF TIMOTHY MIGUEL 
WILLARDSON 
Civil No. 020405636 
Judge: #5 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
TIMOTHY MIGUEL WILLARDSON, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. Defendants5 motion seeks to have this court order plaintiff to participate in an 
arbitration proceeding commenced by Defendants. Plaintiff is so participating. Plaintiff and his 
counsel have filed all required documents in that action, including without limitation, selection 
of arbitrators and disclosure of involved parties (for conflict checks). Plaintiffs counsel has 
participated with Defendant Christensen in a telephone conference on how the arbitration is to be 
managed. Defendants5 assertion that plaintiff is not participating in arbitration is, at least, 
grossly misleading, 
M U 5 23 fft f03 
120A 
DATED Thursday, Januaiy 23, 2 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to befon 
Notary Public 
me this £3 day of rVYttW • 2003 
120B 
2 
4TH : . 
ST- i£ 
Timothy Miguel Willardson (4443) 
10885 South State Street 
Sand}, UT 84070 
Telephone: (801) 576-1400 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRYAN J. WHATLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Bruce E. Chapman, Cen Chapman, James L 
Chnstensen, and Does 1 - V, 
Defendants 
AFFIDAVIT OF TIMOTHY MIGUEL 
WILLARDSON REGARDING 56(F) 
Civil No. 020405636 
Judge- #5 
County of Salt Lake ) 
) SS 
State of Utah ) 
Timothy Miguel Willardson, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows: 
1. I am counsel for plaintiff Bryan Whatley m the above styled matter I have direct 
personal knowledge of all matters affirmed herein. 
I . Why facts precluding summary judgment for dismissal) cannot be presented. 
2. As is discussed m the accompanying motion and memorandum, no discovery has 
yet been taken, nor could any have been taken m conformance with the rules 
I I . Probable facts not available. 
5 We expect that discovery will allow us to further document the malfeasance plead m 
the complaint and to show that defendants Chapman and Gmstensen-were-working cugether to 
harm and/or defraud Mr. Whatley, 
JAK Li s 2b ffj '03 
120C 
III. Steps I taken to obtain missing facts. 
7 Because the case has just commenced and no discovery is permitted, plaintiff has 
done all that|he reasonably can do to discovei the necessary additional information at the present 
time 
IV. Why Additional time will enable Defendant to rebut movant's allegations. 
8 To date the entire program of discovery which is an essential part of the light to 
adjudication has been impossible Discovery is essentia] to fully meet the allegations of 
Defendants' motion 
Timothy Miguel Willardson 
SUBSCRIBBD AND SWORN to this. Thursday, January 23, 2003. 
Notary Public! wfestir** norm PUBLIC>sm *fm 
\^%fJ!}^ r>un\,n in&h 8460* 
n 
V 
Hr'l ROVO UU    
COM? 5X»- 12 27-2003 
120D 
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Timothy Miguel Willardson (4443) 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Telephone: (801) 576-1400 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRYAN J. WHATLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Bruce E. Chapman, Ceri Chapman, James L. 
Christensen, and Does I - V, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR RELIEF UNDER RULE 
56(F) 
Civil No. 020405636 
Judge: #5 
COMES NOW the Defendant and support his motion for relief under Rule 56(f) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as follows: 
Facts 
1. Plaintiffs complaint was filed within the last month, No answer was filed but a 
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) was filed by defendants, along with additional information 
in the form of an affidavit. That additional information, beyond the pleadings, is consistent with 
the requirement of Rule 12(b) that such motion shall be treated as a motion for summary judgment 
under Rule 56. 
2. Neither party has been allowed to conduct discovery in this matter. Defendants 
desire to prevent plaintiff in this matter from having his day in court and has proposed facts which 
cannot be fully answered without discovery as the facts are uniquely in the possession of 
defendants. 
Argument 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) states; 
... If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the 
pleading ro state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the 
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be 
treated as ont for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and 
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. (Emphasis added.) 
In other words, Utah Rule 12(b)(6) is written expressly with the idea in mind that it is not 
inappropriate to put in matters beyond the "pleading," upon the motion depends. In fact, 
defendants have, by referring to Mr. Chapman's affidavit, done so. The motion must therefore be 
considered and resolved as one for summary judgment. 
The Rule also provides that all parties shall be given a reasonable opportunity to present "all 
material made pertinent to such a motion." In this instance, Defendants are seeking to bring in 
items (such as Mr. Chapman's affidavit) which are beyond the pleadings and are seeking to 
prevent plaintiff from being fully heard. 
The United States Supreme Court has stated the purpose and reasoning behind Federal 
Rule 56(f). In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986), the Court stated that, "Rule 
56(f) ... allows a summary judgment motion to be denied, or the hearing on the motion to be 
continued, if the nonmoving party has not had an opportunity to make full discovery. (Emphasis 
added). A recent Federal Circuit case, Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Center, Inc. v. U.S., 985 
F.2d 1575, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1993), interpreted the Supreme Court's position on Rule 56(f) as 
follows: 
"The Supreme Court has made clear that summary judgment is inappropriate 
unless a tribunal permits the parties adequate time for discovery." Dunkin' 
Donuts of America v. Metallurgical Exoproducts Corp., 840 F.2d 917, 919 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988) . . . Indeed, summary judgment should "be refused where 
the nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to discover 
information that is essential to fits! opposition." Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 250 ne5 (1986). (Emphasis added,) 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311 (Utah 1984), also stated that 
Rule 56(f) motions should be liberally granted. The Court stated, "Where, however, the party 
opposing summary judgment timely presents his affidavit under Rule 56(f) stating reasons why he 
is presently unable to proffer evidentiary affidavits he directly and forthrightly invokes the trial 
court's discretion. Unless dilatory or lacking in merit, the motion should be liberally treated." 
The Court in that case discussed another Utah case, Strand v. Associated Students of University of 
Utah, 561 P.2d 191 (Utah 1977), in which Rule 56(f) relief was granted, according to the Court in 
Cox, because "[TJhere had not been sufficient time since the inception of the lawsuit for plaintiff to 
utilize discovery procedures, and thereby have an opportunity to cross-examine the moving parly." 
Both the Federal and Utah Courts, as well as other jurisdictions, are liberal in granting 
relief under this rule. In Patty Precision v. Brown & Sharpe Manufacturing, 742 F.2d 1260, 1264 
(10th Cir. 1984), the court held that courts must rule on the Rule 56(f) motion before ever granting 
a summary judgment, to do otherwise would be failure to exercise discretion and unfair prejudice 
against the party filing a Rule 56(f) motion.1 
The First Circuit held, in Resolution Trust v. North Bridge Assoc, 22 F.3d 1198, 1203 
(1st Cir. 1994), that, "[consistent with the salutary purposes underlying Rule 56(f), district courts 
should construe motions that invoke the rule generously, holding parties to the rule's spirit rather 
than its letter." (Emphasis added, citations excluded.) The Court further stated, "when a party 
claims an inability to respond to an opponent's summary judgment motion because of incomplete 
discovery or the like, [Rule] 56(f) looms large." Id. at 1202. 
Rule 56(f) is so favored that many jurisdictions have granted the motion despite the 
movant's failure to meet all requirements of the Rule. In Snook v. Trust Co. of'Ga. Bank of 
Id. at 1265. 
Savannah N.A , 859 R2d 865, 871 (11th Cn 1988), the Eleventh Circuit held that, "a party 
opposing a motion for summary judgment need not file an affidavit pursuant to Rule 56(f),. m 
order to invoke the protection of that Rule " The court justified that position by stating that courts 
must use "an abundance of caution and to prevent a possible injustice "2 Summarizing the law m 
this area, the court also stated "that the interests of justice will sometimes require a district court to 
postpone its ruling on a motion for summary judgment even though the technical requirements of 
Rule 56(f) have not been met."3 
The Fifth Circuit stated that the purpose of Rule 56(f) "is to provide non-movants with a 
much needed tool to keep open the doors of discovery m order to adequately combat a summary 
judgment motion/' Wichita Falls Office Assoc, v Banc One Corp., 978 R2d 915 (5th Cir, 
1992) Many courts, m fact, have held that, "such continuance of a motion for summary judgment 
for purposes of discovery should be granted almost as a mattei of course unless the non-movmg 
party has not diligently pursued discovery of the evidence "4 
Here the case has barely commenced and plaintiff has been unable to use any of the rights 
to discovery provided by the Rules of Civil Procedure 
Accordingly, the Rule 56(f) motion is required and a continuance appropriate 
Conclusion 
D
 Id Sec also Sames\ Gable, 732 F 2d 49. 52 (3d Cn 1989) (even when it was the plaintiffs fault that 
summary judgment was enteied against them, the court still granted Rule 56(0 saying that it is en or to giant 
defeiiaant's motion for summary judgment while peitment discoveiy requests wei e outstanding) 
4
 Id a t n 4 See also, Beikelev A Home Ins Co
 5 68 F.3d 14Q9 (D C Cn 1995), Imemanonal Snonstop 
Inc \ Rally's, lr\c , 939 F.2d 1257, 1267 (5th Cn 1991) 
Defendants are seeking to block discovery through the stratagem of moving for dismissal. 
The discovery proposed is directly relevant to defeating plaintiffs motion to dismiss. Defendant 
respectfully request the Court to issue the order requested above. 
DATED: Thursday, January 23, 2003 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT - PROVO COURT 
UTAH COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
BR\ANJ W H A T L E Y , 
) 
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BE IT REMEMBERED that this matter came on for hearing 
belore the above-named court on February 26 2003 
WHEREUPON the parties appearing and represented bv 
counsel, the following proceedings were held 
CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT 





2 (February 26, 2003) 
3 THE JUDGE We re on the record in the matter 
4 ofBrvanJ Whatlev versus Bruce E Chapman, etal This 
5 is case number 020405636 And we are here on the motion 
0 to compel arbitration and the motion to dismiss that were 
7 filed bv the detendants m this matter And tnen the 
8 plaintiffs responded with a Rule 56(f) motion for further 
9 discovery 
10 All right And I guess part and parcel of that is 
1 1 the issue as to whether or not the motion to dismiss is 
12 reallv a 12(b)(6) motion or wnether its a motion for summary 
13 judgment 
14 Okay Counsel, will you go ahead and put your 
15 appearances on the recordn 
16 MR WILLARDSON Tim Willardson appearing on 
17 behalf of plaintiff 
IS MR CHR1STENSEN Jim Chnstensen on behalf of the 
19 defenaants I aiso have Chris jessop nere from my office 
20 with me I also have the two detenaants Mr and Mrs 
21 Chapman with me 
22 THE JUDGE Okay And Mr Willardson, you have 
23 with you7 
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1 THE JUDGE Okay All right Mr Chnstensen 
2 why dont vou go ahead 
3 ARGUMENT BY MR CHRISTENSEN 
4 MR CHRISTENSEN Your Honor, what I m going to do 
5 is take a few minutes andjust give vou some factual 
6 background I know that some of this is in tne pleadings 
7 But I've gone ahead and spent some time ana put together a 
8 timeline that might assist you in understanding what I'll be 
9 e\plaming 
10 I have a copy of the same timeline in some of our 
11 other exhibits here, Your Honor, for vou 
12 THE JUDGE Oh, that would be great lean 
13 basically read it but it might be easier 
14 MR CHRISTENSEN It might be helpful In fact 
15 if you'd like I ve given a copy of this to opposing counsel 
16 also 
17 THE JUDGE All right 
18 MR CHRISTENSEN So maybe I can even move this up 
19 a little bit— 
20 THE JUDGE That would be great 
21 MR CHRISTENSEN -- so you can see it a little 
22 bit 
23 Mr Chapman started a photo processing business 
24 aoout 30 vears ago and a he s been running that business 
25 here as World Wide Photo in, in Provo for the last 30 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
PAGE 4 
2 Back in September of or in February of 2001 
Z Mr ChaDman and Mr Whatlev Degan discussing the possible 
-r sale of World Wide Photo Mr Whatlev was a competitor here 
5 in town owned a couDie of his own stores ana was interested 
6 m bu\ mg Mr Chapman s business And so tney began talking 
in Feoruarv of 2001 
S On April 5th Mr Whatlev and and the Chapmans 
9 executed a stock ana asset purchase and saie agreement 
10 At that time Mr there was a period of time in which after 
11 thev signea the agreement that Mr Whatlev had the 
12 opportunity to look at certain financial records ana 
13 determine whether or not he wanted to close on the sale 
14 And so he was given certain tax returns for the most recent 
15 12 months to determine whether or not there was the cash flow 
16 that a he needed and that M J Chapman had represented to him 
17 in the agreement After receiving these tax returns and 
1S making his own individual assessment of whether or not he 
19 wanted to close thev went ahead and closed on April 25th oi 
20 2001 about 20 days later 
21 In that transaction or in that final closing 
22 document there was an amendment that modified paragraph 2C ot 
23 the agreement where Mi Whatlev acknowledged that he had 
24 inspected the equipment And a at that same time he signed 
25 a promissory note m the amount ot $457 500 in favor of the 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
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1 THE JUDGE Okav Before you go into this next 
2 section, you re not on camera at all Wh} don t you switch 
3 it to the voice activated One more Oka> Lets keep 
4 going No"? Thatstheone No Yes, that s the one 
^ All right Thank vou 
6 And speak up because you re— 
7 MR CHRISTENSEN I m probably in the worst place 
8 m the courtroom ior cameras 
9 THETUDGE ^res 
10 MR CHRISTENSEN 
11 THE JUDGE Oka\ 
12 MR CHRISTENSEN 
13 year, about 11 months-
14 THE JUDGE Oka 
15 THE CLERK 
16 THE JUDGE 
17 THE CLERK 
18 THETUDGE 
19 minute but I think its back on Oka\ 
20 MR CHRISTENSEN 0 1 ^ 
21 THE JUDGE Tne woTld of technology 
22 MR CHRISTENSEN All right On April 2nd, 2002 
23 Mr Whatlev entered into a lease agreement with M &. M 
24 Prooem for tne purchase of a. or a new space in Orem 
25 Again Mr Chapman was unaware of that when ne did it But 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
PA-6E-* 
But I won t be here that often 
After approximately almost a 
Wait Stop 
Is it recording? 
Yes I think it is now 
Because mv Okay 
"V es It showed video loss for a 
Sorr> 
1 Chapmans 
2 Also m addition to the business which was given 
3 as security for this promissory note there were two trust 
4 aeeos that were given as additional secunn against the 
5 purchase price And Your honor will recall mat we had 
6 a neanng on the telephone ior a TRO to stop the foreclosure 
7 of those two trust deeds And that s what these two trust 
S deeds were meant to do was to act as additional secuntv 
Q
 against the purchase of this against the promissory note 
10 On April 2no 2002 this was almost a vear 
11 later And let me and let me talk to just a minute for 
12 this period of time of approximately 11 months 
13 During that 11 months Mr Whatlev ran the 
14 business He stepped in he hired, brought m some of his 
15 own people he took over the office had all of the vou 
'6 know had access to all of the records of the business and 
17 a, and ran the business for approximately a year 
1S At his request and and certainlv consistent with 
19 mutual agreement between him and Mr Chapman, Mr Chapman 
20 was oftentimes down there at the store helping, helping with 
21 the store Because he, of course, was interested in making 
22 sure that this purchase was going to work He wanted to get 
23 paid the money that was coming to him under tne promissory 
24 note 
25 On April 2nd 2002--
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
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1 that occurred 
2 And then approximately one month later on Mav 2nd, 
3 I take it back, on April 23rd, 2002 Whatley through his 
4 attomev Mr Willardson sent a four page notice to 
5 Mr Chapman telling him that he was going to permanently 
6 close the doors of World V/ide Photo This was witnout am 
7 without any land of a, a notice or without anv kind of 
8 warning to Mr Chapman It was a total surprise to him when 
9 Mr Whatlev sends this letter through his attorney saving I m 
10 going to just close the business down, I m going to shut i* 
11 down 
12 At that time the letter also demanded a response 
13 from Mr Chapman an or before April 25th two davs later 
14 On April 29th, of course, not wanting to see World 
15 Wide Photo go out of business, Mr Chapman stepped up ana 
16 said I will come back in and I will run the business, but 
17 I m going to run it as a gratuitous bailee meaning that he 
18 would act essentially as a trustee or a receiver for the 
19 business and run it continue to run it for the benefit of 
20 Mr Whatle) 
21 Mr Chapman back, back m on April 29th and dio 
22 just that And he s been running the business ever since 
23 then 
24 THE JUDGE Does ne give mm notice"7 Ididnt 
25 ever see anything in the, the pleading or anv of the 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
PAGES 
i attachments or exnibits that when he comes in and takes it 
2 u\er as a gratuitous bailee that he iets the otner party know 
^ that Does he9 
4 MR CHRISTENSEN Well what happens is is 
^ there s actually telephone calls between me and 
6 Mr Willardson where we arrange and I make it clear, I said 
7 we will come in but we re not coming in talcing this business 
5 back Tnis is not some land ot a a ioreclosure or vou re 
9 not paving us off in doing this We 11 come back in and run 
10 the business But we will do so And then v,e and we oo in 
11 fact send a formal notice on Mav 2nd wnere we sent a notice 
12 or default and demand a cure from Mr Wnatle\ ior 
3 Mr Whatley s breach of the purchase agreement A.na we make 
14 it \erv clear in that notice that Mr Cnapman is onlv running 
15 the business as a gratuitous bailee or as a reserve tor the 
16 business 
P THE JUDGE Yes 
1S MR CHRISTENSEN And so its its clear at that 
1° time both through our our conversations and through the 
20 letter that Mr Chapman then sends that we re taking over 
21 the business, or Mr Chapman is taking over the business for 
22 that purpose alone that in no way does this constitute 
23 pavment or does it constitute in some wav a foreclosure or a 




1 agreement the parties agree that any 
2 action brought shall be submitted to 
3 binding arbitration in accordance with 
4 the rules of the American Arbitration 
5 Association Such arbitration need not 
6 be conducted bv the Amen can Arbitration 
7 Association even though it would follow 
8 tne rule Arbitration proceedings shall 
9 be brougrt in Utah Count), Utah and not 
10 elsewnere 
11 When I was sitting down with Mr ChaDman as his 
12 attorney determining wnat we needed to do because there had 
13 been a default under this agreement by Mr bv the plaintiff 
14 we looked at this line hard and determined that we we were 
15 bound If we were to go after the Dlamtiffm this case 
16 for their breach of me agreement we needed to bring it 
1*7 unoer the arbitration clause because the arbitration clause 
18 makes it very clear that if there s any land of a dispute 
19 unoer this agreement oi any una that anv acnon that 
20 would tnen occur as a result of the dispute under this 
21 agreement, any action needed to be submitted to binding 
22 arbitration 
23 The section 78-31 a-41 of the Utah Arbitration Act 
2*f makes it very clear It savs 
25 "The court upon motion of anv parrv 
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1 Several months later on December 5th tne ChaDmans 
2 file a demand for arbitration with the Triple AAA consistent 
3 with paragraDh 9M of the stock asset ourchase, purchase and 
4 saie agreement 
5 And then on December 19th a couole weeks later 
6 trus lawsuit gets filed by Mr Whatley wherein he files a 
n
 complaint alleging several different causes of action against 
S the Chapmans and against me as counsel for the Chapmans 
9 Which onngs us to the moH^-tnats beiore the Court 
10 toda\ 
11 We re here, Your Honor because we believe that 
12 this provision is emorceable and that this provision that 
13 requires a an arbitration of this matter needs to be 
14 entorceo and that this is essentially is an an eno run 
ID around the compliance with the contract 
16 So today I m here essentially arguing through botn 
17 our motion to compel arbitration and the motion to dismiss 
18 that it is the arbitration agreement that snould control 
19 This is the arbitration clause in the agreement 
20 paragraph 9M Thats a little bit bigger you should be able 
21 to read that I think 
22 THE JUDGE Uh-huh (affirmative) 
23 MR CHRISTENSEN Paragraph 9M of the agreement 
24 reads 
25 "In the event of a dispute under this 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
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1 showing the existence of an arbitration 
2 agreement shall order the parties to 
3 arbitrate 
4 And that s whv we re here today, Your Honor, is 
5 that there is an existence of an arbitration agreement and it 
6 is now the dutv of this Court to order arbitration 
7 There is a, a case called tne Central Florida 
8 Investments, lnc versus Park West Associates It s a 2002 
9 Utah case that reads 
10 "We interpret and I m quoting 
11 "We interpret the agreement keeping in 
12 mmd our policy of encouraging 
13 arbitration IT IS the policy of the 
14 law m Utah to interpret contracts in 
15 favor of arbitration m resolution of 
lb disputes when the parties have agreed not 
17 to litigate 
18 Because the parties have agreed to arbitrate, tnis 
19 Court \ our Honor should compei arbitration 
20 Nov. Mr Whatley s response to this really simple 
21 I think, straightforward argument is that under Utah Code 
22 Annotated Section 7S-31 a-j it states that parties are to 
23 pursue tne arbitration obligation unless iraud has beer 
24 allegeG And a ana we certamn don t disagree witn tha^ 
25 Your Honor That is in fact what tne statute savs 
COURT-PROeEEDINGS 
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' Whatlev goes on also and argues that none of his 
2 causes of action arise unaer the agreement which we we agree 
." vith, or disagree with 
4 We believe Your Honor that altnough fraud har 
5 oeen allegea m this case, that realiv what we have oetore 
o the Court is nothing more than a series of breach of contract 
7 causes of action that nave been recharacterized as fraud 
S And that the Court even though fraud has oeen alleged that 
9 the Court still should cause both of thf^r pnmes to pursue 
10 the binding arbitration requirement 
11 Let me go through eacn of these causes of action 
12 "erv briefly just to help the Court understana where we re 
13 coming from 
14 The rirst cause oi action that a, that has been 
15 alleged is a void contract asking for rescission or a breach 
I o of contract cause of action Certainlv a breach of contract 
17 cause or action would be subject to the arbitration clause 
18 That would be a, a cause of action that would arise under a 
19 dispute unaer this agreement 
20 The second cause of action is a conversion or a 
21 theft cause of action And the agreement specifically does 
22 m fact allege under paragraph three that there was to be 
23 certain assets transrerred with the agreement 
24 Again Your Honor although thev use the words 
25 conversion or theft, it's essentially a breach of contract 
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1 would be a, a clear breach of contract cause of action 
2 recharacterized as a, a federal 18 USC Section 1030 cause of 
3 action 
4 The next cause of action is a breach of fiduciary 
5 duties Again, Your Honor, we would argue that this cause 
o oi action would not exist but for the existence of the 
7 contractual obligations under the contract Hence, it too 
8 would be a contract cause of action 
9 There s also a defamation cause of action We're 
10 not clear on tnis one Your Honor, as to what defamation has 
11 been realiv complained of But again it s our argument 
12 that any defamation cause of action would have arisen because 
13 of this contract between the parties 
14 Finally, and tins brings me to the fraud cause of 
15 action Mr Whatlev nas alleged fraud, m our opinion he has 
16 alleged fraud m an attempt to get out of his obligation to 
17 aroitrate And we believe that the fraua cause of action 
18 ought to be looked at carefully here 
19 in his memorandum m opposition Mr Whatlev argues 
20 that there are essentially four misrepresentations, or rour 
21 representations that would rise to tne level of fraua And 
22 tnose representations appear m paragraphs 4Q 50, 52 ana 
23 56 And what I'd like to do is go through eacn of those 
24 representations here just bnefh 
25 First of all, paragraph 49 of the complaint In 
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1 cause of action It is a reference to paragraph three of 
2 the agreement that requires that assets be transrerrea Ana 
3 us their position that we didn t transfer certain assets 
-i nence tney ve would up with tne characterization o f 
5 conversion or theft 
6 Tne third cause of action is a slander of title 
7 cause of action and this has to do with a the, the real 
8 property that was given as additional securm And this 
o again, Your Honor, goes to paragraph 2(b) of the agreement 
10 that specifically obligates Mr Whatlev to give the Cnapmans 
11 a secunn interest m lots 242 and 243 of Sherwood Hills 
12 subdivision Again specifically goes to certain 
13 requirements under the contract which would be a contract 
W cause of action agair 
15 The fourth cause of action is a tortious 
lo interference with business cause of action Again this 
17 this flows airectlv out of paragraph five in the agreement 
18 where Mr Whatlev says the Chapmans are competing and 
19 interfering with his business and he again, savs that tne\ 
20 can t do that because they have agreed mat they wouldn t do 
21 that under the agreement 
22 The next cause of action is a, a cause of action 
23 under 18 USC Section 1030 which is a computer fraud cause of 
24 action This, again aiso goes to the noncompete clause in 
25 paragraph five of the agreement which Your Honor, again, 
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1 this paragraph the allegation is made that Mr Chapman and 
2 his son with Mr Chapman s assistance, promptly began 
3 actively soliciting business in Utah County And they 
4 allege that this is a fraud cause of acuon 
5 Again, Your Honor, I think it s clear that what 
6 they're really referring to here is, is a breach of the 
7 paragraph five obligation to not compete under the 
8 agreement 
9 THE JUDGE Is this really paragraph 48? 
10 MR CHRISTENSEN Well, its paragraphs 48 and 
11 4 9 -
12 THE JUDGE Okay 
13 MR CHRISTENSEN - of the complaint Those 
14 two taken together essentially say and again this is an 
15 allegation being made bv tne plaintiffs, but thev re saying 
16 that Chapman and his son began soliciting business in Utah 
17 Counts, which would be of course, a direct violation of the 
18 noncompete clause found m paragraph five of the agreement 
19 And our position again is Your Honor that that s 
20 not a fraud cause of action thats really a oreach of 
21 contract cause of action There was an obligation set fortn 
22 in paragraph five of the agreement to not compete and thev 
23 are alleging that they did But they re calling it a fraud 
24 cause ot action 
25 Paragraph 50 states and this is m the complaint 
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2 Tfte named defendants absolutely ^etused 
3 to allow Mr Whatlev access to the 
4 books 
5 And thev call this a rraud cause of action 
o Again in paragraphs 49 and 50 of the complaint all 
7 Mr Whatlev is stating is that we or is that Mr Chapman did 
S not activeh, well mat Mr Chapman dia not hand the books 
9 over and he s calling tnat a fraud cause of action when in 
! 0 tact 1 think its clear that that is anotner breach of 
11 contract cause of action 
12 Paragraph 52 states 
13 'Named aerendants not only 
14 misrepresented the value of the 
15 equiDment thev represented that it was 
16 functional 
17 And again it is their position that in tact it was 
1S not functional Again this representation flows out of 
19 paragraph three of the agreement that states 
20 ' All assets and liabilities m the 
21 business as ot the date of execution 
22 shall remain in World Wide Photo except 
23 the following' 
24 And then there follows a list of equipment 




2 And our argument again Your Honor, is that it is a 
3 dispute It s one of the disputes no question But anv 
4 dispute under this agreement, any action thats brought shall 
5 be submitted to binamg arbitration and it need not go to the 
6 courts for determination 
7 Now, Your Honor, 1 would like to leave that for 
8 just a minute and move onto our motion to dismiss The 
9 motion to dismiss is actually a motion to not onlv dismiss 
10 because ot tne arbitration clause, but we're also moving the 
11 Court to dismiss the action against me personal!}, and the 
12 action against Mr and Mrs Chapman I've already argued 
13 essentially why it ought to de dismissed because of the 
14 aroitration clause I'd like to move on to why it ought to 
15 be dismissed witn regard to the allegations that have been 
16 brought against me 
17 Y our Honor, 1 would remind the Court that an 
18 attorney owes no duty to an opposing parr,, esDecialiy one 
19 who is represented by counsel My Hence, I would be 
20 immune rrom anv lawsuit tnat might be brought m connection 
21 with the preparation of contracts in connection with the sale 
22 of this Dusiness except where their might have been 
23 personal fraua on my pan In other words if I actually 
24 detrauaed the defendants personall\ m some way here tnen 
25 certainly they would be able to bring a cause of action 
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i equipment, or that it wasn't as they thought it was And 
2 our Dosition again Your Honor is that that is a breach of 
3 contract cause of action not a fraud cause of action 
4 Finally paragraph 56 in their comDiaint states 
5 that, or Mr Whatley alleges that representations were made 
b with regard to transfer of tne stock And thev re saving 
7 that Mr Chapman and Mrs Chapman did not transfer stock as 
8 thev had represented thev would They again call that a 
9 fraud cause of action when-aeain-Your Honor that cause oi 
10 action flows directly out of the contract 
11 Paragraph one of the agreement states that the 
12 seller warrants that sellers are the sole and complete owners 
13 of the shares and the sellers own no other or further shares, 
14 and the sellers have all of the rights, privileges and 
15 authorities necessary to sell such shares of World Wide Photo 
16 to Duyer 
17 If there s been a breach here, Your Honor, it's a 
18 breach of that representation it's a breach of the contract, 
19 and the agreement to transfer stock over Whether that 
20 happened or not is a contract issue it s not a fraud 
21 issue 
22 Now, certainly it's possible in circumstances to 
23 to characterize something that is a breach or contract as 
24 fraud But if it flows out of the contract in the first 
25 place it is essentially a, a breach of contract cause of 
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1 against me for that personal fraud But short of that I am 
2 immune from any kind of an action that might be brought 
3 because ot my involvement with the Chapmans in drafting their 
4 documents for this transaction 
5 In the State of Utah in order to plead fraud one 
6 must plead these eight, or nine, I m sorr> these nine 
7 elements This is coming out the (inaudible word) versus 
S Hill case, a 1999 case And I m sure the Court is well aware 
9 of what these all are And a, here, and I'm talking now 
10 just about the cause of action against be personall\, we are 
11 arguing and we're moving the Court to dismiss tne cause of 
12 any fraud causes of action against me because essentially 
13 none of these have been satisfied None of these elements 
14 have actually been specifically pied in the contract 
15 complaint 
16 These are the three references to anything that I 
17 personally did in connection with this transaction I would 
18 like to go througn each of those 
19 The first one comes out in the introduction, it s 
20 paragraph 11 of the complaint where it reads 
21 "On or about April 5th 2001 Mr Whatley 
22 and Chapmans entered into an agreement 
23 entitled Stock and Asset Purchase and 
24 Sale Tnat document was dratted by 
25 defendant Chnstensen ' 
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i Tne second allegation with SDecific reference to me 
2 comes out of the third count, the rraua cause of action 
5 And again Your Honor I would matce u clear that 
4 the oniy wav thev can ever pieaa a case against me is if tliev 
: actually Died with SDecificirv an actual fraud cause of 
6 action So I picked up the allegations that go to thai 
7 rraud allegation So Count Three, fraud reads, paragraph 
5 49 
9 ' The above actions began occurring— 
10 within a very snon time of signing the 
11 agreements ' 
12 <\nd thev re complaining about wnat thev are 
13 alleging Mr Chapman did after the the signing ot the 
14 agreement 
15 "Plaintiff therefore alleges on 
16 information and belief that Mr Cnapman 
17 had no intention of honoring those 
1 S promises at the time thev were made 
19 Those contractual representations, 
20 warranties and promises were conveved and 
21 drafted bv Mr Chnstensen assisting 
22 Mr Chapman's fraud " 
23 So again, the allegation is that 1 conveved and 
24 drafted the promises set forth in the agreement 
25 Finally in Count Three paragraph 56 of the same 
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1 representations that Mr Chapman, or there are allegations 
2 that Mr Chapman made representations But there's not a 
3 singie representation that, or allegation that I made any 
4 kind of a representation 
5 And so essentially paragraph one, or the first 
6 element of the, of the fraud cause of action has not been 
7 satisfied And m order to bring a cause of action against 
8 an attorney or anybody else there must be a specific 
9 representation that that attomev actually made 
10 representations that were relied on Dy the other party And 
11 that's not done All we have here are allegations relative 
12 to documents having been drafted by me Ano, Your Honor, 
13 I m unaware that the drafting of documents m the State of 
14 Utah is actionable, which is whv we re bringing the motion to 
15 dismiss here 
16 We have ouoted tne Heathman versus Hatch case which 
17 is a Utah case And I m lust going to read the one part of 
1 S it, Y our Honor, and 1 m quoting here where it states 
19 "It has long been recognized m Utah 
20 that where the terms fraud, conspiracy 
21 and negligence are but general 
22 accusations m the nature of conclusions 
23 of the pieaoer they will not stand up 
24 against a motion to dismiss on tna+ 
25 ground Tne basic facts must be set 
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1 cause of action states 
2 "The statement that Mr Whatlev was 
3 contracting to purcnase the outstanding 
4 shares of the corporation appears 
5 multiple times in the document which 
•6 Mr Chnstensen drafted and which the 
7 Chapmans signed It is entitled Stock 
S and Asset Purchase and Sale 
9 Mr Whatlev requested the stock records 
10 and corporation records and was initialh 
11 told the" would be produced Ultimately 
12 Mr Chapman admitted they were not 
13 On information and belief the named 
14 defendants either knew or should have 
15 known that the contractual 
16 representations regarding stock and 
17 corporation records were false when 
18 made ' 
19 Your Honor, I've been through this agreement 
20 carefully And with regard to specific fraud causes of 
21 action these are the only allegations that are made against 
22 me specifically And our position, Your Honor, is that in 
23 order to plead fraud against any individual one must allege, 
24 first of all that a representation was made There s no 
25 allegation here that 1 made any representations There's 
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1 forth with sufficient particulantv to 
2 show what facts are claimed to constitute 
3 such charges " 
4 And again, Your Honor, the only facts that we're 
5 aware of is that I drafted documents 
6 Now, I've got to go back just a bit and help the 
7 Court recognize or remember that wnat happened here wnen this 
8 whole document was put together, when this agreement was put 
9 together. Mr Willardson drafted the initial purchase and 
10 sale agreement I then was given a copy of that agreement to 
11 review for Mr Chapman I reviewed the agreement and 1 made 
12 suggested changes And a we went back and forth, 
13 Mr Willardson and myself went back and forth I never 
14 talked to Mr Whatley, the party But I taliced to, talked 
15 to Mr Willardson on probably two or three different 
16 occasions as we went back and forth drafting this document 
17 After that we made some cnanges, and as I understood it tne 
1S document was signed 1 was not party or even part of trie 
19 actual signing of the documents 
20 That certainly would not rise to the level, at 
21 least that I m aware of in the State of Utah would not 
22 rise to the level on fraud on mv oart because I happened to 
23 be involved m drafting documents If it were so, 
24 "VourHonor--
25 THE JUDGE Counsel, are vou standing to object 
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2 MR WILLARDSON lam Your Honor 
3 Mi Cnnstensen has a, an interesting position 
4 being here before the Court He s both tunctiomng as 
5 attomev ana as deiendant ana he nas suommed argument and, 
t> and he s been arguing But it seems to me that he s also 
7 testifying now And I think thats inappropriate If he 
S vvants to 0e a witness ne needs to sit down and let another 
9 lawver argue and then ne can he called to testifS But this 
10 is not an evidentiary hearing, its an argument 
11 THE JUDGE If it s before me by affidavit I tnink 
12 its okay But if voure going beyond whats berore me in 
13 the iorm of an affidavit you are testifying 
14 MR CHRISTENSEN Weil, you have any affidavit 
15 THE JUDGE Okay 
1 c MR CHRISTENSEN And and again Y our Honor, that 
17 miormation I m giving you in terms of how it was put 
1S together is for background purposes only Our motion is 
lc> based on what has been Died This is a motion to dismiss 
20 THE JUDGE Well, then let s go with what s been 
21 pied 
22 MR WILLARDSON Mav I ask to see a copy ot 
23 Mr Cnnstensen s affidavit? I didn t ever receive mat in 




1 did the drafting and it was his changes 
2 that Chapman discussed with Mr Whatiey 
3 and insisted upon implementing ' 
4 And again, out of Whatley's affidavit himself he 
5 states 
t> "Christensen mav not have met with or 
7 spoken with me directly, but he did the 
S drafting and it was his changes that 
9 Chapman discussed with me and insisted 
10 uDon implementing ' 
11 So l think it s clear, Your Honor, there s, 
12 there s certainly no evidence before the Court that I ever 
13 spoke with Mr Whatiey There s no evidence oefore the 
14 Court that Mr Wnatley ever replied or relied on any of my 
15 representations 
16 In the end, Y our Honor what happens here is there 
17 was an agreement that was prepared The agreement was signed 
18 by Mr Whatiey as the purchaser, and the agreement was signed 
19 by the Chapmans as the sellers I was not partv to that 
20 agreement I am not sign the agreement I never met with 
21 Mr Whatlev I never made anv representations to 
22 Mr Whatiey I never preDared or signed any kind of an 
23 ODimon of counsel that Mr Whatiey would have reueo on 
24 None of that is here berore tne Court It s ven 
25 clear that the only thing oefore the Court is the iact that I 
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1 (Inaudible discussion at counsel table ) 
2 MR CHRISTENSEN Thats and thats correct 
3 Your Honor What I m It's not my affidavit its 
4 Mr Chapman's affidavit 
5 But what wnat I ve stated is in fact referenced in 
6 Mr Whatlev s affidavit when he states m fact The last 
7 thing here 
S I m going straight to the issue of the draft of the 
9 documents Tne com Diana-states *4r Christensen drarted the 
10 agreement Tne memo drafted bv Mr Wiliaroson savs that 
11 Mr Willardson reduced the agreement to writing 
12 Mr Whatlev m his own affidavit savs Mr Willardson reduced 
13 the agreement to writing And I ve got the actual paragraph 
14 reterences here to what the comDlaint says relative to what 
15 Mr Whatlev, or Wiliardson says in his opposition memo and 
lo wnat Whatiey says in his affidavit 
17 With regard to whether Christensen communicated 
18 with Whatlej, again, the complaint states 
19 "Those contractual representations 
20 warranties and promises were conveyed and 
21 drafted by Mr Christensen " 
22 That comes out of this right here And yet, and 
23 then in his memo in opposition Mr Willardson states 
24 ' Christensen mav not nave met with or 
25 spoken with Mr Wnatley directly but he 
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1 assisted Mr Willardson in drafting the documents There 
2 were two attorneys involved in drafting documents 
3 And Your Honor, that is not fraud in the State of 
4 Utah 
5 And again, if is there is fraud here it needs to 
t> have been pled witn particularity witn regards to me 
7 Essentially what we have here, Your Honor, is a 
8 kind of a kill the messenger approach And that is if a 
9 partv is angry about what he thinks has happened let's not 
10 only sue the party he bought the business from but let s sue 
31 everybody &l^ that thai partv may have been associated 
12 with And Your Honor, that simply doesn't, they don t have 
13 the right to do that, at least with regard to me 
14 So again we believe that the complaint needs to be 
15 dismissed at ieast with regards to me, primarily because 
16 there has been no pleading with particularity relative to anv 
17 representations I personally maoe to Mr Whatie\ 
18 Finally, and I ve pointed this out here, that 
19 Weil whv dont 1 stop there, Your Honor There s 
20 a couple of things I may bring up in rebuttal Out thats 
21 essentially is wnat our motions are oaseo on 
22 THE JUDGE All right Thank you very mucn 
23 Oka> Mr Willarason? 
24 ARGUMENT BY MR WILLARDSON 
25 MR WILLARDSON Thank vou, Your Honor May it 
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1 please the Court Mr Chnstensen 
2 There are reallv oniv a couple of problems with 
3 what Mr Chnstensen said One is that the factual 
4 allegations are either false or misleading, ana two is that 
5 thev re all irrelevant irrelevant to tne purposes ior wnich 
6 we are here today 
7 The motion to compel amitration can be disposed of 
o very simpiv We have already agreed to participate in an 
0
 arbitration ano in fact Mr Chnstensen._ar_Mi_-Chnstensen 
10 and I have doth participated in the selection of an 
11 aroitrator and Mr Chnstensen and I have already agreed to 
12 a pretrial in that arbitration on March 5th And if 
13 Your Honor would like to see the documents from the AAA I 
14 would be I have them here and I'd be very' pieased to show 
' 5 them to the Court So our— 
16 THE JUDGE Okay So are you conceding his 
! 7 motion and that I should grant it7 
15 MR WILLARDSON NO I'm conceding that to the 
19 extent that a, a dispute under the agreement exists, that we 
20 are cooperating completely m arbitration and that is going 
21 forward 
22 However, it is our position and the basis of our, 
23 or part of one of the mne counts of our complaint, that 
24 there is no enforceaole agreement and, therefore since the 
25 entire agreement is void there is no obligation to arbitrate 
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1 THE JUDGE Then whats being arbitrated? 
2 MR WILLARDSON Mr Chapman's claim against 
3 Mr Wnatley is being arbitrated See,— 
4 THE JUDGE Just the counterclaim? Do we have a 
5 counterclaim in this case? 
6 MR WILLARDSON No There's not been an answer 
7 filed What we've had filed-
8 THE JUDGE Yes I didn't think so 
9 MR WILLARDSON What we've had filed is just 
10 these two motions by the plaintiff One to dismiss and the 
11 other to compel arbitration 
12 The-
13 THE JUDGE Is that what's in front of the 
14 arbitrator? Wnat s in front of the arbitrator? 
15 MR WILLARDSON Mr Chapman s claim that 
16 Mr Whatlev owes him 5400,000 or S457.000 
in THE JUDGE Okay So none of your clients claims 
1 S are in front of the arbitrator, just Mr Chapman s efforts to 
19 entorce the contract? 
20 MR WILLARDSON That s correct 
21 THE JUDGE It only goes one wa\ 
22 MR WILLARDSON Right Secondly, in addition 
23 to the alleged contract bemg void the allegations of both 
24 Mr Whatlev ano a, Mr Chapman are that mere is a breach 
25 In the legal autnontv that I've provided in the brief that 
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1 as to anv of the failings on the part of Mr Chapman and the 
2 other defendants that are covered in the document that was 
3 signed So -
4 THE JUDGE Okay So let me ask vou We, we 
5 have a paragraph like this m a contract that 1 thmk is 
6 pretty clear I mean. I don't thinK it takes rocket science 
7 to read this paragraph 
S You're saving that to avoid arbitration all vou 
9 need to do is allege mat the, tne agreement, the contract is 
10 void? 
11 MR WILLARDSON Well, that s what the statute 
12 savs 
13 THE JUDGE So does that mean that it comes to the 
14 court first? And when I make a determination mat it's 
15 either void or not that s wnen it finally goes to 
16 arbitration? 
17 MR WILLARDSON Well if, if the parties agree 
18 that, that arbitration is covered then obviously they 
19 arbitrate And Mr Chapman has a claim ano we are 
20 arbitrating it 
21 THE JUDGE So which of the causes of action do 
22 you think you re arbitrating? 
23 MR' WILLARDSON We don't believe that any of 




1 you've already read 1 point out that the Supreme Coun of the 
2 United States and other courts as well have held that a 
3 breach does not arise under the contract because logically 
4 speaking a contract is not made for its own breach So even 
5 a breach claim is at least arguably outside of the 
6 contract 
7 The other eight out of nine Counts in the complaint 
8 here are not contractual but tort 
9 Now, Mr Chnstensen argues that well the, the 
10 defamation wouldn't have happened if they hadnt signed this 
11 agreement and the theft wouldn't have happened if they hadn't 
12 signed this agreement and etcetera, etcetera, etcetera But 
13 in fact Oh, and the, we don't know what the, we don't 
14 know what the defamation is, and this computer hacking 
15 wouldn't have occurred if it hadn't been for the agreement 
16 ana, and whatnot 
17 With that argument we really need to send a 
18 transcript of this to the SEC because they'll be able to 
19 disband There is no longer anv need for prosecuting anyone 
20 who participates m a fraudulent activity, mere s no longer 
21 anv need to enforce securities laws because everything, all 
22 these rrauduient secunnes contracts that get written and 
23 sued upon ana people go to ian on over really are mst 
24 contractual matters Tnere can't be anv fraud as long as 
25 there s a contract 
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1 His argument just , while it sounds essentialK 
2 plausible SIITIDIV is not consistent with the ract that one set 
3 or conduct mav consti tute more man one causes of action, 
4 either in criminal law or civil law 
^ Now the a Mr Whatlev can onlv have one 
6 remed\ But he s cena in lv entitled to plead more than 
one cause of act ion and he s done so ana eight of those 
8 are ton There are, there is nothing in that aroitration 
9 ciause that even hints mat therc-s-trrczreement to 
10 arbitrate torts A n a in iact I have oeen unable to fina any 
11 case that would bring a Dreton contract into consideration 
'2 bv ii court In fact 1 trunk that a contract to have a tort 
13 separate and then be arbitrated would be void ab initio 
14 against public policy 
t D Nonetheless this clause cannot cover anv of the 
16 tons and that s e ight of the nine Counts in the complaint 
1 n Mr Chns tensen has a really crushing burden to 
15 sustain here The standard as vou re aware for this kind 
19 of motion a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6), is that the 
20 court :s to take ail of the matters pled in the pleadings as 
21 if thev are the gospel truth, and to draw all reasonable 
22 inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and then there has to 
23 be no set of circumstances given al' those positive facts for 
24 the plaintiff and all tnose positive inferences for the 
25 plaintiff under vvhicn a cause of action can be found 
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1 Would vou give me a factual summarv of everything 
2 he did that vou complain of in the complaint/? Just, just 
3 tell me right here and n o w what what facts have vou alleged 
4 in the complaint that involve him 
5 MR. W I L L A R D S O N Okay 
6 THE J U D G E Obviously drafting the complaint is, 
7 or drafting, or whatever he did as far as drafting the 
8 contract is one of the, of the facts What else do you 
9 allege he did'7 
10 M R W I L L A R D S O N That he participated with the 
11 Chapmans in forming a, competitive Business entities, m 
12 stealing my c l ients data 
13 T H E J U D G E What did he do1? 
14 M R W I L L A R D S O N Well obviously we haven't had 
15 discover}' yet But it is clear from what we nave been able 
16 to discover outside of discovery that M r Chnstensen was 
17 panicipating with tne ChaDmans in forming these competitive 
1S businesses that were attempting to, tnat K were stealing my 
19 cl ients intellectual property, and B, were trying to put my 
20 client out of business 
21 THE J U D G E And m what way was he 
22 panicipating"1 As their attorney0 
23 M R W I L L A R D S O N The office of the of one of the 
24 entities is Mr Chns tensen s office as registered with the 
25 State of Utan as of Julv of 2002 
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1 Now the as I pointed out in the, in the pleading 
2 in this complaint, i t s a largecompjaint but the pleading 
2 is mteneiated Everv Count does not stand on its own and 
n and everv Count a o e s n t jus t reference the paragraphs which 
5 preceed that Count Each Count represents all tne 
o allegations of all the Counts 
7 So when M r Chnstensen goes througn and savs well 
S mv name is oniy ment ioned here, here and here in connection 
° with fraud that is not reading the complaint thoroughly ana 
10 its not accurate 
11 Mr Chnstensen, one of M r Chnstensen's bnets 
12 acknowledges that tne complaint specifically defines the term 
13 named defendants to include Mr Christiansen or 
l-i Mr Chnstensen \ n d M r Chnstensen is therefore, named 
15 either by the use of the w o r d s ' named defendant" or by his 
16 given name or his Christian name, in paragraphs 14, IS 25 
17 37 4 5 , 4 9 , 5 0 , 5 1 , 5 2 , 5 6 , 5 7 , 5 8 , 5 9 , 6 2 , 6 5 Oh, pardon 
18 me 65 jus t says derendants which means all defendants 60 
19 and 66 as well And 67 and 68 also mentioned defendants 
20 75 mentioned defendants And then 76 and then 80 and, SO 
21 including Mr Chns tensen s name specifically And 84 again 
22 includes the named defendants 
23 T H E J U D G E Now Mr Willaroson when I read your 
24 brief I went through all of the paragraphs that vou listed as 
25 having involved M r Chnstensen 
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1 THE J U D G E Okay So why is that important? 
2 M R W I L L A R D S O N W e l l -
3 THE J U D G E What entity was it? 
4 M R W I L L A R D S O N What we ve got here is a group of 
5 people the defendants, who approached mv client and said we 
6 have this great business, it s maiong positive cash flow of 
7 on over $10 000 every single month and i t s got sales of over 
8 $800,000, etcetera, etcetera 
9 THE J U D G E I know that I understand that 
10 M R W I L L A R D S O N But we're not going to let vou 
11 look at any of the documents ano, and we just want to get out 
12 of the business So we'll sign this thing, we promise that 
13 everything is jus t as it is and we won't do anvthmg except a 
14 little hobby work in our, our garage 
15 T H E J U D G E So where does he fit into that? 
16 M R W I L L A R D S O N And, where does Mr Cnristensen 
17 fit in? 
18 T H E J U D G E Uh-hun (affirmative) 
19 M R W I L L A R D S O N Well, he is the person who 
20 coached and masterminded the Chapmans --
21 T H E J U D G E And how do v o u -
22 MR W I L L A R D S O N - scheme 
23 T H E JUDGE - k n o w mat 0 
24 I don t see anything m the complaint anywhere thai 
25 substantiates, substantiates vour claim that ne s tne 
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1 mastermind behind this whole thing 
2 MR WILLARDSON He was the one who came UD with 
3 the idea of a, of trust deeds on the propem He was the 
4 one who-
5 THE JUDGE So now is that-
6 MR WILLARDSON -- drafted the Pardon? 
7
 THE JUDGE How is that different from being their 
S attorney if he comes up with, if he advised them as to how to 
9 make it some son of a transaction mat has collateral 
10 Isn't what attornevs do9 
11 MR WILLARDSON Thats what attornevs ao But 
12 when, when attorneys coacn— 
13 THE JUDGE Do vou want to be sued the next time 
14 you do that, Mr Willardson0 I mean, isn t that what vou re 
15 opening this up to? 
16 MR WILLARDSON No Not 
17 I don't believe that lawyers should attack other 
1 8 lawyers in general However, as countless security fraud 
19 cases will demonstrate, when a lawyer, and even 
20 Mr Chnstensen's own case says that if the lawyer goes 
2 3 beyond merely counseling the client, then actually actively 
22 participates in some malicious act then ne is liable 
23 And we believe that since Mr Christensen created 
24 this situation with the, the property deeds, wrote them m 
25 such a way that they were on their face unenforceably, 
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1 That's not the standard We've got people 
2 operating here~ 
3 THE JUDGE So you're telling me that in front of 
4 the jury, when we get this to a jury, when vou prove vour 
5 allegations of fraud against Mr Chnstensen, you're not 
6 going to be able to prove all nine elements against him' 
I " " MR WILLARDSON No, 1-
S THE JUDGE Some of them will be against the 
9 Chapmans and some aeamst him'' 
10 MR WILLARDSON No I hope to be able to 
II prove all nine elements against all of the defendants 
12 But-
13 THE JUDGE Have vou got case law that savs you 
14 can do it any other way? 
15 MR WILLARDSON Well, I haven't researched that 
16 specific point for this argument But a fraudulent 
17 enterprise includes all of the participants 
18 Ana we re at the inception of this case We 
19 haven t done discover, I believe that Mr Christensen will 
20 have been found to conceal material miormation from 
21 Mr Whatlev whicn is concealment is an alternative element 
22 ot representation You can, if vou deliberately conceal 
23 mrormation that's material for someone as part of a 
24 fraudulent act mat does renoer you liable 























unenforceable ano is, was assisting the Chapmans in 
attempting to put my client out of business and stealing 
their property, that that goes oevond merely advice 
THE JUDGE Well didn't vour clients nave you as 
counsel at the same time this contract was entered into? 
MR WILLARDSON My client, my client actually 
consulted me early on and verv late In the mia, of 
course, I was not involved too substantially great I mean 
I was aware that the transaction was being contemplated 
but there was a hiatus wnen I was not being consulted about 
it 
THE JUDGE Okay All right I'll let you go 
forward 
MR WILLARDSON So taking all of the allegations 
in all the paragraphs of the complaint, then all of the 
necessary elements for fraud have been alleged And when 
vou nave a fraudulent enterprise, a person can t, or an 
entity or, or a group cannot avoid liability for fraud simply 
by splitting it up, we're going to have vou make all the 
representations and we're going to have, that are false, and 
we're going to have you persuade them to rely on them, and 
we're going to have you do this other element so we ve got 
there, we've got all nine elements of fraud but we don't have 
any one person against whom all nine of those things can 
individually be pled 
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1 MR WILLARDSON So a, taking all of the 
2 allegations as true and all of the inferences that can 
3 reasonably drawn, be drawn from them, there is no, it's not 
4 possible to say that no cause of action can possibly exist 
5 against any of the defendants It's certainly not possible 
6 to say that as to the two Chapman defendants 
7 Now, as to the alleged contradictory pleadings 
S Mr Christensen has apparently not read all of the things 
o that he is citing Under drafter of documents he asserts 
10 that the memo and Mr Whatiey s affidavit savs that I 
11 reduced the agreement to writing What is actually said m 
12 the affidavit and m the memo m opposition is that 
13 Mr Whatiey recounted to me wnat he believed the agreement to 
14 be and I reduced Mr Whatiey's understanding to writing 
15 That's not the same as me doing the final agreement by any 
16 means 
And what paragraph was that in his 17 THE JUDGE 
18 affidavit? 
19 MR WILLARDSON In the affidavit it's paragraph 
20 30 In the memo in opposition it's paragraph 26 
21 THE JUDGE Okay Let me just find this 
22 paragrapnSO Thank vou 
23 MR WILLARDSON Next ne proposes that a, we have 
24 a contradiction between the statement tnat Cnapman ran the 
25 operation of World Wide Photo that's tne first column under 
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1 identity off short inaudible away rrom mic) and the 
Z statement that Mr Christensen has been the prime mover in 
3 ail of the activit es of derendams Those are two 
4 different contracts, or contexts 
3 World Wide Photo is a photo finishing operation 
6 The activities of defendants alleged here are this 
7 trauduient and otherwise tortious scheme to bilk mv client of 
5 S40Q 000 DIUS two pieces or property 
Q
 There isn t anv contradiction-aftSer-idcntitv of 
10 mastermind 
11 A.na unaer the location and base or operations the 
12 first column says there is no specific reference to a base af 
13 operations so therefore there cannot be any contradiction 
14 berween the complaint ana ana either the affidavit or the 
1 ^ memo 
16 What we have here is a multifaceted largely tort 
17 complaint that has been pied And if evaluated under 
18 standard tnat applies a valid and sustainable cause of 
19 action pending discovery and we \ e got Mr Christensen 
20 trying to expand an arbitration clause into areas which it 
21 clearly is not intended to cover which it cannot under law 
22 cover and to pretry this matter betore we re entitled to anv 
23 discoverv 
24 Mr Christensen asserts that he s got a clear 
2D 12(b)(6) motion Nevertheless m support of that 12(b)(6) 
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1 arbitration matters then I think you might have a better 
2 argument than he s got But in fact when he Under the, 
3 the express and clear language of the rule if you add 
4 anything to the pleading you ve got a Rule 56(f) motion and 
5 it s mandatory that it be treated as such And it's clear 
o under Rule D6 and 56(f) in particular that when you re 
7 trying when someone is trying to dispose of things m the 
8 case on a substantive basis that the opposing party in this 
9 case the plaintiff is entitled to do discovery to flush 
10 those things out 
11 And so I believe that that we re entitled to 
12 conduct discovery oefore any substantive resolution is 
13 obtained It s clear from the Pacific Development versus 
14 Thornton case tne 2001 case that you cant stretch an 
15 arbitration clause beyond what it says 
16 And given the tact that we have disputes of 
17 material facts Mr Christensen asserts tnat Mr Whatley had 
18 all the records Mr Whatley asserts tnat no he did not 
19 have anv significant records until ver\ shortly betore he had 
20 me send tne letter that was referenced in ADIII OI of the 
21 ioilowing year They assert tnat the that the deal was 
22 nnal and finalized and that everything was performed We 
23 assert that not onl\ was it not finalized tnat Mr Chapman 
24 was continually trying to renegotiate tne price and terms 
2*^  during the entire penod that Mr Whatle> was associated with 
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1 motion is a seven page affidavit only the first 10 
2 paragraphs of which ending on Dage three of the affidavit 
- can oe even areued to relate to the auestion of the 
4 aroitration clause Paragraphs--
5 THE JUDGE Let me just find that 
6 MR WILLARDSON Sure 
7 THE JUDGE Was it actually attached to the 
8 motion to compel7 And the motion to dismiss7 Or was it 
0
 separate7 
10 MR WILLARDSON It was filed at the same time as 
11 the two motions 
12 THE JUDGE Ml right 
13 MR WILLARDSON The two motions had a 
14 consolidated bner which cannot--
15 THE JUDGE Okay I found it Okay Its the 
lo arnaavit of Bruce Chapman 
P MR WILLARDSON Right 
18 THE JUDGE Oka^ So vour your allegation here 
19 is the first ten deal with-
20 MR WILLARDSON Either introductory matters or 
21 matters for paragrapn ten deals is the last one to deal 
22 with the arbitration agreement Then you have paragraphs 11 
23 through 29 pages three through six that deal with the 
24 substance of the case 
25 Now if this were if he'd restricted himself to 
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1 the business And not only, they say all the assets were 
2 transferred, our assertion is that Mr Chapman was removing 
3 assets throughout the entire penod that Mr Whatley was 
4 associated with it 
5 So if this were a motion for summary judgment being 
6 decided toda\ there are clearly material disputes of fact 
7 We haven t had discovery The burden is insuperably mgn 
8 And and we are entitled to have a, all the inferences drawn 
9 in our favor 
10 Just one more short evidence of Mr Christensen s 
11 distortion of what he s actually said He s asserted to 
12 Your Honor that a the notice that was given says that we re 
13 going to put the thing, the business permanently out of 
14 business And he s also asserted that a that no thought of 
1:> arbitration occurred until or litigation occurred until 
lb after the arbitrauon demand was filed 
17 In the letter dated April 23rd 2002 the last 
18 paragraph of the letter says 
19 'In light of the above and foregoing 
20 tnis letter constitutes a demand that 
21 Mr and Mrs Chapman execute a document 
22 acknowledging the contract above is void 
23 and releasing Mr Wnatlev and nis 
24 property trom all liability and 
25 refunding Mr Whatley the amounts paid 
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! oui-ol-pockcl. 533.01)0 
2 The foregoing demand actually 
constitutes an offer oF settlement. If 
A ihat demand is noi complied with we will 
;
 have no choice hut to go Forward with 
^ litigation scckinLf damages which we 
presently estimate".. Etcetera 
N "Please be advised that my client is not 
l
' continuing to pour money into your 
in clients business and will not he paying 
I i any more bills including payroll. Time 
12 is therefore of the essence in order to 
13 constitute a timely response" ... 
l-t etcetera. 
15 That does not say the business is permanently being 
1^  put out of business. It doesn't. And it certainly belies 
I"7 the. the assertion of Mr. Chnstensen that this litigation is 
IN m any way precipitated b\ their arbitration In fact, we 
I1' were attempting to work out a noniitigous solution for many 
2" months until the deiendanis here decided to try- and prevent 
2 I us getting our day in court by having the arbitration. 
22 But as I said, their arbitration demand is moot. 
23 Tbev cannot overcome the standard that applies to 
24 dismissal. And they're not entitled to deprive us, deprive 
25 us oI'due process by preventing us from doing discovery on 
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1 our case. 
2 Thank vou. Your Honor. 
3 THE.il/DGE: Thank vou. 
4 FURTHER ARGUMENT 13 Y MR. CliRLSTENSEN 
5 MR. CHRJSTENSEN: Very briefly. Your Honor. A 
6 couple of items. 
7 One. I'm a little at a loss here to understand what 
S Mr. Willardson is really arguing For when he states that he 
l> has no problem with us-mm-mg-forward with the arbitration so 
10 long as he has the right to bring his causes of action in a 
1 1 court of law It appears to me. again, under the 
12 arbitration clause that any action on either side is supposed 
13 to have been arbitrated and he can't choose to stay outside 
14 of the arbitration. 
i 5 And also, it doesn't make sense to me to have the 
16 merits of this case totally adjudicated in an. in an 
17 arbitration oniy to turn around and ha\e this court have to 
I 8 do it all over again. Obviously 1 .see problems with res 
I1) judicata. 1 see problems with a. judicial economy, ali of 
20 those issues. But to state and. and make the arguments thai 
21 it out to go both ways at the same time just doesn t make 
22 sense and 1 think that they, that it wouldn't be upheld by an 
23 appellate court. 
24 This notion that he has adequately pled a cause of 
25 action against me personally because 1 am a quote, "named 
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1 defendant", also does not comply completely with the nine 
2 elements thai are required under pleading fraud with 
5 particularity. Again, it's not enough just to say the named 
4 defendants have done this or the named defendants have done 
5 that. If Mr. Willardson is going to be able to successfully 
(t pend a cause of action for fraud against me personally he has 
7 the obligation and he has the burden in his pleading of 
X pointing out to the court what it is 1 did specifically. 
*•* Thai is what pleading fraud with particularity is all about. 
10 1 have read already to the Conn what Utah case law says with 
11 regard to that. If he wants to maintain a cause of action 
12 against me he needs to specifically state what it is 1 did. 
13 And lo just lump me in with a bunch of named defendants and 
14 say that the named defendants did all of these different 
15 things is not sufficient in terms of pleading fraud with 
In particularity in the Slate of Utah. 
17 This notion of forming a competitive business 
IS enterprise being actionable, again, is completely without 
I1' support Attorneys create businesses all the time for their 
20 clients by incorporating them. If that's all the allegation 
2 1 we have here. Your Honor, it is not actionable It's not 
22 actionable to draft a document for a client, nor is it 
23 actionable to incorporate a business, or to obtain a business 
24 name for a client. And that's all 1 hear Mr. Willardson 





1 Again, there's no allegation that I actually was 
2 the competitor or that 1 actually was the one that may have 
3 made misrepresentations. It's just that I did nothing more 
4 than satisfy my responsibilities as an attorney, 
5 THE JUDGE: What aboutlrre allegation that one of 
6 these competing businesses is located at your office'' 
7 MR. CHR1STENSEN: Well Your Honor, again, none of 
8 this is before the Court, it's not been, it's not been, it's 
9 not in the pleading. But since Counsel brought it up I'll 
10 explain to Your Honor what happened. If 1 may approach the 
1 1 bench. 
12 THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
13 MR. WILLARDSON: Your Honor, 1 object. It is 
14 before the Court because it was one of the attachments to the 
15 motion. 
16 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Because it was what0 
17 MR. WILLARDSON: This '^ before the Court. It's 
IS one of the attachments to the motions and the printout from 
1° the a. State Department of Commerce showing that 
20 Mr. Christensen's office is the office of World Wide 
21 Imaging. 
22 THE JUDGE: And is that m your complaint0 
23 MR. WILLARDSON It's in the response to his 
24 motions. 












allegation in the complaint7 
MR WILLARDSON We allege in the comDiamt that 
Mr Chnsiensen assisTed the ChaDmans in aoing their 
misdeeds 
THE JUDGE Okav So vou don t make the 
allegation and specifically in a complaint that one of their 
competing businesses is located at his office7 
MR WILLARDSON T aon t recollect that I do 
THE JUDGE Then I m not worried about it So 
111 give that back to vou 
MR CHRISTENSEN cinally for the first time 
\ our Honor I hear that now I m being accused ot concealing 
iniormation irom Mr Whatie\ Again I would remind the 
Court that 1 don t nave am dun to give information to 
Mr Whatie\ 1 think mv dury is just the opposite 
In the first place I don t beiieve I ever concealed 
anv iniormation from anybody all I did was draft documents 
here But in the second niace-
MR WILLARDSON We ve got testimony again 
i^ our Honor 
KIR CHRISTENSEN I m arguing what has been, what 
has been what has oeen accused here Your Honor And I 
guess m\ position— 
THE JUDGE 1 think you need to argue it then in 
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suing opposing c&unsel just so that he can turn around and 
then try to both have me out of the case and try to dig into 
what my conversations may or may not have been with the 
Chapmans in connection with this negotiation 1 think it s 
wrong I don t think it should be sanctioned 
I think that clearl} back to the arbitration it s 
clear that this ought to be arbitrated tne whole thing both 
sides of the case in front of the arbitrator Especially 
when m tins situation opposing counsel has aireadv agreed to 
the arbitration 
Thank you 
THE JUDGE Could you address his argument about 
vour affidavit? Or I m not I m sorn Mr Chapman s 
affidavit And whether or not that goes to the motion to 
dismiss or the motion to compeP 
MR CHRISTENSEN Sure The affidavit goes to 
the motion to compel That s what it s there tor We gave 
the Court at least our version of tne background facts 
relative to that motion to compel in the arbitration 
clause How it came about. wn\ its there what went on 
oetween the Dairies in connection with it 
Certainly and clearly our motion to dismiss 
references onl\ the complaint Tnere s nothing in our motion 
to dismiss tnat reterences the affidavit And if you want 
to read through the motion itself read through the 
1 context of of the complaint and what the complaint says 
2 MR CHRISTENSEN The complaint ooesn t say 
3 anything about concealed inrormation 
4 THE JUDGE Okav 
MR CHRISTENSEN So thats the first time I ve 
6 heard that And I won t respond to it since it has not been 
7 pleaded 
5 In in conclusion Your Honor I think what w e 
9 really have here is a fishing expeditior We nave CoLnsei 
10 arguing that he ought to nave the right to sue me so he can 
11 then go out and I m quoting now that he he would then ha\e 
12 a valid cause of action ODen quote pending discover, 
13 close quote 
14 Under the pleading rules of the State of Utah and 
1 ** under the fraud rules of the State of Utah its not enough to 
16 just to sa\ someone committed fraud now let me go out and 
17 see if I can find a way to prove it That s not how it 
18 works You nave to state specificallv with particularly 
19 what someone did what the misrepresentation was how 
20 thev ve been damaged by it what the what the intention 
21 was None of that has been pleaded here None of it with 
22 regard to me And to tell the truth none of it has been 
23 pleaded with particularity with regard to either of the 
24 Chapmans 





1 memorandum all references are to the complaint all 
2 references are to the pleadings themselves There is 
3 nothing m there that that seeks to have the Court oeheve a 
4 certain version ot the facts The version ot the facts 
5 before the Court are the versions set forth m the 
6 allegations m the complain* and our anility to have the 
7 complaint dismissed rises or falls on what is pleaded in the 
8 complaint itself But there are no references to the 
9 affidavit m the complaint 
10 THE JUDGE All right 
11 MR CHRISTENSEN I m sorry There are no 
12 references to the to the affidavit in our motion or in our 
13 memorandum in support of that 
14 THE JUDGE Okay 
15 MR CHRISTENSEN Thank you Your Honor 
16 FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MR WILLARDSON 
1" MP WILLARDSON Mr Chnstensen continues to take 
18 liberties with the facts He asserts that tne arbitration 
19 that Mr Chapman started is going to totally adjudicate all 
20 these issues 
21 There are federal tons and common law tons 
22 alleged not covered The standard a for these kinds of 
23 motions is set tortn in Educators Mutual versLs Allied 
2^ Property and Casualty insurance 890 P 2d 102^ in so dome 




1 Accept the factual allegations in the 
2 complaint on page 1030 as true and 
3 consider all reasonable inferences to be 
4 drawn from those facts in A light most 
5 favorable to the plaintiff" End quote 
6 The onlv way that Mr Chnstensen s arguments can 
7 succeed is if that stanaard is violated because this is not a 
S mal, discover/ has not occurred and. therefore we are at 
9 the very least entitled discovery betore any of the other 
10 motions is resolved because they are diSDOSitive 
11 And as is pointed out as to arbitration the 
12 defendant already has everything that thev might argue thev 
13 bargained for And a, they are not baptized by a 
14 contractual arbitration clause Even if it were valid, which 
15 we aon't concede that it is, but even if they were valid 
16 they are not baptized for any tons they might have 
17 committed 
IS Thank you Your Honor 
19 COURTS RULING 
20 THE JUDGE Thank you 
21 I'm going to start with the motion to dismiss 
22 As I indicated to the parties I am familiar with 
23 the file, I've read it thorough!} I think I ve probably 
24 gone through the contract two or three times now, and the 
25 complaint two or three times 
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1 And in looking at Rule 12(b)(6) it states in part 
2 "Every defense in law or fact to claim 
3 for relief m anv pleading wnether a 
4 claim counterclaim, crossciaim or 
5 thiro-panv claim, shall be asserted in a 
6 responsive pleading thereto if one is 
7 required, except that the following 
S defenses mav at the option of the pleader 
9 oe made ov motion ' 
10 And here we go to subparagraph (6) 
11 ' Failure to state a claim upon wnich 
12 relief can be granted ' 
13 And, lets see Going down further 
14 "If on a motion asserting the defense 
15 numbered 6 to dismiss for failure of the 
16 pleading to state a claim upon which 
17 relief can be granted, matters outside 
18 the pleading are presented to and not 
19 excluded bv the court, the motion snail 
20 be treated as one for summary judgment 
21 and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, 
22 and all parties shall be given a 
23 reasonable opportunity to present all 
24 material made pertinent to sucn a motion 
25 by Rule 56 ' 
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1 As the parties mav have noted I've made an effort 
2 during this hearing to keep the parties to the complaint, and 
3 both parties have strayed from the complaint But I'm not 
4 going to 
5 I think that the affidavit that was provided to the 
o Court by Mr Cnapman goes to the motion to compel arbitration 
7 and I am going to consider it for that purpose only And I 
S look onlv at the complaint 
0
 Mr Wiharason is right wnen he reminds me that in 
10 looking at the complaint I must take the facts alleged there 
11 as true And I do In looking at the complaint I tnmk tne 
12 First place for me to begin is to consider each cause of 
13 action and whetner as claimed bv Mr Willardson it's a matter 
14 of tort or a matter of contract 
15 1 am persuaded that I must do more than simply look 
1 6 at tne title that s above each cause of action 
l 7 On Count One, its entitled Voia 
1S Coniract/Rescission What it talks about in mis cause of 
1Q action at length is the minimum monthlv flow cash flow that 
20 was represented in the recitals to the contract, the fact 
21 that the sellers didn't provide tne 12 month financial 
22 records, that there was a misrepresentation by the seller in 
23 footnote one that he was selling all the assets they claim 
24 that was not true And it continues to give reasons why the 
25 contract is void at length I think this is the longest 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
PAGE 55 
1 cause of action 
2 Count Two clearly calls it a breach of contract and 
3 it discusses a, the failure to transfer bank accounts, the 
4 resignation required by the contract for Mr and Mrs Chapman 
5 to, or the requirement for them to resign as corporate 
6 officers, and their failure to do so 
7 Count Three I tniiuc is the most interesting It 
8 alleges fraud And then it talks about the noncompete clause 
9 and claims that in spite of the noncompete clause that 
10 Mr Chapman and nis son Degan soliciting other ousmess m 
11 Utah County, that the defendants retused Mr Whatiey access 
12 to the books, and it discusses the SI0,000 claim that was 
13 made and the fact that thev didn't get the 10,000 per month, 
14 that the value of the equipment they claim was not as it was 
15 represented to them 
16 And I find in reading this carefully that really 
17 this is not the typical fraud allegation It doesn't even 
18 attempt, I think, to work tnrough all of the elements of 
19 fraud And it is still in reality a complaint that there's 
20 been a breach of contract And tne same with the 
21 subparagraph cause of action in that same group as to tne 
22 stock fraud 
23 Next is the breach of fiduciary duties And this 
24 deals the allegations here deal with the retaking, alleged 
25 retaking of the business by Mr Cnapman, and the fact tnat as 
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a trustee ne began embezzling business receipts and an 
2 allegation that he had not timely renewed the coruorate 
registration with the State of Utah and that the Cnapman 
- aerenaants have stolen corporate opDonunities oy setting up 
^ other entities which again would bring us bac*. to the 
6 noncompete clause 
And so 1 find that this is again realK an issue of 
S tne breach oi the contract 
9 And the conversion and theft Coum-Hve-iS again 
10 an issue as to whether or not there was compliance with the 
11 contract ana wnat was properly or improperly done with tne 
12 Dropem that was supposed to have been transferred as can 
I J or the contract 
14 Count Si\ is the slander of title which deals with 
b the oropertv that was used as I guess collateral what 
16 would we call it It alleges that Mr Whatle> nas received 
17 offers to sell the property but he can t do so because ot 
18 the defenaants having filed documents m the county 
1^  recorders office that are preventing Mr Whatiev from 
20 selling his land 
21 Again that is all tied into the contract 
22 Count Seven is the defamation It claims that 
23 Bruce Chapman has told Mr Whatiev s \ enaors that he s 
24 stolen propert) a stolen cash stripped the business 
2^ behaved in a dishonest and dishonorable fashion and that 
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1 that 1 guess was located at the business And this would 
2 have again been a violation of the contract and the 
agreement between the parties as to how this business was 
4 going to run 
5 As I look at the entire complaint and read it in 
0 context paragraph to paragraph it is very clear to me that 
7 everything that we re here for is based on a contract And 
8 depending on how the contract is interpreted and the facts 
9 are interpreted as to the creation of the contract and the 
10 enforcement ot the contract everything else will fall into 
11 place m the decision making process for either the 
12 arbitrator or if it went to a jury for a jury But it all 
13 centers around the contract 
K I took a look at the case law that was offered by 
1 * Mr Willardson and I just can t read it the same way that 
16 Mr Willardson does 
17 I think tins is clearlv under tne arbitration 
1S clause m this contract a dispute that s unaer tnis 
19 agreement And I think it s m some wav subterfuge to trv 
20 and get around that bv saying tnat because the the piamtifi 
21 thinks it s u, ^oid ab initio that that taices it out of the 
22 aroitration clause 1 aon t thirbv it can and I don t think 
23 ii aoes I mini that this is a dispute unaer this agreement 
2T and thaf the parties aid acree that any action brousnt should 
2i be submitted to the to arbitration 
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1 Mr Chapman and Mr Christensen have publiciv accused 
2 Mr Whatle\ of piling up hundreds of thousands of debt on the 
business and that because of those statements rus credit has 
4 been damaeea 
D Again this all goes back to ana will be proved m 
6 the process of proving eitner the contracts voidability or 
7 enforceability ana am accompanying preaches 
8 Count eight is the tortious interrerence with the 
9 business wmcn is ven' similar frankly io some ot the other 
10 things And simplv says that Mi Whatiev s business has been 
11 interrupted b\ the wrongrul actions of the namea 
12 defendants Well its again all cased on the contract 
13 The bottom line folks is if it weren t for the 
34 contract nobodv would be here today 
1 ^ Counr nine the violation of the 18 USC 1030 has 
16 several interesting problems I ve checked the statute very 
17 carefully it does allow for both criminal and civil 
18 proceedings Paragraph 89 savs 
19 On information and belief Chapmans 
20 through their son have intentionally 
21 accessed that computer 
22 Apparently it s the son that accessed it according 
23 to this allegation, but he s not a party to this suit But 
24 the the basic allegation here is computer hacking thar 
25 their son accessed one of their computers or their FTP server 
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1 And I am going to grant the motion to compel 
2 arbitration and order that the parties go forward with 
3 arbitration on all issues from both sides not just the 
4 defendants claims against the plaintiff but plaintiffs 
5 ciaims against the defendants 
6 Now let me deal with Wei1 I kind or 
7 switched gears here l started to talk about the motion to 
8 dismiss 
9 As to the motion to dismiss as I look at the 
10 complaint and putting aside the statements tnat have oeen 
11 made today b\ both parties that are bevond the complaint 
12 when I look at the complaint and all its paragraphs and all 
13 its causes of action and especially the fraud cause or 
14 action everything I see before me that refers to 
15 Mr Christensen comes down to several things His clients 
16 consulted with mm during the creation of this contract He 
17 wrote a portion or he 
18 Let me put it this wa^ In looking at the 
19 complaint itself and taking those facts as true it is clear 
20 that Mr Cnnstensen mav have used some input from 
21 Mr Willardson And that between tne two or them m whatever 
22 form the contracr was written whether ne wrote it all or 
23 wrote onh part of n for purposes of tnis rearing I m 
24 going to sa\ that he wTOte it all even if he wrote it all 
25 as claimed m the contract although its a little 
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1 confusing, the oniv allegation that I see m the complaint 
2 ts that he was acting as an attorney for his clients There 
3 are no facts alleged tnat I can take at face value in the 
4 compiaint that persuade me that he's any kind of a mastermind 
5 benind any nefarious doings of the Chapmans. the defendants, 
6 the other aefendants 
7 As to the fraud alleganon, I will again reiterate 
8 that as I read through tne pleadings I went througn verv 
9 carefully all of the paragraphs that the Diamtiff used to 
10 justify the inclusion of Mr Chnstensen in this case And 
11 as I looked at even' one oi those paragraphs all 1 could find 
12 were factual allegations and some conciusorv allegations that 
13 he was acting as an attorney, that he helped write the 
14 contract, that he advised his clients And then there is a 
15 very conclusionary allegation that he's a mastermind of 
16 something 
17 As to the fraud, fraud must be pled in a complaint 
1S with some particularity The case law is very clear 
19 And there has to be more than a conciusionary allegation of 
20 fraud for it to survive a motion to dismiss as we have 
21 here 
22 And I find that in looking at the cause of action 
23 number tnree which is the fraud cause of action, and even in 
24 looking at all of the other paragrapns mentioned by 


















No I'm not going to go that version 
Given the ruling I've made ana my analysis of the 
contract and finding that, of the contract and the complaint, 
and finding that all of the allegations really do go to the 
contract, I will grant the motion to dismiss the case and 
send the parties into arbitration I think that's the 
appropriate thing to do at this point 
All right Thank vou, folks, for your attendance 
today and your time I appreciate your arguments They were 
very clear and very helpful And we're in recess 
MR CHRISTENSEN Thank you 
WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded 
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1 his arguments today, the nine elements of fraud are noi 
2 alleged with sufficient Darticuiarity to escaoe dismissal 
3 I don't find any allegations here in the complaint 
4 that Mr Chnstensen made representations to anyone other 
5 than to his own clients as their aavisor and as their 
6 counsel 1 don't, 1 just see nothing here that persuades 
7 me And looking at the facts as alleged in the complaint m 
8 their best light as perfectly true I see nothing here that 
9 persuaoes me that he acted as anything bpyond an attorney in 
10 this matter 
11 And so I do grant the motion to dismiss as to 
12 Mr Chnstensen 
13 And I guess it's clear by now I am denying the 
14 Rule 56 motion made by the plaintiffs 
15 I have frankly not really relied on the affidavit 
16 of Mr Chapman in making my decision toaay I have looKed at 
17 a, the complaint strictly and the alleged facts in the 
18 complaint in making this decision I have not relied upon 
19 Mr Chapman's affidavit 
20 I will ask Mr Chnstensen to write findings ana an 
21 order, and I will order the parties into arbitration 
22 The statute allows me to stay this action or to 
23 dismiss it And at this point given wnat is in front of me I 
24 don't see any reason to require that the, tne parties to 
25 start all over again, a, so weil 
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1 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH 
5 ) SS 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
I, Penny C. Abbott, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and 
Notary Public m and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify 
that I received the electromcalh recorded videotape #179 
in the matter of Whatley vs Chapman, hearing date February 
26, 2003, and that I transcribea it into typewriting and that 
a full, true and correct transcnption of said hearing so 
recorded and transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages 
numbered 1 through 64, inclusive except wnere it is indicated 
that the tape recording was inaudible 






PENNY C. ABBOTT. COURT REPORTER 
License 22-102811-7801 
Notary Public, Comm Exp 9-24-04 
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James L. Chxistensen, USB No. A0639 
Christopher G. Jessop. USB No 8542 
CORBRIDGE BAIKD & CHRISTENSEN 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -2705 
Telephone: 801/534-0909 
Fax: 801/534-1948 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
PI? nVH r)PP A P ^ 4T7VHT C T A T P H I } T I T A Inf 
BRYAN J. WHATLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
BRUCE E. CHAPMAN, 
CHAPMAN, JAMES L. 





ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
! MOTIONS AND DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S RULE 56(f) MOTION 
Civil No. 020405636 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
The following motions came on regularly for hearing before this Court on Wednesday, 
February 26, 2003, at 10:30 a.m.: 
1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, dated January 10, 2003; 
2. Defendants5 Motion to Compel Arbitration, dated January 10, 2003: and 
3. Plaintiff s Motion for Relief Under Rule Rule 56(f), dated January 23, 2003. 
Plaintiff Bryan J. Whatley was present at the hearing and was represented by his attorney, 
Timothy Miguel Willardson. Defendants Bruce E. Chapman, Ceri Chapman ("Chapmans") and 
FILID 
Pourrh judicial District Ooun 
o> Jtan County, State of Uiah 
ty'<J&l fi% $t—" Deput/ 
James L. Christensen were also present and were represented by their attorneys, James L. 
Christensen and Christopher G. Jessop. The Court, having considered the memoranda, affidavits, 
oral argument of counsel, and all relevant pleadings and documents pertaining to the motions, now 
makes the following findings and enters the following order: 
FINDINGS 
I. The effect of the affidavits of Mr. Chapman and Mr. Whatley. 
f 1 After reviewing the affidavit of Mr. Chapman, and considering the arguments of the 
parties, the Court finds that Mr. Chapman's affidavit was submitted exclusively in support of 
Defendants' motion to compel arbitration. 
*)T2 Furthermore, the Court has not relied on the affidavit of Mr. Chapman in making its 
decision with regard to Defendants* motion to dismiss, but has looked to the allegations made in 
the complaint, and the provisions of the contract between the parties. Hence, the Court declines 
to treat either of Defendants' motions as motions for summary judgment, and, for the purposes 
of this ruling, accepts the allegations in Plaintiffs complaint as true. See St. Benedict's 
Development Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991) ("A rule 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss admits the facts alleged in the complaint but challenges the plaintiffs right to 
relief based on those facts.") 
II. Motion to Compel Arbitration 
t3 According to the allegations in Plaintiffs complaint. Plaintiff and the Chapmans entered 
into an agreement entitled Stock and Asset Purchase and Sale (" Agreement"), on or about April 
5, 2001, that was to transfer ownership and control of a photographic business, World-Wide 
2 
Photo, Inc., from the Chapmans to Mr. Whatley. (Complaint, f 11.) The Agreement contains 
an arbitration clause that reads as follows: 
In the event of a dispute under this agreement, the parties agree that any action 
brought shall be submitted to binding arbitration in accordance with the rules of the 
American Arbitration Association. Such arbitration need not be conducted by the 
American Arbitration Association, even though it would follow their rules. 
Arbitration proceedings shall be brought in Utah County, Utah, and not elsewhere. 
(Complaint, Exhibit A, i[ 9(m).) 
f4 The Court finds that the arbitration clause is clear on its face and is binding upon the 
parties. 
K5 The Court finds that Counts 1 and 2 of Plaintiffs complaint, titled "Void 
contract/recission," and "Breach of Contract" respectively, are breach of contract causes of action 
that arise under the Agreement. 
f 6 With regard to Count 3 of Plaintiffs complaint, titled "Fraud," the court finds that Plaintiff 
has made no any facts with particularity supporting the elements in this cause of action, and that 
this cause of action, including the sub-cause of action for "stock fraud," is really a breach of 
contract cause of action, that arises under the Agreement. 
V The Court finds that Count 4 ("Breach of Fiduciary Duties"), Count 5 
("Conversion/Theft"), Count 6 ("Slander of Title"), Count 7 ("Defamation") and Count 8 
("Tortious Interference With Business") are all. m substance, breach of contract causes of action 
that arise under the Agreement, and that none of these causes of action would exist but for the 
Agreement between Mr. Whatley and the Chapmans. 
j 
^8 With regard to Count 9 of Plaintiffs complaint ("Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030") the 
court fmds that when taken as true. Count 9 only directly applies to the Chapmans' son. who is 
not a party to the lawsuit, and that this cause of action is a breach of contract cause of action that 
arises under the Agreement in any case. 
^9 In addition, the Court finds that it is clear, when looking at the entire complaint in context, 
paragraph by paragraph, that everything Plaintiff complains of in his complaint is based on the 
contract and arises under the contract. The Court further finds that Plaintiffs argument that his 
causes of action do not arise under the agreement is, in some respects, subterfuge to try to get 
around his contractual obligation to arbitrate. 
f 10 The Court further finds that the parties agreed to submit any action with regard to the 
contract to arbitration, and that the arbitration clause is enforceable as a matter of law. 
m . MOTION TO DISMISS 
f 11 With regard to Defendants5 motion to dismiss as to Mr. Christensen, after scrutinizing the 
complaint, and putting aside the statements made in their memoranda and at oral argument by both 
parties that go beyond the complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to plead the elements 
of fraud with sufficient particularity to escape dismissal, which elements are as follows: 
(1) that a representation was made (2) concerning a presently existing material fact 
(3) which was false and (4; which the representor either (a) knew to be false or (b) 
made recklessly, knowing that there was insufficient knowledge upon which to base 
such representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it 
and (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity7, (7) did 
in fact rely upon it (8) and was thereby induced to act (9) to that party's injury and 
damage. 
Semenov v. Hill, 1999 UT 58, 1 9, 982 P.2d 578. 
4 
if 12 The Court finds no allegations in the complaint that Mr. Christensen made representations 
to anyone other than his own clients, as their advisor and counsel. The only substantive allegation 
made in Plaintiffs complaint is that Mr. Christensen acted as an attorney for his clients. 
If 13 Consequently, the Court finds that there is no basis for the inclusion of Mr. Christensen 
as a party to the lawsuit. 
ORDER 
Based on the Court's findings, the Court hereby orders as follows: 
I" 14 Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted with respect to Mr. Christensen for Plaintiff's 
failure 10 plead any facts that justify Mr. Christensen's inclusion as a party to the lawsuit. 
?15 Defendants motion to dismiss is granted with respect to the remaining defendants because 
the arbitration clause in the Agreement is clear on its face and enforceable against the parties. 
i[16 Plaintiffs motion for relief under Rule 56(f) is hereby denied. 
if 17 Defendants' motion to compel arbitration is granted, and, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-31a-4(l), the Court orders the Plaintiff and Defendants to submit all of their claims with respect 
to the Agreement, including all of Plaintiffs causes of action raised in the complaint, to 
arbitration, 
f 18 The Court has discretion under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-4 to dismiss or stay this lawsuit 
pending the outcome of arbitration. Given the Court's findings, the lawsuit is hereby dismissed 
as all of Plaintiffs claims arise under the contract between Plaintiff and the Chapmans. and are 
subject to a valid, binding arbitration clause. 
5 
DATED this _^3day of April, 2003 
Approved as to form and substance: 
CORBRIDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Defendants 
/ / s / 
James L. Christensen / V 
Christopher G. Jessop 
Timothy Miguel Willardson, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, 
and faxed to the following at the address(es) indicated on the jjj^tda.} of April, 2003 
Timothy Miguel Willardson 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Facsimile 576-1960 
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Timothy Misuel Willardson # 4*43 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy. Utah 84070 
Telephone (801; 576-1400 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRYAN J. WHATLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 020405636 
vs. 
Bruce E. Chapman, Ceri Chapman, James L. 




1. Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff Bryan J. Whatley, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court 
the final judgment of Claudia Laycock entered rn this matter on Ma}' 29, 2003. This appeal is 
therefore within the 30 day time to appeal. 
2. This appeal is taken from the entire judgment. 
DATED: Tuesday, May 27, 2003. 
Attorney for Timothy Miguel Willardson 
Attachments: Anneal Fee S205Cost Bond S300 
CERTIFY-^HAT THIS 
AN ORIGINAL DOC 
FOURTH JUDICIAL 
COUNTY, STATE OFy, 
DATE 
DEPUTV-^SUftJ 
Timothv Mieuel Willardson - 4^-4-3 
ATTORNEY' FOP. A P P E L L ANT 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone (801; 576-1400 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICLAJL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
BRYAN J WHAJLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
Brace E Chapman, Cen Chapman. James L 
Christensen, and Does I - V, J 
Defendants 
_ . ^ , * _ , ^ - • - ' 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
' Civil No 020405636 
Jud^e fo 
I hereby cenify that a full, true and correct copy of the above and foregoing "Notice of Appeal" was 
placed for deliver} as specified below Where "MaiT is specified, the items were placed in the 
United States Mail with first-class postage thereon fully prepaid, addressed as follows 
James Christensen Sent.via 
Corbridge, B and & Christensen % Mail 
39 Exchange Place, #100 Facsimile 
SLC, Utah"84111 Hand-delivery 
Timotnj Miguel Willardson (-^ 443 j 
Attorney at Lav 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy UT 84070 
Telephone (801)576-1400 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOUP.TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MOTION TO STAY JUDGMENT 
PENDING APPEAL 
vs 
BRUCE E CHAPMAN, CERI CHAPMAN, Civil No 020405636 
JAMES L CHRISTENSEN, and DOES I-V, 
Judge* Claudia Laycock 
Defendants 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, Bryan J Whatley, by and through his attorney, Timothy 
Miguel Willardson and respectfully moves this Court as follows: 
To Stay the Judgment m the above captioned case pending appeal pursuant to Rule 62(d) 
Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure upon filing of a supersedeas bond by Plaintiff In support of this 
motion Plaintiff shows the Court that the requested stay is necessary to avoid prejudicing 
plaintiff s rights The issues include a Federal criminal statute and other non-contractual issues 
If the court's judgment is not stayed, plaintiff will be forced to litigate these issues twiceumoe to 
the arbitrator and, after the appeal again before the district court In addition, since there is no 
JD.EV x n i ^ , 
Plaintiff, 
clear cur law covering what to do in a situation like this, where extra-contractual issues are 
ordered into arbitration, the risk to plaintiff of unfair prejudice is extraordinarily high. 
DATED this CP day of June, 2003 
Timothy Miguel Willardson 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
I hereby certify that I am employed by Timothy Miguel Willardson and that a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO STAY JUDGMENT PENDING APPEAL was 
mailed, first class postage prepaid as follows: 
James L. Christensen Sent via: 
CORBRIDGE B AIRD & CHRISTENSEN Y Mail 
39 Exchange Place, #100 J_ Facsimile (801) 534-1948 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 Hand-delivery 
DATED this [Q day of June, 2003. 
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77TU BRYAN J. WHATLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
BRUCE E. CHAPMAN, CEPJ CHAPMAN, 
and JAMES L. CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendants. 
RULING SETTING ASIDE THE 
DISMISSAL OF DEFENDANTS BRUCE 
E. CHAPMAN, CERI CHAPMAN, AND 
DOES I-V and ORDER 
Date: 10 November 2003 
Case No. 020405636 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
Division 5 
ipv> 
This matter came before the Court as it was preparing its ruling in a companion case, MM 
Properly Management, L.C. v World-Wide Photo, Inc., et. a!., our file no. "030400447. In its 
review of both matters, the Court became persuaded that it had incorrectly ruled as to the issue of 
the dismissal of three of the defendants in this matter. Therefore, the Court on its own motion 
has reviewed carefully the applicable statute and the Order Granting DefendantsJ Motions and 
Denying Plaintiff's Rule 56(f) Motion1 and now enters the following ruling: 
FACTS 
1. On April 23, 2003 the Court signed an Order Granting Defendants' Motions and 
Denying Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion (the "Order"). It was entered on April 29? 2003. 
2. The order, which was written by counsel for defendants, accurately reflected the 
Court's bench ruling of February 26, 2003 and ordered the following as the disposition of the 
case: 
]The Court notes that briefing is now complete on plaintiffs Motion 10 Slav Judgment 
Pending Appeal, however, neither party has filed a notice to submit so the Coun will not address 
said motion in this ruling. 
1 
(aj Plaintiffs motion for relief under Rule 56(f) was denied 
(b) Defendants' motion to compel arbitration was granted, 
©) Defendants' motion to dismiss James L Chnstensen from the case was 
granted, 
(d) The remaining defendants' motion to dismiss was granted 
3 The remaining defendants (Bruce E Chapman, Cen Chapman, and Does I-V) were 
dismissed because the lawsuit was based on a contract that contained a unequivocal and 
enforceable arbitration clause and because the Court believed that Utah Code Annotated §78-
3ia-4 gave discretion to a court to dismiss or sta> the lawsuit pending the outcome of arbitration 
4 The Court chose, both at the February 2003 hearing and in the April 2003 order, to 
dismiss the remaining parties from the lav suit and to send the parties to arbitration 
DISCUSSION 
Section 78-3 la-4 of the Utah Arbitration Act addresses the procedure that a court should 
follow when ordering pames into arbitration2 In subparagraph (3) it states "An order to submit 
an agreement to arbitration stays an) action or proceeding involving an issue subject to 
arbitration under the agreement If a motion is made in an action or proceeding, the order for 
arbitration shall include a stay of the action or proceeding " There is no other provision in the 
Utah Arbitration Act that would allow a court to dismiss a lawsuit pending arbitration 
This Court misinterpreted section 78-3 la-4 as giving the Court discretion to dismiss the 
2This portion of the Utah Code has been repealed and replaced with a more recent version 
of the Utah Arbitration Act in section 78-31a-101 through 78-31a-131 However section 78-
3la-4 still applies to the preseni action because the nov repealed arbitration act governs contracts 
signed before May 6, 2002, the contract involved m the present suit was signed on April 2, 2002 
lawsuit after ordenng arbitration The Court will now correct nself set aside the dismissal of the 
law suit as to the defendants othei than James L Chnstensen, and stay the lawsuit under section 
78-31a-4(3) of the Utah Arbitration Act until arbitration is complete 
The Court has also reviewed the other portions of the order and finds that the remaining 
portions of the ruling of April 29, 2003 are correct Defendant James L Chnstensen was 
properly dismissed, plaintiffs motion for relief under Rule 56(f) was properly denied, and 
defendants' motion to compel arbitration was properly granted This ruling only grants relief 
from the portion of the ordei that dismissed the remaining defendants (Bruce E Chapman, Cen 
Chapman, and Does I-V), according to the Conn's misinterpretation of section 78-31a-4(3j. 
ORDER 
1. The Court sets aside its previous order of April 29, 2003 onh a:, to the dismissal of 
defendants Bruce E, Chapman, Cen Chapman, and Does I-V 
2 The Court orders this case stayed pending the completion of arbitration proceedings 
3. All other portions of the April 29, 2003 order remain in effect. 
D 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing by mailing a true and exact copy thereof, 
postage prepaid on the \7 day of November, 2003 to 
James L Chnstensen 
Christopher G Jessop 
Corbndge Baird & Chnstensen 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2705 
Timothy Willardson 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
l^tyuty court clerk 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I Hereby Certify that I caused to be delivered as specified below, on the date specified 
below, two true and correct copies of the foregoing "ADDENDUM TO INITIAL BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT" to the following: 
James Christensen 
Corbridge, Baird & Christensen 
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